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CHAPTER I 	  	  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
November 8, 2012 began as an uneventful day in Argentine politics. In a country 
well known for its economic and political instability over the years, there were no pivotal 
elections approaching or economic crises erupting. No controversial votes would be cast 
in the Chamber of Deputies or Senate, nor did anyone anticipate an important 
announcement by President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Put simply, November 8, 
2012 seemed to be an unremarkable day in the history of Argentine democracy. It 
remained that way until Argentines got off work. 
At 7 o’clock that evening, hundreds of thousands of seemingly average citizens 
armed with pots and pans, homemade signs, and catchy anti-government chants took to 
the streets of Buenos Aires and cities across the country to protest against the current 
administration. Within fifteen minutes, 9 de Julio, the widest avenue in the world at 
fourteen lanes across, was inundated with protestors for block after block, and the famous 
Plaza de Mayo—the site of so many seminal moments in the nation’s political history—
was a pulsating sea of angry protestors. Indignant attendees voiced their dismay over 
President Kirchner’s rumored desire to reform the constitution and run for a third term, 
high perceived levels of insecurity and government corruption, and troubling signs of 
increasing inflation, amid alleged attempts by the government to manipulate official 
economic statistics. 
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According to newspaper reports, the event—dubbed “8N” for its ubiquitous 
Twitter hash tag, which began to appear a few days earlier announcing the 7 p.m. 
gathering—was one of the largest anti-government rallies since the country’s return to 
democracy in 1983, and marked the climax of growing discontent with a president that 
had only one year earlier garnered a healthy fifty-four percent of the vote in the first 
round of the presidential election.1 By 9 pm, the mass demonstration was over. While the 
protestors’ motivations were diverse, the rally’s organizing forces mysterious, and the 
exact number of protestors hotly debated (estimates for Buenos Aires alone ranged from 
70,000 to 700,000 by the government and opposition, respectively),2 one thing was clear 
– lots of Argentines had decided to take to the streets to effect change in their democracy, 
in an incredibly organized and succinct way. 
While 8N was perhaps the most dramatic example, it was only one event in an 
avalanche of contentious episodes in Argentine politics during the final months of 2012. 
On September 13, another massive cacerolazo had erupted in the capital city, as 
thousands of porteños converged on the Plaza de Mayo to voice many of the same 
grievances regarding the current government’s performance. Not even two weeks after 
8N, on November 20, union leaders called for the first general strike of Kirchner’s 
presidency, as truck drivers, public transit workers, and farmers alike stayed home from 
work and transformed the bustling city streets of Buenos Aires, Rosario, and Córdoba 
into ghost towns. On Monday December 3, rival subway worker’s unions clashed in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Clarín 2012: http://www.clarin.com/politica/multitudinaria-protesta-
Gobierno_0_807519384.html;  
Página 12 2012: http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-207606-2012-11-11.html 
Página 12 2012: http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-207606-2012-11-11.html 
2 La Nación 2012: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1525179-para-la-federal-fueron-solo-70000-
personas  
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heated debate over salary demands at a stop for the D-Line—an outcome of the on-going 
conflict regarding plans to transfer the subway system from the national government to 
the Buenos Aires city government in 2013—resulting in the closure of all subway lines 
and forcing the city’s one million daily metro passengers to seek alternative modes of 
transportation.  
While there is considerable variation in Latin America in the levels of enthusiasm 
for contentious politics, protest has frequently served as a vital form of political 
expression in countries across the region—particularly since democracy’s “third wave” 
began to spread throughout Latin America in the 1970s and 80s (e.g. Eckstein 2001, 
Boulding 2010, Bellinger and Arce 2011, Machado et al. 2012, Arce and Mangonnet 
2012). From marching against low wages, high gas prices, or run-down schools, to 
clamoring for democracy in the face of repressive authoritarian rule; from demanding the 
truth about war crimes committed under dictatorships, to organizing roadblocks in the 
name of indigenous autonomy, it seems that myriad important issues and events in the 
region’s recent history have been defined by instances of “politics in the streets.” 
In Bolivia, thousands of demonstrators called for and eventually achieved the 
deposal of a sitting president in 2003, and contentious participation has further 
crystallized as a common form of political voice in the country under the presidency of 
Evo Morales. The police riots in Ecuador in October 2010 offer yet another example of 
contentious politics having significant consequences for a Latin American regime, as 
hundreds of policemen angered by a reduction in government-paid bonuses threatened 
violence against the president, only to be restrained eventually by the military. The 
student protests for education reform in Chile had dire consequences for President 
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Sebastian Piñera’s approval ratings, and offer evidence that even one of the region’s more 
docile democracies historically is not immune to episodes of intense organized 
contention. Finally, ongoing street protests in Brazil that have centered on the exorbitant 
costs of staging the 2014 World Cup amid decaying transportation infrastructure, public 
schools, and hospitals, have recently cast a contentious light on the world’s most 
prominent sporting spectacle.  
This anecdotal evidence of heightened protest participation finds further support 
in recent survey data from the region. According to the findings from the 2008-2012 
AmericasBarometer surveys, conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) hosted by Vanderbilt University, nearly twenty percent of respondents (all 
voting age) have reported participating in a protest during the prior year to the survey in 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru, while more than one in ten citizens had protested in Haiti, 
Guatemala, Colombia, and Paraguay (Figure 1.1). In all of these countries, rates of 
protest have rivaled those of “conventional” participation—e.g. joining a political party 
or volunteering for a political campaign (LAPOP 2008-2012).  
However, not all Latin American democracies are as suffused with protests as 
these examples suggest. While protest seems to be a relatively common form of political 
voice in several Latin American regimes, it remains comparatively uncommon in 
countries like Panama, El Salvador, and Costa Rica (LAPOP 2008-2012; see Figure 1.1). 
In fact, in each of these countries fewer than six percent of respondents reported 
protesting in 2010. It seems that for every Latin American country that is engulfed in 
intense cycles of protest, there is another where contentious tactics are seldom utilized, 
and citizen participation is primarily channeled through formal political institutions. 
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Moreover, further variation in protest levels can be found within countries, as in the high 
protest country of Bolivia, where demonstrations are almost a daily occurrence in El 
Alto, but far less common only a dozen kilometers away in La Paz. 
 
Figure 1.1 Variation in Protest Participation across Latin America, 2008-20123 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 These numbers represent the percentage of individuals in each country that claimed to have 
participated in a protest march or demonstration during the previous year in 2008, 2010, and 
2012.  
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With this variation in mind, the following questions motivate my dissertation: 
Why does protest surface as a common form of political participation in certain contexts, 
but not others? Further, can we identify common factors at the national and sub-national 
levels to explain variation in protest across polities?  
 
A Roadmap 
 
In following chapter, I will review existing work from the contentious politics 
literature, particularly that which speaks to the basic question of “Why do people 
protest?” Then, I discuss the more specific challenges related to explaining varying levels 
of protest participation across contexts. Following this discussion, I propose my own 
explanation of variation in contentious politics in Latin American democracies – one that 
focuses on the link between representative political institutions and individual-level 
political behaviors. The chapter concludes with a discussion of my methodological 
approach to testing this theoretical perspective.   
This dissertation’s third chapter will be its first empirical one, focusing on the 
cross-national determinants of protest participation in Latin America democracies. In this 
chapter, I use multi-level modeling techniques to evaluate how second-level institutional 
characteristics interact with individual-level indicators of civic engagement to explain 
protest behaviors. By testing my own theory against contending paradigms from the 
contentious politics literature, this chapter offers one of the most thorough cross-national 
empirical studies of the determinants of contentious participation to date. Indeed, rather 
than finding support for dominant grievance-based explanations of protest or theoretical 
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perspectives couched solely within the resource mobilization or political opportunities 
traditions, I find that an interactive relationship between institutional context and civic 
engagement best explains why individuals across Latin America choose to protest.  
Chapter Four will begin the discussion of Argentina, as I attempt to trace the 
institutional roots of protest participation in that case from Carlos Menem’s election in 
1989 to the current Fernández de Kirchner government. I then narrow my focus to the 
provinces of Mendoza, Buenos Aires, and San Luis, drawing on dozens of interviews 
with citizen activists, movement organizers, and politicians. These interviews were 
conducted from March to June 2013 with support from a dissertation grant from the 
National Science Foundation (SES-1263807). In this particular chapter, I utilize the 
comparative method (Lijphart 1971) to examine how distinct institutional characteristics 
in each province have produced different trends in terms of protest participation. Through 
the interview process, I obtain a qualitative, nuanced perspective of protest in each 
province, as I endeavor to gain firsthand knowledge of how citizens view the political 
regimes they inhabit, and how those views govern their behaviors.   
In the fifth chapter, I proceed to analyze variation in protest activity across 
Argentine provinces. Using two sources of protest events data, I trace how characteristics 
of subnational democracies related to electoral competition and executive dominance 
produce different protest outcomes over the past twenty years. This chapter thus uses 
time series analytical tools and Poisson regression to observe how changes in political 
institutions might lead to shifts in protest activity over time, uncovering a curvilinear 
relationship between subnational democracy and contentious politics that echoes findings 
from the cross-national analysis.  
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This dissertation ends with a chapter on the implications and conclusions to be 
drawn from its findings, and avenues for future research. Few scholars have examined the 
consequences of varying levels of institutional quality for mass political participation in 
third wave democracies, making the research findings of this dissertation an important 
addition to our understanding of important political phenomena in the region. By 
connecting a growing trend in mass political behavior to specific features of Latin 
American democratic institutions, this dissertation sheds light on the ways in which 
political institutions shape how citizens engage the political system they inhabit. Further, 
I argue the key finding that intermediate levels of democratic quality—i.e. suboptimal 
institutions coupled with a highly mobilized citizenry—spur high levels of contentious 
activity at the national and subnational levels, calls for a recalibration of the received 
wisdom on the nexus between political institutions and contentious politics. 
In focusing on protest, this dissertation also speaks to a topic that is currently 
highly relevant to regimes outside the region under consideration. Given recent political 
upheaval in the Middle East, riots across Southern Europe, elevated protest participation 
in China and Russia, and the emergence of the Occupy Wall Street movement in the U.S., 
this project will speak to a more universal audience, contributing to a growing dialogue 
on a type of political participation that seems increasingly important in regimes of all 
types. The lessons drawn from Argentina and Latin America are certainly germane to 
other societies that are experiencing similar cycles of contentious politics, therefore 
making the findings from this dissertation relevant to students of protest and political 
behavior across the world. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
EXPLAINING PROTEST: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN CONTEXTUAL 
AND INDIVIDUAL LEVEL FACTORS 
 
 
''The looting is not about hunger. They are stealing alcoholic beverages. This is a 
political matter.'' 
- Argentine Interior Minister Ramón Mestre, December 20114 
 
 
Empirical work on variation in protest across countries has been limited, primarily 
owing to problems related to data availability. However, theoretical work and single-case 
studies on the roots of protest politics abound, offering rich source material for any 
budding project on the sources of protest participation. In this section, I attempt to 
provide a basic sketch of the current theoretical and empirical landscape, beginning with 
classic approaches and finishing with the latest frontiers in scholarly work on contentious 
politics. But first, this section begins with a brief treatment of the concept of “contentious 
politics,” laying the foundation for the rest of the literature review and the theory 
sections.  
 
Concept Formation: On “Contentious Politics” 
 
Generally, protest has fallen under the conceptual umbrella of “contentious 
politics,” a term coined nearly forty years ago to describe “disruptive,” or at least extra-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 New York Times, 2001: www.nytimes.com/2001/12/20/world/reeling-from-riots-argentina-
declares-a-state-of-siege.html 
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institutional, political behaviors (Tilly 1978). Therefore, to answer any question related to 
protest, one much first arrive at a clear conceptualization of what “contentious politics” 
actually means (which is easier said than done), and then decide where the phenomena of 
interest lie within that conceptual framework.  
Since contentious politics emerged as a burgeoning new field of study in the 
1960s, the term has been used to describe a vast array of “unconventional” forms of 
political behavior, such that the term itself has become somewhat vague. Indeed, 
“contentious politics” has come to encompass work on civil wars and ethnic conflict, 
social movements, mass demonstrations, strikes, and revolution and democratization – in 
other words, a category of political phenomena seemingly alike in their 
unconventionality, but dissimilar in virtually every other aspect.  
 Despite its nebulousness, scholars have continued to pursue a more parsimonious 
conceptualization of contentious politics, mostly for the purposes of cross-country 
comparison. For in-depth conceptual work on contentious politics, there is no better 
source than Charles Tilly, whose pioneering work on protest, revolutions, and social 
movements in European states has paced the literature for decades. Throughout his 
illustrious career, Tilly made contributions to virtually every sub-section of the 
contentious politics literature, making him one of the most important social scientists of 
the last half-century, and the unofficial guardian of the term “contentious politics,” along 
with his frequent co-authors Douglas McAdam and Sidney Tarrow. In their 2001 piece 
on the state of the literature, McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow define the term “contentious 
politics” as: 
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“… episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their 
objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to 
the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the 
claimants.” (2001; p. 438) 
 
 According to McAdam et al. (2007), contentious politics is characterized by three 
critical factors: 1) interactions, 2) claims, and 3) governments.  The term “interactions” 
describes the cluster of political actors who join together to make particular “claims”—
i.e., “calls for action on the part of some object that would, if realized, affect that object’s 
interests” (p. 261, McAdam et al. 2009). These claims are by definition either directed at 
actors within “governments,” the third crucial property of contentious politics, or have 
important consequences for governments as third parties. Oftentimes, according to 
McAdam et al. (2009), contentious politics entails citizens utilizing confrontational 
tactics directed at non-confrontational government entities, such as “routine public 
administration, organization of elections, military conscription, tax collection, 
appointment of officials, and disbursement of funds” (p. 262). However, the extent and 
nature of contentious politics are strongly conditioned by characteristics of political 
regimes.  
 Given the diverse nature of “contentious politics,” it would seem necessary to 
take a few steps down on the “ladder of abstraction” (Sartori 1970), as it relates to this 
particular dissertation project. Thus, in an effort to produce and empirically test a “middle 
range” theory (LaPalombara 1968), this dissertation will focus on a subset of contentious 
politics: public protests and demonstrations by civilians targeted at government actors in 
democratic polities. This particular conceptualization excludes civil war, intra-
institutional contention, and democratization or revolution, all of which fall within the 
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purview of contentious politics according to Tilly and his associates. The primary 
rationale for limiting my focus to this particular type of contentious politics lies in this 
dissertation’s focus on Latin America’s developing democracies. In contemporary Latin 
America (outside of Cuba), democracy is the dominant type of political regime, rendering 
democratization unnecessary and attempts at revolution nearly obsolete. Moreover, none 
of the Latin American countries examined here are currently experiencing civil war or 
prolonged militarized conflict.5 Thus, I confine my approach to studying these 
phenomena to political claims made via extra-institutional methods, aimed at actors 
within the regime in an effort to induce political reform.  
 
Classic Explanations of Protest 
 
For decades, scholars in the social sciences have sought to explain the emergence 
of mass protest movements. In particular, the topic received a considerable uptick in 
scholarly activity during and immediately after the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S. 
during the 1960s, and with the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization in the 
early 1970s (Huntington 1990). While the literature has certainly evolved over time, as 
some theoretical traditions have faded while others have consolidated as powerful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 While there have certainly been exceptions to these statements over the past thirty years – the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and the FARC in Colombia spring to 
mind – it seems that democracy has consolidated in Latin America to the extent that the debate 
has largely shifted from examining its durability to an increased focus on its quality throughout 
the region (e.g. Smith 2005, Levitsky and Murillo 2005, Levine and Molina 2011). Even when 
democratic norms and processes appear to be under assault (e.g. Chávez’s Venezuela), leaders 
often appeal to democratic ideals to sell constitutional reforms and infringements on political 
rights (Rodríguez-Vargas 2013). Moreover, the most notable militarized political conflicts have 
begun to fade in recent years, with the demise of the Sendero Luminoso and weakening of the 
FARC. 
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explanatory tools, many of the contending paradigms emerged contemporaneously, 
making for a useful comparison of the contributions and drawbacks of each theoretical 
approach. In this section, I briefly summarize what is an incredibly multifarious 
literature, touching on disaffected radicalism, resource mobilization, and political 
opportunities, among other theoretical traditions in the larger contentious politics 
literature. I then proceed to review the existing work on the Latin American context, and 
recent empirical treatments of the question of “Why do people protest?” across political 
regimes. 
 
Disaffected Radicalism  
Popular during the 1960s and 1970s, the “disaffected radicalism” thesis holds that 
protest is a response to extreme deprivation, and constitutes a rejection of the key 
representative institutions of the political system (Gurr 1970, Jenkins 1983, Dalton and 
van Sickle 2005). According to this line of thought, widespread political protest is a 
threat to the legitimacy of democracies, as citizens express discontent not with particular 
leaders or issues, but with the political system itself (Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aeslt 
2005). Gurr’s Why Men Rebel (1970) offers the classic articulation of this perspective, as 
the author argues that relative social and economic deprivation greatly increase the 
likelihood that mass protest will occur as an expression of discontent. According to Gurr, 
contentious forms of participation can emerge as viable options when citizens face 
“shifts” in grievances—e.g. an uptick in dire economic circumstances, racial oppression, 
or widespread government corruption (see also: Gusfield 1968). Put simply, it is the 
grievance itself that serves as the primary catalyst in producing mass protest, as 
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frustration and alienation incite violent, anti-state participation, which can in turn 
destabilize political systems.  
 According to this view of contentious politics as anti-state radicalism, protest 
substitutes for conventional participation (Muller 1979). That is, protestors generally 
come from destitute socioeconomic backgrounds, and do not take part in the political 
process through conventional channels like voting, party membership, and civic 
associations. Other scholars have drawn the connection between macro-level economic 
conditions—e.g. income and land inequality—and violent participation, asserting that 
protest can take root due to relative deprivation in poor countries (Muller and Seligson 
1987).  
 
Resource Mobilization 
Simultaneously, another significant literature began to gain traction in the 1960s 
and 70s based not on shifting grievances and relative deprivation, but the socioeconomic 
factors that underpin the formation and sustainability of social movements. Scholars 
adhering to this particular approach were classified under the banner of “resource 
mobilization theory”—or the idea that the primary determinants of whether or not social 
movements emerge and are successful lie in a particular movement’s access to 
organizational resources. For scholars adhering to this school of thought, grievances are 
viewed as a constant, while the driving mechanism behind movement formation is related 
to a change in how easy it is for “political entrepreneurs” to spread their message and 
mobilize support (Jenkins 1983; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977).  
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In particular, the resource mobilization school received a boon from studies on the 
U.S. Civil Rights movement that occurred in the 1960s. While in many ways, blacks in 
the U.S. encountered the same grievances they had faced during the decades preceding 
this time period, access to organizational resources changed drastically in the direct lead-
up to the Civil Rights movement. Indeed, it seemed that increased urbanization, the 
growth of historically black universities, and an expanding black middle class, led to the 
removal of traditional paternalistic social relations between (particularly Southern) whites 
and blacks, and paved the way for a thriving national movement (McAdam 1982; Jenkins 
1983). In sum, according to Jenkins, “the formation of movements is linked to 
improvements in the status of aggrieved groups, not because of grievances… but because 
these changes reduce the costs of mobilization and improve the likelihood of success.” (p. 
532; 1983).   
 
Political Opportunities 
The growing emphasis on non-grievance related determinants of protest 
eventually expanded into other areas beyond organizational resources—most notably, a 
focus on how political regimes influence the opportunities available to potential 
contentious actors. The “political opportunity structures” approach to the study of 
protest—i.e., the idea that a particular movement’s potential for mobilizing support and 
acquiring influence depends in large part on political context (e.g. Eisinger 1973; Tilly 
1978, 2006; Kitschelt 1986; Brockett 1991; Meyer 2004)—thus offers another approach 
to understanding how protest movements emerge and evolve, and how particular tactics 
take root in a given society.   
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Specifically, scholars operating within this theoretical construct seek to 
undercover the contextual mechanisms that allow previously unexpressed grievances to 
blossom. This might entail a focus on processes of democratization and political 
liberalization, or within existing democracies on the role of political parties, labor unions, 
or important legal decisions in structuring potential protest activity (McAdam 1982; 
Kitschelt 1986). Others have sought to compare regimes characterized by different levels 
of democratic “openness,” as several scholars have posited a curvilinear relationship 
between political openness and protest (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978, 2006). According to 
this logic, protest movements arise and flourish more frequently in moderately open 
regimes, where opposition is tolerated and widespread but representative institutions are 
not fully facilitative, than in regimes at either end of the openness spectrum (Tilly 1978; 
Muller and Seligson 1987). 
 
Latin American Accounts 
Moving on from the classic literature and zeroing in on contemporary 
explanations of protest, the comparatively high levels of protest in certain Latin 
American countries have not gone unnoticed by social scientists, who have spent a great 
deal of time studying particular episodes of mobilization in the post-transition era. In the 
mid-1990s, the scholarly consensus held that protest in Latin America would quiet down 
following the tumultuous transition period of the 1980s, as political parties came to 
replace social movements as the most important vehicles for participation (e.g. Hipsher 
1996; Eckstein 2001). However, numerous case studies of specific episodes of protest 
have found no such evidence of this predicted downturn. For example, we have studies of 
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social movements organized by the economic victims of neoliberal policies in Argentina 
and Peru (Auyero 2005; Levitsky and Murillo 2005; Arce 2008) and works on the rise of 
indigenous protest groups in Mexico, Central America, Ecuador and Bolivia (Yashar 
1999; Jung 2003; Lazar 2006). In sum, students of political science, sociology, and 
anthropology alike have documented the persistence of mass protest in countries across 
Latin America, focusing on a diverse array of political actors and contexts. 
However, as revealed by the pieces cited above, most of the research on protest in 
the region has dealt with particular movements or episodes of mass mobilization, 
favoring specific explanations over general ones.6 While this tendency raises obvious 
problems of generalizability, it has also reinforced the notion that instances of protest 
mobilization can be traced to a unique situation or set of grievances. Even comparative 
work on neoliberalism or economic crisis as a cause of mass mobilization essentially 
homes in on a specific type of policy-related complaint or injustice as the driving force 
behind movement formation, rather than making broader claims about the conditions that 
seem to give way to high levels of protest activity in some countries but not others (e.g. 
Vilas 2005, Levitsky and Murillo 2005, Silva 2009). 
 
Recent Cross-National Studies on Protest Participation 
In recent cross-national, quantitative work on the determinants of protest 
participation, theories focusing on specific grievances and political extremism have been 
widely rejected as invalid or at least not generalizable explanations of protest, as 
empirical evidence from primarily Western Europe and the U.S. (and some developing 
countries via the World Values Survey) has revealed that protestors are often educated, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 With the notable exception of Machado et al. 2012, which is discussed below.  
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middle-class citizens who seek to effect political change through non-traditional 
methods—a far cry from the “disaffected radical” described by Gurr, and much closer to 
the predictions made by adherents to the resource mobilization and political opportunities 
traditions (e.g. Inglehart 1990; Norris et al. 2005; Dalton et al. 2009). According to this 
perspective, high levels of protest activity in a given polity are the result not of extreme 
poverty or dissatisfaction with the regime, but of 1) the opportunities offered by political 
freedom in advanced democracies, 2) the post-materialist desire for self-expression, and 
3) increased access to resources for mobilization in developed democracies. An important 
implication of this argument is that perhaps we should observe the highest levels of 
protest participation in the most democratic contexts, contrary to the prior notion that 
protest arose from dire political and economic circumstances. 
Though an advance in our understanding of protests, this work too suffers from 
some flaws, especially when applied to Latin American democracies. First, empirical 
analyses based on the World Values Surveys (which include most of those mentioned 
above) do not measure protest participation with respect to a specific time period, instead 
relying on survey items that ask respondents if they have ever participated in a protest 
activity, and thus fail to gauge the current pervasiveness of contentious behaviors for a 
given year or time period.7 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the conventional 
understanding of protest throughout much of this work includes relatively tame forms of 
contention—e.g., petition-signing—as a form of protest, rather than the more aggressive, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The most recent version of the WVS questionnaire available online (2005) states that “during 
the last five years” has since been added to this question. However, all previous surveys—which 
have been used in the studies cited above—ask if respondents have ever participated in any of the 
enumerated activities without limiting responses to a certain time period. It would thus seem 
difficult to draw conclusions regarding the determinants of protest participation when one has no 
idea as to when the participation took place. 
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street-based forms of direct action that are predominant in Latin America. Finally, none 
of these studies has offered a comprehensive account of protest in emerging democracies, 
where the post-materialist conditions seen as causes of protest are less pervasive. Rather 
than protest being more likely where democracy is healthiest, I explore in this project the 
idea that it is precisely the flawed nature of many Latin American democracies that lies at 
the root of the region’s high levels of protest 
 
Another Answer? 
Though lacking extensive empirical work, the insights from the political 
opportunities literature seem highly germane to explaining protest in Latin America, a 
region populated by numerous moderately open or “hybrid” democratic regimes 
(Diamond 2002). While every country in the region aside from Cuba is widely 
characterized as a democracy, and peaceful forms of political participation are generally 
tolerated and even encouraged, Latin American regimes differ substantially in how 
effectively their formal political institutions channel participation. In other words, these 
regimes are open enough that groups are capable of organizing and sustaining contentious 
action without fear of harsh retribution, but often lack the institutional capacity to fully 
incorporate citizens into the policy-making process (e.g. O’Donnell 1993; Levitsky 2002; 
Gibson 2006). 
Recent work by Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi (2012; see also Przeworski 
2010) on institutions and street protests in Latin America offers the most relevant 
example of this approach being put into practice in an effort to explain cross-national 
variation in protest participation. In the authors’ view, widespread protest is a symptom 
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of low quality institutions, rather than specific grievances, political freedom, or post-
materialist political culture. Utilizing Latin American public opinion data from 2008 and 
aggregate measures of institutional quality for a set of seventeen Latin American regimes, 
they demonstrate that there is a strong positive correlation between institutional 
deficiencies and rates of protest activity, and that the individual-level characteristics of 
protestors differ a great deal across contexts. 
In some ways, the argument I outline in the following section echoes this 
theoretical approach, however there are several key distinctions. Most significant is my 
inclusion of mass-level political engagement—or access to mobilization structures—as a 
critical moderating factor, rather than relying solely on institutional weaknesses to 
explain variation in repertoires. Indeed, without an assessment of general patterns of 
political engagement among a citizenry, it becomes difficult to account for those contexts 
where institutions are weak, but protest activity is also very low. I also examine trends in 
protest participation both over time and within nations, thereby providing a “baseline” for 
a given society and moving beyond a snap-shot, cross-sectional approach. Below, I 
attempt to build on the literature summarized above, remedying some of the problems 
associated with existing explanations. 
 
Constructing a Theory of Protest in Latin America 
  
The goal of this dissertation is to understand why protest is so prevalent within 
certain democratic contexts but not others, and how second level regime characteristics 
interact with individual level factors to explain protest participation. In this section, I first 
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address the more general challenge of explaining levels of protest across countries, given 
the myriad moving parts involved in such an enterprise. This leads me to my own theory 
of protest in the Americas – one that focuses on the importance of political institutions 
and patterns of civic engagement in shaping individual-level protest behaviors.   
 
Explaining levels of protest across political contexts 
All studies seeking to explain protest participation ask, at a very basic level, 
“Why do some people choose to protest, while others do not?”  In many ways, this 
dissertation project is no different. At its root, this is a project that seeks to unravel why 
individual citizens engage their political systems in diverse ways across and within 
regimes. Put simply, I endeavor to explain why certain modes (or to use Tilly’s 
terminology, “repertoires”) of political participation are so common within certain 
contexts, yet infrequently utilized within other political regimes.  
 As seen in the literature review above, there are myriad aggregate-level economic 
and political factors that could influence protest behavior at the individual level. Indeed, 
whether they might be short-term economic crises, long-term transitions to democracy, or 
simply unresponsive politicians, the potential macro-level stimuli for the emergence of 
protest are impossibly vast. However, one might reasonably divide the contextual factors 
that might influence individual level protest behavior into four categories: grievances, 
representation, repression, and mobilizing structures. All of these four factors have been 
discussed at length in the protest literature, and this section will focus on how each might 
affect individuals’ choices to partake of contentious forms of participation—thus altering 
the decision-making calculus across countries and determining the extent to which protest 
	  22	  
takes hold in a given society. I present the four categories sequentially, to approximate 
the process by which grievances might translate into contentious behaviors.   
  
1. Grievances: The initial stimuli 
The first, and perhaps most obvious, contextual influence on protest participation 
is the overriding grievance. Almost any historical treatment of a particular instance of 
mass mobilization attributes that movement’s existence to a particular motivating 
complaint or criticism. Intuitively, this perspective makes a great deal of sense. If 
contemplating what drives an individual citizen to attend a protest demonstration or join a 
social movement, it seems fairly self-evident that in the absence of some sort of 
motivating claim, that individual would not engage in contentious political behaviors 
(unless to benefit some sort of political elite in a pseudo-clientelistic exchange; see 
Auyero 2012). When aggregated to the country level, one might therefore expect that 
potential grievance-producing conditions should also foment high levels of protest 
participation, as citizens are confronted with more fodder for contentious claim making. 
 When considering what contextual factors influence individual behavior, scholars 
must consider how the claim itself emerged, and how that claim might drive individuals 
to action. At the aggregate level, certain large-scale economic shocks have clearly had 
mobilizing effects on citizenries throughout history. For example, it would be impossible 
to explain the explosion of protest participation that occurred in Argentina during the 
1999-2002 economic crisis, or in Spain throughout the 2008-2012 economic recession, 
without referencing the massive influence those national crises had on individual 
citizens’ quality of life.  
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The existence of a motivating grievance is undoubtedly an important part of the 
“Why do people protest?” equation. Put simply, in a world devoid of grievances, 
individual citizens would have no reason to question or object to the actions of 
government. Unfortunately, no such idyllic political regime exists in the real world. 
Citizens of every country inevitably have reasons to expect more from their government, 
and even if the objective direness of the grievance might differ substantially depending 
on the regime—e.g., a comparison between recent pro-democracy protests in Syria and 
student protests in Chile—there are endless possibilities in terms of claims that might 
mobilize protest in different political regimes. Moreover, studies have shown over the 
years that in many cases, the political regimes characterized by the most ostensibly 
protest-inducing conditions—e.g. severe state repression, extreme poverty, or high 
inequality—are rarely home to the highest levels of protest (Dalton et al. 2009).  
In sum, grievances matter. But to adequately explain why rates of protest 
participation are high in some democratic regimes and low in others, one has to go 
beyond grievances – indeed, there are too many cases where “extreme” grievances are 
present and protest does not result, or where “minor” grievances produce massive 
mobilization – to base one’s explanation entirely on these initial stimuli. While a 
motivating claim on the government might be necessary for an individual to take to the 
streets, it is not sufficient. 
 
2. Representation: What options are there for redressing grievances?  
After identifying the grievance(s), the next step in tracing the impact of context on 
individual-level behaviors is evaluating the representational outlets available for the 
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aggrieved to make claims on their government. In making this evaluation, questions 
abound. Is the regime a democracy, where representatives are expected to listen to 
constituents and voice concerns on their behalf, or is it an authoritarian regime devoid of 
meaningful feedback mechanisms for political leaders? If the country is a democracy, 
what are the most commonly utilized avenues for the airing and potential reparation of 
grievances? Are institutional actors generally “responsive” (Eulau and Karps 1977), or is 
the process of rectifying claims inefficient and/or inconsequential?  
Even in democracies, the potential vehicles for pursuing the redress of grievances 
differ greatly depending on the nature of the grievance and the characteristics of political 
institutions in the regime. For example, in certain cases, citizens might seek out local 
municipal authorities to make their claims, while in other cases claims are directed at 
national actors, including legislatures, political parties, and even the executive branch. 
Whether in subnational or national regimes, regular elections inevitably serve as a way to 
voice grievances and seek a response from government in any democracy (Schumpeter 
1976). 
 In cases where institutions serve to effectively channel citizens’ claims and 
eventually respond to them, one might expect that formal political institutions render 
contentious behaviors less necessary. However, in cases where those institutional 
channels do not exist, or they are ineffective in producing meaningful government action, 
it would seem that protest could emerge as a viable form of political expression. In other 
words, high quality democratic institutions should serve to diminish the need for 
contentious action, while low quality institutions might push individuals to explore other 
options for receiving the government responsiveness they desire. Indeed, democratic 
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institutions that promise viable mechanisms for representation but fail to deliver will 
likely induce higher levels of contentious politics than if there were no such 
representative institutions in the first place.   
 
3. Repression: If one decides to protest, what are the consequences? 
Another crucial factor to consider when evaluating how regime characteristics 
might condition mass level behaviors is the degree of political repression found within 
that context. In certain regimes, public demonstrations that challenge authority are strictly 
forbidden, in some cases to the extent that protesting is a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment. In other contexts, institutional actors—i.e., political parties, trade unions, 
or individual politicians—actively work to mobilize protest participation on behalf of 
their interests and those of their followers. The extent to which public claims on 
government are allowed or even encouraged is thus an important component of any 
explanation of levels of contentious activity across polities (Tilly 1978; Muller and 
Seligson 1987).  
 In contexts that exhibit high levels of political repression—think Soviet Russia or 
North Korea—protest participation is likely to be limited generally, even if grievances 
are plentiful and no institutional actors are available for voicing those grievances, due to 
state repression of any potential challenge to the regime. Indeed, only in regimes that are 
at least partially open can protest movements emerge and thrive, making some minimum 
level of democracy often necessary for high levels of contentious politics to be present. 
However, if repression is used temporarily in a semi-open regime, it is possible that it 
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serves not to discourage protest, but to shift the strategies of protestors, pushing them to 
adopt more violent protest technologies (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998).  
 
4. Mobilizing Structures: What organizational framework is available to structure 
collective claim making? 
Finally, the existence of mobilizing structures that can be utilized for fomenting 
widespread contention are crucial to the emergence of protest in a particular society. 
Even when high-protest conditions are otherwise in place – grievances are present, 
representative outlets are suboptimal, and political repression is low or sporadic – 
potentially contentious actors still require the organizational resources necessary to 
mobilize groups of citizens behind a particular cause. Without established organizational 
structures via labor unions, political parties, churches/religious groups, or community 
advocacy organizations, grievances might go unvoiced and potential movements 
thwarted. Scholars from the resource mobilization tradition have frequently demonstrated 
that these organizational apparatuses are crucial to fomenting protest activity, and that 
individuals with connections to mobilizing structures are the most likely protestors 
(Schussman and Soule 2005).  
Of the four factors listed above, representation and mobilizing structures emerge 
as the two most likely factors explaining rates of protest participation across democratic 
contexts in Latin America for several reasons. First, as mentioned above, grievances 
themselves are rarely useful predictors of protest participation, as often times the worst 
grievances result in little mobilization while seemingly minor grievances can provoke 
massive protest participation. Second, levels of repression are very important in 
	  27	  
explaining the differences in rates of participation across democratic and authoritarian 
regimes, but in democratic countries repression is by definition low. For example, though 
China’s high levels of political repression serve to squelch protest activity domestically, 
whereas Greece’s low levels of repression allow protest movements to flourish, these 
considerable differences are not as present in a region full of at least minimally 
democratic countries like Latin America.8 
On the other hand, representative institutions and mobilizing structures vary 
greatly in Latin America, which lends considerable explanatory power to these two 
factors. Below, I argue that while grievances and repression should be viewed as fairly 
constant when considering Latin American democracies, institutions and mobilizing 
structures drive the vast differences we observe in terms of protest across the region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Recent events in Venezuela might indicate a shift towards increased government repression of 
social movements and street demonstrations; however, the empirical analysis conducted in this 
dissertation extends only to 2012, when state repression was a less common occurrence in the 
country. 
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Figure 2.1. The Protest Checklist: Contextual Determinants of Protest Participation 
 
 
Political Institutions, Civic Engagement, and Protest Participation in Latin 
America: Theory and Hypotheses 
 
The often-sharp, cross-national variation we observe in protest participation 
across Latin America requires a focus on how political context interacts with individual 
level factors to influence the rise of contentious politics. Specifically, I argue that 
ineffective political institutions in nascent democratic regimes precipitate more radical 
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3. Low threat of 
repression? 
4. Mobilizing 
structures? 
5. PROTEST 
NO PROTEST 
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modes of political participation, as governments’ ability to deliver on citizens’ 
expectations fails to match the capacity for mobilization of increasingly active democrats. 
Thus, where institutional performance is low—e.g., high corruption, undisciplined 
political parties, and low legislative effectiveness—but political engagement via 
mobilizing structures is high—i.e. widespread interest in politics and participation in civil 
society—radical mass protest can become “normalized” owing to the inability of formal 
political institutions to adequately channel and respond to the demands of an increasingly 
knowledgeable and participatory citizenry. 
Following this line of thought, individuals utilize protest as a means of exerting 
their influence more forcefully on the regime, given their lack of efficacy operating 
through conventional channels. When this style of demand making persists over time, 
protest eventually becomes an integral component of everyday political life. That is, 
citizens active in traditional modes of participation become the most likely protesters, and 
political elites attempt to mobilize contentious participation on behalf of their policy 
initiatives. Thus, contrary to the commonly-held notions that protest movements are 
either largely led by economically deprived segments of society that have long withdrawn 
from the political arena (e.g. Gurr’s 1970 grievance-based theory), or that protest is a 
healthy byproduct of liberal democracy and economic development (e.g. Dalton et al. 
2009), I argue that in contemporary Latin America, protest has become part of the 
“repertoire” (Tilly 1978) of conventional participation utilized by politically active 
citizens and elites in systems devoid of effective representative institutions. 
The specific mechanisms that determine how well regimes channel and respond to 
popular demands can be found in existing representative institutions, and include the 
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number and quality of political parties, the capacity of legislatures to form coalitions and 
enact policies, and perceived levels of corruption present in formal institutions (Kitschelt 
1986; Przeworski 2010). Political institutions in Latin American democratic systems vary 
greatly in terms of their ability to offer a high quality representational outlet for their 
population, and their capacity to translate citizens’ policy preferences into government 
output. For example, while political parties have been relatively disciplined and 
predictable in countries like Chile and Costa Rica, party platforms vacillate wildly in 
countries like Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador. Though Brazil has in recent years 
demonstrated the ability to form working coalitions in Congress, gridlock has been the 
norm in Bolivia, with President Evo Morales and his party pitted in a constant struggle 
against opposition legislators.9 These examples highlight the extent to which regimes 
differ in their ability to absorb citizens’ preferences and produce representative public 
policy, and it is this variation that I see as critical to understanding varying levels of 
protest in the region. 
 
Table 2.1. Institutional Sources of Mass Protest Participation 
Institutional Characteristic Mechanism 
 
Party Institutionalization 
Where party institutionalization is low, with 
inconsistent platforms and little party 
discipline, contentious participation is more 
likely, as citizens lose faith in formal modes 
of representation.  
 
Legislative Effectiveness 
When Congress is mired in gridlock and 
functional legislative coalitions fail to 
surface, citizens (and thus elites) might seek 
extra-institutional solutions.  
 
Political Corruption 
When formal institutions and politicians are 
delegitimized by corruption scandals, 
cynicism about the viability of “traditional” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  A la current U.S. politics, where we certainly are seeing more protests as well.	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participation translates into protest.  
 
Executive Dominance 
Where the president holds ultimate power 
over important policy decisions, the 
opposition will be galvanized to protest due 
to their lack of faith in formal representation. 
Defenders of the president will also be 
motivated to take to the streets.   
 
 
My focus on political engagement—via mobilizing structures like mass-based 
parties, labor unions, and community organizations—as a moderating variable in this 
process speaks to the literature on resource mobilization and protest (e.g. McCarthy and 
Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Jenkins 1983), which argues that the formation and survival of 
protest movements depends in large part on the political resources available to 
contentious actors. While political (or “civic”) engagement might seem like a synonym 
for participation itself, rather than part of a causal explanation of protest, it in fact refers 
to the extent to which citizens are knowledgeable about and interested in political issues, 
and how connected they are to the types of social and political networks that can serve to 
foment collective action. The degree of political engagement in a given context is thus 
well measured by survey items used to gauge political interest and knowledge, 
membership in community organizations, and connectedness to political parties, via 
traditional or clientelistic modes of interaction. In contexts where institutions are high 
performing, we would expect that highly engaged citizens would participate in politics 
primarily through formal (or “conventional”) vehicles. However, where representative 
institutions are weak, I argue that high levels of political engagement give rise to 
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contentious modes of participation, as formal institutions do not adequately channel 
participation. 
 
Table 2.2. Expectations: The Interaction between Institutions and Political 
Engagement 
 Effective Institutions Ineffective Institutions 
High engagement Low protest/High levels of 
formal participation 
(e.g. Uruguay, Costa Rica) 
High protest/Low or 
ineffective formal 
participation 
(e.g. Argentina, Perú, 
Bolivia) 
Low engagement Low protest/Elite-
dominated politics 
(e.g. Panama) 
Low protest/Machine-style 
participation through formal 
vehicles 
(e.g. El Salvador, 
Guatemala) 
 
Put simply, I argue that political protest is more likely to become a normalized 
tool of political participation in democracies where engagement among citizens is high 
and institutional performance is low. Where these conditions persist, contentious politics 
can be absorbed into a society’s repertoire of collective action and utilized regardless of 
the specific characteristics of the grievance being expressed, and even under conditions 
where institutions might have actually improved.10 Below, I outline three general 
hypotheses that emerge from this theoretical perspective: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Where basic freedoms are guaranteed and citizen participation is 
relatively open and widespread, yet formal representative institutions fail to adequately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This assertion echoes Tilly (1978) and Tarrow’s (1998) work on repertoire change—i.e. that it 
occurs slowly, over long periods of time.  
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channel citizens’ demands, contentious action emerges as a vital form of political 
participation. 
 
Specifically, I expect that fragmented party systems, ineffective legislatures, and 
high corruption should correlate with high levels of contentious mobilization at the 
national level, as should high levels of executive dominance or weak rule of law. This 
first hypothesis implies an interactive relationship between the strength of representative 
political institutions and the degree to which citizens are engaged in political life (see 
Table 2.2). In other words, where democratic political institutions are weak, yet the 
populace is not particularly informed about or engaged in political life—e.g. there is low 
political interest, depressed turnout, and/or scarce participation in civic organizations—
there is no reason to expect that protest movements will gain traction. Likewise, where 
institutions are high-functioning and the population is politically active, aggressive 
modes of participation are not needed for citizens to feel efficacious. However, where 
there are low-performing institutions and a high degree of political awareness and 
involvement among the citizenry, protest can normalize as a standard form of political 
voice. I address this hypothesis in Chapter III, IV, and V. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Where formal modes of policymaking are deemed ineffective, civically 
engaged citizens in particular – whether through parties, unions, or NGOs – will adopt 
more contentious tactics than they do in high-performing democracies.  
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In other words, where formal policymaking institutions are seen as ineffective and 
inconsequential (due to any of the shortcomings enumerated above), and citizens thus 
cease to view them as legitimate, individuals involved in organizations within civil 
society are likely to adopt more radical tactics in pursuing their goals. In this vein, 
Machado et al. argue in their 2011 paper that actors (i.e. unions, parties, etc.) who “have 
little or no chance of having their interests taken into account in the formal decision-
making process” are more likely to use protest to influence policymakers than 
organizations operating in more high-functioning democratic contexts (p. 11).11  Thus, in 
societies where formal institutions are delegitimized, members of political organizations 
are forced outside of the realm of “traditional participation” and adopt more radical 
modes of behavior (Boulding 2010). 
One important implication of this hypothesis—that political organizations and 
even elites utilize protest for their own ends in societies where contentious politics has 
normalized—is that politicians will marshal public support for their policy agenda by 
recruiting party members and other citizens to participate in protests. In other words, 
protests are used by powerful political actors to apply pressure to relevant policymakers 
(e.g., the president or national legislature), en lieu of more formal modes of bargaining 
and debate, which have been deemed ineffectual by elites themselves. Moreover, when 
contentious politics has achieved this degree of primacy in domestic political life, the 
under-the-table tactics addressed in the literature on clientelism that are utilized to drum 
up political support (e.g. vote-buying, conditional cash transfer payments, and patronage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Also see Scartascini and Tommasi (2012) for a more thorough examination of institutionalized 
vs. non-institutionalized policymaking.  
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appointments) will also be used to solicit protest participation (Mangonnet and Moseley, 
working paper). I test this hypothesis in Chapter III.  
 
Hypothesis 3: While institutional deficiencies can trigger protest participation in certain 
cases, political regimes can also become so closed off that they render contentious 
participation too costly. 
 
At a certain point, the limitation of opportunities for political expression becomes 
so complete that individuals can neither organize themselves nor hope that potential 
contentious actions on their part would have any influence on policymakers. That is, 
where the democratic promise of representation ceases to exist, so too does the 
motivation to take to the streets in demand of change. The argument that bad institutions 
generate protest is thus limited to democratic contexts, meaning a curvilinear relationship 
exists between political openness and protest. This hypothesis is tested in Chapters IV 
and V.  
 
Hypothesis 4: When institutions fail to improve in terms of transparency and 
responsiveness, protest can take hold as a standard form of political participation, akin 
to voting or volunteering for a political campaign.  
 
In these so-called “social movement societies” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998), where 
protest is firmly entrenched in the country’s participatory culture and utilized as a 
primary representational vehicle, contentious behavi
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active democrats and even political elites. In other words, once citizens who are 
interested and active in politics regularly utilize protest to achieve their desired end and 
politicians themselves mobilize protest on behalf of their policy initiatives, societies can 
settle on an equilibrium state where protest remains high regardless of the specific 
grievance. I come back to this hypothesis in Chapters IV and V. 
 
Testing the Theory: Triangulating Measures, Levels of Analysis, and 
Methodological Approaches 
 
This is a comparative dissertation, attempting to test a generalizable theory of 
protest across diverse political regimes to draw causal inferences regarding the role of 
political institutions in moderating levels of contentious political participation. However, 
it is not a simple cross-national comparison that will serve as the empirical basis of this 
project. Indeed, the primary methodological objective of this dissertation project will be 
to triangulate methodological approaches and data sources in an effort to provide the 
soundest test possible of the theoretical framework outlined above. The principal strength 
of triangulating methodological approaches is that by corroborating the findings from an 
analysis of one set of units—or one measure of a particular concept—with findings from 
another data source, a scholar can become more confident that the theory she claims 
explains the relationship between X and Y is valid and borne out in empirical data (King 
et al. 1994). While more specific description of methodological choices will be reserved 
for the coming chapters, this section will serve as a more general discussion of the 
methodological orientation of this dissertation. 
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Triangulating Measures of Protest Participation 
The key dependent variable in this dissertation is protest—a notoriously difficult 
and controversial phenomenon to conceptualize and measure. As outlined above, 
according to the most commonly cited definition (Tilly and Tarrow 2006), protest is 
understood as the use of disruptive, extra-institutional techniques by actors who seek to 
make a particular claim, in which governments emerge as targets, initiators, or third 
parties of those claims. Naturally, this type of definition raises serious questions about 
operationalization. Almost by definition, protests do not occur on a regular schedule, nor 
are they officially registered and documented.  
From a practical standpoint, when it comes to measuring protest, scholars 
interested in conducting quantitative research on the topic are left with two realistic 
options: 1) event counts data of protests, usually culled from newspaper articles, and 2) 
individual-level participation data based on surveys of citizens. This dissertation will 
utilize both types of data in an effort to “triangulate” and carry out a more thorough 
empirical evaluation of my theoretical approach and its implications, thus increasing the 
explanatory power of my theory. For the individual-level data, I look to the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project’s 2008, 2010, and 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys. 
Depending on the year, the AmericasBarometer covers up to twenty-six Latin American 
and Caribbean countries from Mexico to Argentina, and over 40,000 individual 
interviews. Each of these surveys included an extensive battery of questions on protest 
behavior, aimed to gauge whether or not citizens protested, how often they protested, and 
what types of tactics they tended to utilize.  
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As for the protest events data, I turn to datasets compiled by two separate 
Argentine think tanks: the Programa de Investigación sobre el Movimiento de la 
Sociedad Argentina (PIMSA) and Nueva Mayoría. Each of these Buenos Aires-based 
organizations has collected information on protest events since the early-1990s for each 
of the country’s twenty-three provinces and its autonomous capital, and generously has 
granted me access to these data. Thus, these two sources offer coverage of nearly twenty 
years of contentious activity across twenty-four subnational units, making for a 
subnational protest dataset of unprecedented temporal and geographic breadth. By 
combining a cross-national analysis of protest participation using survey data with this 
subnational analysis of Argentine protest using two sources of event counts data, this 
dissertation will thus triangulate multiple measures of protest in conducting the 
quantitative portion of the analysis.   
 
Triangulating Levels of Analysis 
As mentioned in the section above, this dissertation will also combine analyses of 
protest participation across levels—notably, a cross-national analysis of survey data and a 
subnational analysis of events counts data. Testing my theoretical approach across levels 
of analysis is important for several reasons. By conducting a cross-national analysis, I 
aim to put forth a more general test of my argument, testing concepts that can potentially 
travel to other national contexts outside of Latin America (Sartori 1970). By carrying out 
an in-depth subnational analysis of protest in Argentina, this dissertation provides 
increased specificity regarding one particular national case, while at the same time 
avoiding the “whole nation bias” that can sometimes emerge in purely cross-national 
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studies, and shedding light on the importance of subnational political institutions in 
shaping individual level political behaviors in Latin America (Rokkan 1970, Snyder 
2001; Fox 1994, Hiskey and Bowler 2004, Falleti 2010).  
Beyond simply serving as a subnational counterpart to the cross-national analysis, 
recent events in Argentina make it an intriguing puzzle for students of contentious 
politics. Even prior to the recent surge in contentious activity during the last quarter of 
2012, the contemporary political climate there has been one of heated conflict, including 
widespread and oftentimes violent protest. Motivated by sundry grievances throughout 
the past decade, Argentines have taken to the streets regularly, banging pots and pans in 
the Plaza de Mayo, installing roadblocks throughout the country, and occupying factory 
and office buildings (Auyero 2006). In 2009 alone, there were over 5,000 roadblocks 
nationwide, frequently bringing everyday life to a screeching halt (Nueva Mayoría). 
Nearly one-third of Argentines reported that they had taken part in a protest in 2008, 
placing Argentina second in the Americas in protest participation behind only Bolivia 
(LAPOP 2008).  
The frequency and intensity of protests alone make Argentina a critical case in the 
study of protest behavior. One additional feature of Argentine democracy, though, makes 
it an ideal laboratory for examining the relationship between institutions and protest. 
Argentina is home to one of Latin America’s most (in)famous federal systems, with vast 
differences in democratic quality found among the country’s twenty-three provincial 
governments and autonomous capital (e.g. Chavez 2004, Spiller and Tommasi 2009). 
Given this variation in provincial-level political regimes and institutions, a subnational 
analysis of the role provincial political institutions play in shaping participatory 
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repertoires offers a quasi-experimental setting that will allow for tremendous analytical 
leverage in my efforts to uncover the institutional determinants of protest—even more so 
than at the country level.  
 
Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches 
Finally, this dissertation will also meld the rigorous quantitative techniques 
alluded to above with a crucial qualitative component as well. Each of these two major 
methodological approaches offers clear advantages in any effort to draw causal 
inferences, and used complimentarily provide a more well-rounded treatment of the 
political phenomena one seeks to explain. The quantitative approach allows for the 
examination of a larger number of cases and variables, permitting one to increase the 
amount of variance on the independent and dependent variables and control for 
alternative explanations (Lijphart 1971, King et al. 1994, Jackman 1985). This ability to 
systematically assess multiple causes and potential interaction effects (or second level 
effects of political institutions in the case of this dissertation) is crucial to scientific 
inference, and only attainable via quantitative analysis (Lieberson 1991). The large-N 
quantitative approach also offers a more effective means of avoiding selection bias—in 
the case of this dissertation, every major country in Latin America and the Caribbean 
minus Cuba will be included in the analysis, as well as every province in Argentina 
(Geddes 1990). Finally, the quantitative approach provides for probabilistic explanations, 
while also offering quantified estimates of uncertainty via confidence intervals and error 
terms (Jackman 1985, Lieberson 1991). 
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The qualitative approach also has its own set of distinct advantages. Through 
small-N comparisons of units or case studies, the qualitative approach is capable of 
generating valid “mid-level” concepts that are thoroughly crafted, but can also travel 
(Almond 1968, Sartori 1970). Through the use of specific qualitative strategies like 
Mill’s methods of difference and agreement (also referred to as the most-similar/different 
designs by Przeworski and Teune (1970)), qualitative scholars can closely compare two 
units in an effort to eliminate explanations or necessary and sufficient conditions 
(Savolainen 1994, Mahoney 2007). Qualitative approaches can also be more adept at 
avoiding problems regarding the quality of data, as researchers have a closer knowledge 
of the data with which they are working and can prevent problems like the whole-nation 
bias (e.g. Linz and De Miguel 1966). 
To better understand the Argentine case, I have carried out interviews with four 
groups of actors across the country: citizen activists, journalists, local academics, and 
politicians. These interviews took place in the provinces of Mendoza, Buenos Aires, and 
San Luis and the national capital, and provide the qualitative data for three in-depth case 
studies of protest behavior and a more nuanced understanding of the cross-provincial 
quantitative analyses. Perhaps most importantly, in a case study of Argentina based 
primarily on how macro-level provincial factors influence aggregate levels of protest 
participation, these interviews provide a crucial window into the individual-level 
motivations underpinning citizens’ decisions to take to the streets or not and the strategic 
choices of opinion leaders. 
Distinct institutional environments and wide variations in levels of contentious 
activity characterize the provinces of Mendoza, Buenos Aires, and San Luis. Mendoza is 
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widely viewed as one of Argentina’s most democratic provinces (Chavez 2004; 
Gervasoni 2010; Wibbels 2005) and is home to a highly competitive political 
environment and high quality representative institutions. Conversely, the neighboring 
province of San Luis is infamous as one of the country’s most authoritarian subnational 
political systems (Chavez 2004), with one family—the Rodríguez Saá—occupying the 
governorship since democratization in 1983 and controlling the only major local 
newspaper (Gervasoni 2010). Buenos Aires, the largest province in the country according 
to population, lies somewhere in between its two western counterparts with a relatively 
open and competitive political environment but low quality institutions. Recently, it has 
placed host to a number of important uprisings, including the standoff between 
agriculture and the Kirchner government in 2008 that produced nearly two thousand 
protests in Buenos Aires province alone (Cotarelo 2010). These provinces thus present an 
ideal opportunity to employ Mill’s classic method of agreement (1843), isolating key 
differences in terms of political institutions while holding constant basic structural, 
socioeconomic, and cultural characteristics such as economic activities, development 
levels, and religion in an effort to parse out the causal mechanisms driving variation in 
protest activity across subnational political systems.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
CONTENTIOUS ENGAGEMENT: UNDERSTANDING PROTEST IN LATIN 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES 
 
 
In 2008, there were 5,608 roadblocks across Argentina (Nueva Mayoría 2009). In 
a representative national survey conducted in early 2008, one-third of Argentines 
reported having taken part in a protest the year prior to the survey, placing Argentina 
second in the Americas in protest participation behind only Bolivia (LAPOP 2008). In 
July, a months-long standoff between the government and the country’s powerful 
agrarian sector over a proposed increase in export taxes on agricultural items, the issue 
behind many of the roadblocks, came to a head when the vice president—feeling pressure 
from protestors across the nation—voted against the government’s proposal in a tie-
breaking vote in the Senate.  
During the same year, the Argentine economy grew by about seven percent, 
representing yet another calendar year of impressive progress in the wake of the 
country’s devastating 2001-2002 economic crisis (World Bank 2009). Also in 2008, 
Argentines celebrated twenty-five years of uninterrupted democratic rule—the longest 
continuous democratic run in the nation’s history. According to the same 2008 survey 
(LAPOP), by at least one measure, Argentines ranked as the most democratic populace in 
Latin America—and even ahead of the United States—with eighty-seven percent of 
respondents viewing democracy as the best form of government.12 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 While the Argentine interviews were conducted face to face, the surveys in the United States 
were carried out online. Argentina scored an 86.9 out of 100 in terms of support for democracy as 
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In many ways, 2008 was a bellwether year for Argentina from an economic and 
political perspective—yet paradoxically, it was also perhaps the most contentious in 
recent history. However, Argentina is not alone in Latin America in its enthusiasm for 
politics in the streets. Despite widespread belief that contentious protests would shift 
from being the norm to becoming the exception with the consolidation of democracy (e.g. 
Hipsher 1998, Eckstein 2001) and passage of purportedly demobilizing neoliberal 
reforms (e.g. Kurtz 2004, Oxhorn 2009), the past decade is peppered with examples of 
large-scale protest movements across Latin America, many of which have had important 
consequences for democratic politics in the region (Bellinger and Arce 2011). In 2003 
and 2005 in Bolivia, thousands of demonstrators called for and eventually achieved the 
deposal of a sitting president, and contentious participation has further crystallized as a 
common form of political voice in the country during the presidency of Evo Morales. In 
2011 in Chile, student protests swept across what had been thought to be one of the 
region’s more docile countries in terms of protest, having drastic consequences for the 
approval ratings of President Sebastian Piñera. And, in 2013, Venezuela and Brazil 
assumed the spotlight—Venezuela for the mass demonstrations that occurred following 
the election to replace fallen president Hugo Chávez, and Brazil for the spontaneous anti-
government rallies that swept the country during an important international soccer 
tournament.  
If a casual observer of Latin American politics assumed there was a band of 
disgruntled demonstrators banging pots and pans on every street corner south of the Rio 
Grande, it would be hard to blame her. Yet the reality is that for every Latin American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the best form of government, while the U.S. average was 78.4. The difference is statistically 
significant at the p<.05 level and adjusted for design effects.  
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country that is engulfed in intense cycles of protest, there appears another where 
contentious tactics are seldom utilized, and citizen participation is primarily channeled 
through formal political institutions. Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Panama are examples of 
countries where rates of protest participation seldom top five percent in cross-national 
surveys of the region and, the more recent episodes of contentious movements 
notwithstanding, Chile and Brazil have rarely registered high numbers of demonstrators 
either (LAPOP 2008-2012). Region wide, only eight percent of Latin Americans 
interviewed in 2012 reported having protested in the previous year—a relatively small 
portion of the overall population when compared to participation rates in other political 
activities (LAPOP 2012). 
These highly disparate trends in protest activity across Latin America offer an 
important opportunity to better understand the determinants of contentious politics in a 
region where much of the existing research suggests we should find very little. Why has 
protest participation exploded in certain countries while not in others in recent years? 
More specifically, how do individual and country level characteristics interact to explain 
why some individuals protest, while others do not?  
In this chapter, I try to answer these questions through a focus on the interaction 
between individuals’ access to organizational resources and institutional context. I argue 
first that ceterus peribus, civically engaged citizens are more likely to protest than those 
individuals with low levels of involvement in politics. Thus one element to understanding 
protest across Latin America in recent years can be found in the region’s socioeconomic 
and demographic trends that find higher percentages of educated, formally employed, and 
socially connected individuals than at any time in the region’s history.  However, this is 
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only part of the story.  For while these citizens will channel their energies through formal 
modes of political participation in political systems with strong, reasonably well-
functioning representative institutions, the same individuals are more likely to turn to 
protest when living in countries where political institutions fail to provide effective 
democratic representation. Conversely, such institutional failings will have little effect on 
a disengaged citizenry, and this therefore helps explain low levels of protest in contexts 
where few citizens are involved in civic life. In evaluating this interaction of institutional 
context and citizen engagement, Latin America offers an ideal collection of cases that 
vary across both of these critical dimensions.  
While many studies have sought to explain which individuals protest and why, 
and the circumstances under which specific protest events arise, scant empirical work 
examines the role of an individual’s institutional context in moderating individual-level 
propensities to protest. A key contribution of this work, then, is to highlight the 
interaction between institutional context and patterns in civic engagement, with respect to 
individuals’ proclivity to engage in contentious participation. In a series of cross-national 
analyses of individual level survey data, I find that neither individual-level characteristics 
nor features of one’s institutional setting alone fully explain protest behavior. Rather, 
only when viewed together do we have a more complete picture of why protest seems to 
be common in some cases but not in others.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I examine recent trends in civic 
engagement and the quality of democratic governance across Latin America, and how 
they might help explain the substantial variation in protest participation we observe 
across Latin American regimes. Then, I articulate my own answer to this question—
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namely, that high mass-level civic engagement combined with ineffective political 
institutions results in heightened levels of protest participation. I proceed to outline 
several individual and country-level observable implications that emerge from this 
theoretical approach. To test this explanation, I draw on data from the 
AmericasBarometer surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean from 2008, 2010, and 
2012. I employ multi-level statistical techniques to investigate the connection between 
institutional environments, civic engagement and protest participation at the individual-
level across the region. I find that neither low-quality national political institutions nor 
individual-level trends in political engagement fully explain the immense differences we 
observe in terms of contentious participation across political systems. Rather, it is the 
volatile mix of institutions that promise representation but fail to deliver along with an 
engaged citizenry that seeks representation but cannot find it in the halls of government 
that leads them to the streets.  
 
The Rise of Civic Engagement in Latin America 
 
From an economic standpoint, the twenty-first century has been good to most 
Latin American countries. Buoyed by new trade relationships with China and other East 
Asian countries, Latin America’s largely commodity-based economies have grown at 
unprecedented rates in the new millennium. From 2003-2007, Latin American countries 
grew at an average GDP growth rate of six percent, marking the most successful five-
year period of growth in the post-war era (Ocampo 2008). In 2010, while the advanced 
industrialized world was still mired in a severe economic crisis, Latin American 
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economies expanded by about six percent (IMF 2012). More than just growth, Latin 
America has also made gains in terms of poverty reduction and education. The region’s 
poverty rate dropped from forty-four percent in 2002 to thirty-three percent in 2008 
(ECLAC 2013), while the number of Latin Americans with tertiary degrees rose from 
nine percent in 1990 to fourteen percent in 2009 (World Bank 2013).  
 
Figure 3.1. Recent Economic Growth in Latin America 
 
 
In conjunction with these massive advances in terms of socioeconomic 
development, electoral democracy has finally consolidated as the only legitimate regime 
type in the region. Despite democratic “backslides” (Huntington 1991) in countries like 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua (Weyland 2013), no country in the region has 
undergone a full-scale reverse transition to authoritarianism. Moreover, there is evidence 
that Latin Americans have become more active democrats in recent years. According to 
cross-national surveys, Latin Americans overwhelmingly support democracy as the best 
form of government, and since 2004 have become increasingly interested in politics, 
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active in elections, and participatory in their communities (LAPOP 2004-2012). The 
expansion of access to internet and social media has also had important consequences for 
politics in the region, with five Latin American countries ranking in the top ten in the 
world in terms of social network “engagement” (hours spent per month) and social media 
increasingly being utilized for political purposes (The Economist 2013; Valenzuela et al. 
2012). The end result of all of these trends is that Latin America has become a region 
where many (but not all) citizens are highly engaged in democratic politics and their 
communities via interpersonal and virtual activities, perhaps more than anytime in the 
region’s history.13 
How might recent trends in socioeconomic development and increases in civic 
engagement relate to protest? Beginning in the 1970s, scholars shifted their attention 
from grievance-based explanations of protest (e.g. Gusfield 1968, Gurr 1970) to the 
causal mechanisms that might explain why grievances translate into collective action in 
certain cases, but not others.14 The “resource mobilization” approach offers an 
explanation based not on relative deprivation, but on the socioeconomic factors that 
underpin the formation and sustainability of social movements. For scholars adhering to 
this particular theoretical construct, the primary determinants of whether or not social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “Community” and “civic” engagement will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter, 
which is in keeping with the literature on the topic (e.g. Putnam 2000). 
14 Despite this trend in the protest literature, some recent work has delved into the potential causal 
influence of specific types of grievances in spurring protest involvement (Finkel and Muller 
1998). Land and income inequality (Muller and Seligson 1987, Sen 2002, Jenkins and Jacobs 
2003), neoliberal reforms and associated austerity measures (Walton and Ragin 1990, Arce 2008, 
Roberts 2008, Silva 2009, Bellinger and Arce 2011), and political repression or exclusion in 
authoritarian regimes (Loveman 1998, Bunce 2003) have all been attributed causal weight in 
spurring mass mobilizations. Moreover, journalistic accounts of virtually any episode of mass 
mobilization—from Occupy Wall Street to Arab Spring to the recent protests in Brazil—tend to 
focus on the grievances being voiced by demonstrators as a primary causal factor, rather than the 
longer-term economic and political trends that might facilitate instances of mass mobilization. 
	  50	  
movements emerge and are successful lie in a particular movement’s access to the 
organizational resources necessary for mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977). 
According to Jenkins, “the formation of movements is linked to improvements in the 
status of aggrieved groups, not because of grievances… but because these changes reduce 
the costs of mobilization and improve the likelihood of success” (p. 532; 1983).15   
Since the initial emergence of the resource mobilization approach, it has 
continued to solidify its place through empirical studies as one of the most powerful 
theoretical tools for explaining protest participation. In recent cross-national work on 
protest, theories focusing on specific grievances and disaffected radicalism have been 
widely rejected as invalid or at least not generalizable explanations of protest, as evidence 
from primarily Western Europe and the U.S. (and some developing countries via the 
World Values Survey) has revealed that protestors are more often educated, middle-class 
citizens who seek to effect political change through non-traditional methods—a far cry 
from the “disaffected radical” described by Gurr, and much closer to the predictions 
made by adherents to the resource-based tradition (e.g. Inglehart 1990, Norris et al. 2005, 
Dalton et al. 2009). 
 In Latin America, studies have found that citizens who are more highly educated, 
interested and active in politics, and connected to civil society organizations are the most 
likely to engage in protest (e.g. Booth and Seligson 2009, Moreno and Moseley 2011). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In particular, the resource mobilization school received a boon from studies on the U.S. Civil 
Rights Movement published in the 1960s and 1970s. While in many ways, blacks in the U.S. 
encountered the same grievances they had faced during the decades leading up to this time period, 
access to organizational resources changed drastically in the direct lead-up to the Civil Rights 
movement. Indeed, it seemed that increased urbanization, the growth of historically black 
universities, and an expanding black middle class, led to the removal of traditional paternalistic 
social relations between (particularly Southern) whites and blacks, and paved the way for a 
thriving national movement (McAdam 1982; Jenkins 1983). 
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Thus, it would seem that at the individual-level, the resource mobilization approach 
begins to explain which individuals are more likely to protest in Latin America, 
especially in an era when more citizens have access to organizational tools than ever 
before. Yet at the aggregate level, the resource mobilization approach predicts (and has 
found, in the case of Dalton et al. 2009) that rates of protest participation are highest in 
the most economically developed contexts, where more citizens possess the 
organizational resources to build movements and articulate their interests. This 
perspective is at odds with a case like Bolivia, for example, which ranks as Latin 
America’s most contentious country while also being one of the region’s most 
underdeveloped. Moreover, while countries like Peru, Argentina, and Ecuador have 
developed rapidly in recent years and played host to numerous mass demonstrations, 
other countries like Uruguay and Costa Rica have grown at impressive rates and failed to 
register high protest numbers. Thus, while resource mobilization clearly helps understand 
current trends in protest activity across Latin America at the individual level, it falls short 
in capturing why individuals in certain countries in the region are so much more 
contentious than others. 
  
The Persistence of Flawed Institutions 
 
Latin America is a region populated by regimes of varying democratic quality 
(e.g. O’Donnell 1993, Diamond 2002, Levitsky 2002, Gibson 2006, Tommasi and Spiller 
2007, Levitsky and Murillo 2009, Levine and Molina 2011, Scartascini and Tommasi 
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2012).16 While every country in the region aside from Cuba is widely characterized as a 
formal, electoral democracy (though some regimes, like Venezuela, probably require 
additional adjectives (Collier and Levitsky 1997)), Latin American regimes differ 
substantially in how effectively their formal political institutions channel participation 
and implement public policy. In this section, I explore the potential consequences of this 
variation for protest participation in the region.  
Much of the recent literature on Latin American democratic political institutions 
has focused on institutional weakness in countries across the region, and how it might 
contribute to poor representation outcomes and policy output. Two dimensions define 
institutional weakness, according to Levitsky and Murillo (2009): enforcement and 
stability. In many Latin American countries, the formal “rules of the game” (North 1990) 
often change or are not enforced. For example, presidents in countries like Argentina, 
Venezuela, and Ecuador (among others) have sought to change reelection laws so that 
they can remain in power, and despite explicit legal prohibitions against doing so, many 
presidents in the region have pursued “court-packing” strategies to attempt to establish 
political control over the judicial branch or have eliminated central bank autonomy (e.g. 
Helmke 2002; Boylan 2001). This degree of institutional uncertainty often has dire 
consequences for the quality of public policy, as it encourages shortsightedness among 
government officials, who in many cases are under qualified for the positions they hold 
(Spiller and Tommasi 2007). 
Shortcomings related to institutional weakness and poor governance are reflected 
in Latin Americans’ attitudes. Despite widespread support for democracy as a form of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Democratic quality can be defined as the extent to which regimes adhere to democratic norms 
like “freedom, the rule of law, vertical accountability, responsiveness, and equality” (Diamond 
and Morlino 2004, p. 21). 
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government across the region, confidence in key regime institutions like political parties, 
legislatures, and law enforcement remains low in many Latin American countries (Booth 
and Seligson 2009). In addition, even as Latin America has experienced unprecedented 
economic growth and reductions in poverty, satisfaction with public services like 
education, healthcare, and transportation continues to be comparatively low (LAPOP 
2012). High crime rates plague many countries in the region, increasing exponentially in 
recent years across countries like Venezuela, Mexico, and much of Central America 
(Ceobanu et al. 2011; Bateson 2012). Thus, it would appear that a gap has emerged 
between Latin Americans’ demand for democracy and its supply (Bratton, Mattes, and 
Gyimah-Boadi 2005), as diffuse support for democracy has consolidated while criticism 
of specific regime actors and dissatisfaction with government performance has persisted, 
and in some cases increased (Booth and Seligson 2009; Mainwaring and Scully 2010).  
Within the protest literature, numerous studies have discussed and in some cases 
tested the potential relationship between institutional context and protest. Specifically, 
scholars utilizing the “political opportunities” approach have sought to uncover the 
political mechanisms that allow previously unexpressed grievances to materialize. This 
might entail a focus on processes of democratization and political liberalization, or, 
within existing democracies, on the role of political parties, labor unions, or important 
legal decisions in structuring potential protest activity (Huntington 1968, Tilly 1978, 
McAdam 1982, Kitschelt 1986, Brockett 1991). Others have compared rates of protest in 
contexts characterized by different levels of democratic “openness,” as several scholars 
have posited a curvilinear relationship between political openness and protest (Eisinger 
1973; Tilly 1978, 2006; Muller and Seligson 1987). According to this logic, protest 
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movements arise and flourish more frequently in moderately open regimes, where public 
opposition is tolerated and widespread but representative institutions are not fully 
facilitative of effective participation, than in regimes at either end of the openness 
spectrum (Eisinger 1973, Tilly 1978, Muller and Seligson 1987). 
 Empirical work on the impact of political institutions on protest participation has 
produced mixed results. In their cross-national study utilizing data from the World 
Values Survey, Dalton et al. (2009) find that more democratic, high functioning (i.e., 
“open”) institutional contexts produce higher rates of protest participation. Their 
dependent variable measures participation in four types of protest activities over an 
indefinite time period, across a mix of democratic and authoritarian regimes. 
Unfortunately, failing to specify a time period for participation casts serious doubt on 
those results (which will be further discussed below in the discussion of measurement), 
and the most common form of protest participation reported was petition signing, an 
activity that falls outside of most conceptualizations of contentious politics. Similarly, 
relying only on a rule of law indicator to measure political development leaves out of the 
analysis several potentially important institutional factors that might moderate rates of 
protest participation.  
In other recent work, scholars have shifted towards examining how weak political 
institutions in democracies can push citizens towards adopting contentious tactics (e.g. 
Boulding 2010, Machado et al. 2011). A focus on more specific features of national level 
political institutions by Machado et al. (2011) in their study of Latin American 
democracies reveals that institutional weakness actually increases the prevalence of 
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protest participation within that regime.17 However, despite the significant contributions 
of this work, its limited sample of seventeen countries from one time point prevents 
inclusion of other important second-level economic controls, and raises the question of 
whether 2008 may have been somewhat anomalous in terms of protest activity across the 
region. More generally though, I argue that studies to this point have overlooked the 
degree to which institutional factors interact with the individual-level characteristics that 
motivate protest participation—most notably, civic engagement—to shape distinct 
participatory repertoires across countries.  
 
Contentious Engagement in Flawed Democracies 
 
The often-sharp, cross-national variation we observe in protest participation 
across countries calls for a focus on how political context interacts with mass level 
dynamics to influence the rise of contentious political participation. In the face of trends 
related to community engagement and institutional quality in Latin America, I argue that 
a combination of high levels of civic engagement among citizens and ineffective political 
institutions precipitates more radical modes of political participation, as regimes’ ability 
to deliver on citizens’ expectations fails to match the mobilization capacity of the 
citizenry. Thus, where individuals are engaged in civic life and interested in politics, but 
institutional quality is low—e.g. unresponsive or inconsistent representational vehicles, 
fickle systems of checks and balances, and weak rule of law—protest emerges due to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Boulding’s 2010 piece on the impact of subnational electoral environment on the relationship 
between NGOs and protest activity in Bolivian municipalities finds that the presence of NGOs 
increases the number of protests in uncompetitive electoral environments. It also offers what is 
probably the closest approximation of the argument I make here, though it does not employ 
multilevel techniques nor does it measure protest participation at the individual level. 
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inability of formal political institutions to adequately channel and respond to the voices 
of active democratic citizens. 
Following this line of thought, politically active individuals utilize protest as a 
means of exerting their influence more forcefully on the regime given their mistrust of 
formal political institutions and their perceived lack of efficacy operating through 
conventional vehicles. Thus, contrary to the commonly-held notions that protest 
movements are either largely led by economically deprived segments of society that have 
long withdrawn from the political arena (e.g. Gurr’s 1970 grievance-based theory), or 
that protest is a healthy byproduct of liberal democracy and economic development (e.g. 
Dalton et al. 2009), I argue that in contemporary Latin America, protest has become part 
of the “repertoire” (Tilly 1986)—or set of options at the disposal of collective actors—of 
participation utilized by politically active citizens in systems devoid of effective political 
institutions. 
While the term community engagement might seem like a synonym for protest 
participation itself, rather than part of a causal explanation of protest, it in fact refers to 
the extent to which citizens are knowledgeable about and interested in political issues, 
and how connected they are to the types of social and political networks that can serve to 
foment collective action (Putnam 2000). The degree of civic engagement in a given 
context is thus well measured by survey items used to gauge political interest and 
involvement, membership in community organizations, and exposure to political 
information-sharing via social networks. In contexts where institutions are high 
performing, we would expect that highly engaged citizens would participate in politics 
primarily through formal (or “conventional”) vehicles. However, where representative 
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institutions are weak, I argue that high levels of civic engagement give rise to contentious 
modes of participation, as citizens come to believe that formal institutions do not 
adequately represent their interests and respond to their claims. 
The specific mechanisms that determine how well regimes channel and respond to 
popular demands might include the quality of party representation, the effectiveness of 
governments in implementing policy and providing public services, and the extent to 
which rule of law institutions provide citizens equal protection under the law (Kitschelt 
1986, Przeworski 2010, Machado et al. 2011, Scartascini and Tommasi 2012).18 Engaged 
citizens naturally seek to influence politics, as they are interested in and knowledgeable 
about key issues, and believe that policymakers should be responsive to their voices. 
Where formal institutions are strong and of high quality, those citizens can have faith that 
their opinions will be reflected through formal institutional channels, whereas that 
assumption cannot be made where institutions are incapable of fulfilling basic 
representative functions.  
Political institutions in Latin American democratic systems vary greatly in terms 
of their ability to offer a representational outlet for their population, and their capacity to 
translate citizens’ policy preferences into government output. For example, while 
political parties have been relatively programmatic in countries like Chile, Uruguay, and 
Costa Rica, party platforms and ideological positions vacillate wildly in countries like 
Argentina, Peru, and Paraguay, and clientelistic linkages pervade (Kitschelt et al. 2010). 
While executives have for years possessed the power to act unilaterally in countries like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In their 2011 piece, Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi argue that where institutionalized 
modes of participation are deemed unproductive, citizens adopt “alternative political 
technologies” as a more direct means of obtaining representation (also see Scartascini and 
Tommasi 2012). 
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Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, rendering legislative bodies basically 
inconsequential, presidents wield considerably less power to rule by decree in countries 
like Uruguay and Chile and must adopt more collaborative tactics in pursuing policy 
agendas (e.g. Mainwaring 1990, Foweraker 1998). Chile boasts effective law 
enforcement and low levels of corruption, but other countries with similar levels of 
economic development like Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil are characterized by police 
corruption and weak judicial-legal institutions (e.g. Seligson 2006). These examples 
highlight the extent to which regimes differ in their ability to absorb citizens’ preferences 
and produce responsive public policy, and it is this variation that I see as critical to 
understanding varying levels of protest in the region. 
However, focusing solely on the role of institutions is missing a key piece of the 
puzzle. My emphasis on civic engagement—i.e. individual-level linkages to mobilizing 
structures like community organizations or social media—as a conditioning variable in 
this process speaks to the literature on resource mobilization and protest (e.g. McCarthy 
and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Jenkins 1983), which argues that the formation and survival 
of protest movements depends in large part on the political resources available to 
contentious actors. A single-minded emphasis on institutional characteristics as the 
decisive determinant of contentious participation ignores the critical role that swelling 
rates of civic engagement have played in producing protest across Latin America in 
recent years. Weak political institutions themselves do not necessarily guarantee that 
protests will occur—rather, weak institutions and a citizenry readily mobilized, able and 
motivated to organize collective action, operate in concert to produce high protest 
societies. The list of national cases where institutions are low quality but protest 
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movements fail to gain traction is endless—in Latin America and the Caribbean, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Jamaica, to name a few—and includes virtually any 
authoritarian regime where representational institutions are non-existent or ineffective but 
grassroots engagement is limited. Moreover, protests often materialize in countries with 
“good” institutions, as was the case recently in Chile in 2011 and in the U.S. during the 
Occupy Wall Street movement, due in part to the dense organizational networks that also 
exist in such democracies. For this reason, I argue that any cross-level explanation of 
protest must factor in individual level civic engagement, as these critical organizational 
linkages serve as a necessary condition for any potential institutional effect on 
contentious politics. 
 
Table 3.1 Interactive Relationship between Institutional Quality and Civic 
Engagement 
 
 
Low Quality Institutions High Quality Institutions 
Low Civic Engagement Low probability of 
protesting 
 
Low probability of 
protesting  
High Civic Engagement High probability of 
protesting  
Moderate probability of 
protesting 
 
 
The three hypotheses that emerge from this discussion are as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 3.1: Individuals with access to organizational resources—e.g. higher 
community activity, interest in politics, education, and use of social media—will be more 
likely to protest than their less engaged counterparts.  
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Hypothesis 3.2: Individuals with less support for formal institutions and more 
dissatisfaction with public services are more likely to protest.  
 
Hypothesis 3.3: Low institutional quality will increase the probability of participating in a 
protest, but only among those citizens who are at least minimally engaged in political life. 
 
I now turn to an examination of these ideas through analysis of survey data gathered 
across Latin America over the past six years. 
 
Data and Measurement 
 
To test the theoretical framework proposed above, I utilize data from the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer surveys from 2008, 
2010, and 2012, which consist of representative national surveys of individuals from 
twenty-four countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. The key dependent variable 
comes from a question that asks respondents if they have participated in a street march or 
public demonstration during the previous twelve months.1920 
 Figure 1 displays the percentage of respondents who participated in a protest from 
2008-2012 in each Latin American country included in the AmericasBarometer biannual 
surveys. Clearly, significant variation exists in the region in terms of the extent to which 
protest has been adopted as a form of political participation. Bolivia had the highest rate 
of protest participation in Latin America at nineteen percent, followed closely by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See appendix for specific question wording for all variables included in the analysis.	  	  
20 Summary statistics for each variable are included in the appendix. 
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Argentina, Peru, and Haiti. Bolivia also experienced the most contentious single year rate 
of participation recorded by the AmericasBarometer surveys, at nearly thirty percent 
participation in 2008. These results immediately cast doubt on the notion that high levels 
of development produce high levels of protest, as Haiti and Bolivia are among the poorest 
nations in the Americas, while in such economically diverse countries like Jamaica, 
Panama, and El Salvador, protest appears to be extremely uncommon, with barely five 
percent of citizens registering participation. 
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Figure 3.2 Percent of Respondents Who Participated in a Protest, 2008-2012 
 
 
The AmericasBarometer survey instrument offers an improvement on previous 
cross-national data on protest participation utilized in other studies for two primary 
reasons. First, the AmericasBarometer surveys from 2008-2012 always specify a 
timeframe of the past twelve months when inquiring about protest participation—
something that other cross-national projects like the World Values Surveys have not 
done. Questions that fail to establish a timeframe for respondents are not measuring 
current levels of protest participation, but instead capturing an individual’s lifetime 
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account of protest activity. This would seem to favor higher rates of protest participation 
for older democracies, where protesting has been permitted for many years, even if 
current levels are not particularly high. While these data do not speak to present levels of 
protest, the predictors of protest—e.g. community activity, wealth, and even levels of 
education—do reflect current conditions. This temporal disconnect between the 
independent and dependent variables then casts doubt on the meaning of findings 
utilizing this measure of protest activity, such as those relying on World Values Survey 
data before 2005.21 
Second, the AmericasBarometer survey offers multiple time points at which we 
can evaluate the determinants of protest participation for each country, which helps 
remedy any potential bias related to an outlier year for a particular country and increases 
the number of observations for second level variables. For example, in the case of Chile, 
protest participation was relatively low in 2010 (and seemingly before, though we lack 
AmericasBarometer data to confirm) but skyrocketed to eleven percent in 2012, placing it 
in the top five in the region. A snapshot view using one round of surveys can thus capture 
an anomalous moment in a country’s history, given the oftentimes sporadic nature of 
large protest events. By taking into account results from three separate surveys, this study 
provides a more balanced view of a country’s proclivity for protesting over time, less 
subject to exceptional years and episodes of mass contention. 
 At the individual level, the key independent variable for capturing community 
engagement is an index that gauges the frequency with which citizens participate in local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The most recent version of the WVS questionnaire available online (2005) states that “during 
the last five years” has since been added to this question. However, all previous surveys—which 
have been used in the studies cited above, including the key study by Dalton and co-authors 
(2009)—ask if respondents have ever participated in any of the enumerated activities without 
limiting responses to a certain time period.  
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civic organizations. Respondents were asked how often they attended meetings for a 
variety of different types of community organizations during the previous year, including 
community improvement associations, parent organizations, professional associations, 
religious groups, and political parties. The response options provided were “Never,” 
“Once or Twice a Year,” “Once or Twice a Month,” and “Once a Week.” I then coded 
the response levels from 0 (“Never”) to 3 (“Once a Week”), and added the five variables 
to form a single “engagement” index, which as then rescaled to 0-100. I argue that this 
variable effectively measures the extent to which individuals are engaged in community 
activities, and have access to the organizational structures that can serve to facilitate 
collective action.  
At the individual level, I also include variables for interest in politics, level of 
education, and use of social media to share or receive political information—all of which 
approximate the resource mobilization approach to explaining protest participation by 
individuals. In addition, I draw from questions on support for key political institutions, 
satisfaction with public services, and external efficacy to shed light on how perceptions 
of political institutions influence individuals’ proclivity to protest. To test competing 
theories regarding the influence of specific grievances on protest participation, I will 
utilize individual-level variables for presidential approval, evaluations of one’s personal 
economic situation, evaluations of the national economic situation, and socioeconomic 
status. Interpersonal trust is also included, as many have argued in the past that trust in 
one’s fellow citizens increases the probability of protesting (e.g. Inglehart 1989, Dalton et 
al. 2009). 
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 For the second level (i.e., country level) variables on institutional quality, I turn to 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The WGI offers measures 
on six dimensions of governance, three of which are relevant to this study: Voice and 
Accountability, Government Effectiveness, and Rule of Law. These measures represent 
the views of business, citizen, and elite survey respondents, and are based on “30 
individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms” (WGI 
website). These indicators offer the best combination of coverage across countries and 
time and rigorous measurement techniques for the countries included in the 
AmericasBarometer survey, though the indicators are certainly not without drawbacks 
(see Kaufmann et al. 2007). Descriptions of each dimension from the creators of the 
indicators are as follows: 
 
Voice and Accountability: “Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.” 
 
Government Effectiveness: “Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies.” 
 
Rule of Law: “Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence.” 
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 Each of these three dimensions captures an important component of institutional 
quality, and will be tested individually as a second level predictor of protest 
participation.22 The “Voice and Accountability” measure helps gauge the extent to which 
individuals can effectively participate in politics and obtain representation in government, 
while “Government Effectiveness” serves as a measure of regime transparency and 
capacity in the making and implementation of public policy. “Rule of Law” offers an 
indicator for how well regimes offer citizens equal protection under the law, a crucial 
characteristic of effective democratic governance. I combine the three variables in an 
additive index I call the Institutional Quality Index, which I use in the analyses below as 
an indicator of the institutional environment in which individual citizens operate. I argue 
that this multifaceted indicator offers an effective proxy for the extent to which Latin 
American regimes fulfill the democratic promise of representation, which I expect will be 
reflected in patterns of protest participation across countries.  
In Figure 2, countries are listed in terms of average Institutional Quality Index 
Score for the period 2008-2012. Chile leads the region in terms of institutional quality 
with a score of 1.2.23 Venezuela and Haiti score lowest, unsurprisingly, while a large 
group of Latin American regimes hover around zero. These scores indicate that while 
democracy predominates in the region, the quality of political institutions and governance 
varies greatly, with the majority of regimes falling short of living up to modern standards 
of liberal democracy.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For country values on each of these of these indicators, please see the table in the appendix.  
23 As a reference point, the score for the United States during this time period was 1.39.  
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Figure 3.3 Mean Institutional Quality Scores, 2008-2012 
 
 
As controls, I also include second-level measures of human development, 
inequality, and economic growth during the year of the survey. These variables will serve 
to test grievance-based explanations of contentious politics, in addition to providing 
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participation are not a function of an omitted variable linked to both institutional quality 
and protest levels.  
  
Analysis 
 
The dependent variable in this analysis is protest participation, measured at the 
individual level. I begin with two individual-level models of protest across Latin America 
that will highlight those individual socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics 
associated with protest behavior. In the second set of models, I then incorporate the 
national-level variables discussed above in order to assess the impact of these second-
level institutional factors on individual-level protest participation.   
 
Individual level models 
Table 2 displays the results from the first set of models, each of which employs 
logistic regression given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable.24 In Model 1, 
we see that several variables emerge as strong predictors of protest participation, none 
more so than community engagement. An increase from the 0 to 50 on the community 
engagement scale nearly triples one’s probability of protesting, holding other covariates 
at their means (see Figure 3.4).25 Moreover, a person at the highest value in terms of 
community activism is more than four times likelier to participate in a protest than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 These logistic regression models account for the complex nature of the survey data, which 
include stratification and clustering. Both models were also run including fixed effects for 
countries and years, with Uruguay and 2012 as the baseline, but given that this did not affect 
results, those coefficients are not reported in Table 2. All countries are weighted to an equal N.  
25 Predicted probabilities are calculated using Stata 12’s “margins” command while holding other 
variables in the model at their mean. Graphs were made using the “marginsplot” command, which 
graphs the results from “margins.” 
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someone in the lowest quintile, holding other variables constant at their means. In 
keeping with the resource mobilization approach to explaining protest participation, 
education and interest in politics also have strong positive effects on the probability of 
participating in a protest. 
 
Table 3.2 Individual Level Models of Protest Participation in Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
 Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
 
Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Model 1 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Model 2 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
   
Female -0.278*** -0.292*** 
 (0.025) (0.049) 
Age -0.008*** -0.005*** 
 (0.0009) (0.002) 
Wealth (quintile) -0.011 -0.078*** 
 (0.010) (0.019) 
Interest in Politics 0.011*** 
(0.0004) 
0.009*** 
(0.0008) 
Education 0.325*** 0.309*** 
 (0.021) (0.039) 
Community Participation 0.026*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0273*** 
(0.001) 
Presidential Approval -0.003*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
Interpersonal Trust -0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.001 
(0.0008) 
Personal Economic Situation -0.002*** -0.002* 
 (0.0007) (0.001) 
National Economic Situation 0.0005 0.0007 
 (0.0006) (0.001) 
Perception of Corruption -1.89e-05 -0.002* 
 (0.0005) (0.0009) 
System Support -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.0007) (0.001) 
Efficacy 0.0007 0.0005 
 (0.0005) (0.0008) 
Satisfaction with Public Services -- -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
   
Shared Political Information via -- 0.009*** 
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Social Network (0.0007) 
   
Constant -2.784*** -2.569*** 
 (0.090) (0.168) 
   
Observations 88,750 29,248 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Two-tailed tests 
 
  
On the other hand, several variables seem to decrease Latin Americans’ likelihood 
of participating in a street march or demonstration. Net of other factors, women are less 
likely to have participated in a protest, and age has a significant negative impact on 
protesting as well. Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this paper, system 
support has a significant negative effect on the probability of taking part in a protest 
march or demonstration, meaning that individuals who view key regime institutions more 
positively are less likely to protest, while those with more negative evaluations are more 
likely protestors. While this effect falls far short of the magnitude of the effect for 
community engagement, moving from the lowest quintile in terms of system support to 
the highest results in a twenty-five percent decrease in the probability of participating in a 
protest (from .12 to .9).  
 One individual-level finding that seems to hint at a potential cross-level 
interaction between institutional quality and civic engagement is the interaction between 
system support and community involvement (Figure 3.5). As predicted, low system 
support and high engagement produce the highest probabilities of participating in a 
protest. Perhaps most interesting about this interaction though is the extent to which the 
effect of low system support is conditional on at least a moderate level of community 
involvement. At minimal levels of community engagement, no decrease in system 
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support seems to increase the probability of protesting—however, as community 
engagement increases even slightly, system support’s effect surfaces.   
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Figure 3.4 Predicted Probabilities Based on Changes in Levels of Community 
Engagement 
 
Figure 3.5. Predicted Probabilities: Interaction between System Support and 
Community Engagement 
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Model 2 adds variables for information sharing via social networks and 
satisfaction with public services to the equation. Each of the questions that serve as the 
bases for these two variables was only asked in 2012, meaning that the number of 
observations drops substantially. However, both variables have significant effects on 
one’s probability of protesting: while an increase in satisfaction with public service 
provision decreases the odds of having protested, those who actively share or receive 
political information through social networks are nearly three times more likely to 
participate in a protest than those who do not, holding other variables at their means and 
modes.  
In sum, based on these predictive models of protest participation in Latin America 
from 2008-2012, it appears that citizens who are actively engaged in their communities—
i.e., they are interested in politics, participate in community organizations, and share 
political information via the Internet—and citizens who have negative views of key 
regime institutions and public services are the most likely protestors.26 While these initial 
findings comport with the theoretical approach outlined above, the more important test of 
how institutional environment shapes participatory repertoires requires a multilevel 
approach, which follows in the next section. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In any attempt to propose and test a causal argument using cross-sectional data, endogeneity is 
justifiably a concern. In this case, the most plausible alternative explanation would be that protest 
actually increases community engagement, in that demonstrations might link formerly 
unassociated protestors to established civic organizations. Replacing a potentially problematic 
variable with an instrument unrelated to the outcome variable can help solve this problem (Sovey 
and Green 2011). A two-stage least squares model instrumenting for protest with ideology (an 
instrument deemed “not weak”) coupled with a Hausman test somewhat assuages concerns that 
the causal arrow flows from community engagement to protest and not the other way around, as I 
was unable to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. However, I include results from an 
instrumental variables regression model that instruments for community engagement in the 
appendix. While the predicted effect of community engagement on protest is somewhat 
attenuated, it remains one of the strongest predictors in the model.  
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Multilevel models 
In the second set of models, country level variables were added to each model and 
multilevel mixed effects logistic regression models were estimated to account for 
variation between countries during the three survey years under consideration. In other 
words, the second level variables listed in each model describe “Country Years”—i.e., 
the national context in which individuals from each round of the AmericasBarometer 
responded to the survey questions. The results for eight models of protest participation 
are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. In each model, second level economic variables serve 
as controls, in addition to the individual-level variables that proved consequential in the 
regional analyses presented above. Variables for the WGI indicators of institutional 
quality were added one at a time in the four models in Table 3.3, and then interaction 
terms were inserted in the four models in Table 3.4. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Multilevel Models of Protest Participation in Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
 Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
 
Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
 
Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
 
Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Model 3 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Model 4 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Model 5 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Model 6 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
      
Individual Level 
Variables 
    
     
Female -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.272*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Age -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Wealth (quintile) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Interest in Politics 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Community 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
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Participation (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
     
Presidential 
Approval  
-0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
     
Interpersonal Trust -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Personal Economic 
Situation 
 
-0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
 
-0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
 
-0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
 
-0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
     
System Support -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Second level 
Variables 
    
     
Gini Index (2009) 3.899 3.988 4.017 3.937 
 (2.637) (2.685) (2.666) (2.665) 
HDI (2007) 2.909 1.106 1.386 1.731 
 (2.365) (2.111) (2.090) (2.206) 
GDP growth 
(annual) 
 
0.005 
 
0.010 
 
0.011 
 
0.011 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
-0.364 
   
 (0.268)    
Voice and 
Accountability 
 -0.032 
(0.267) 
  
     
Rule of Law   -0.099  
   (0.211)  
Institutions Index    -0.177 
    (0.263) 
     
Constant -7.255*** -5.804** -6.100** -6.313** 
 (2.668) (2.509) (2.568) (2.592) 
     
Observations 92,567 92,567 92,567 92,567 
 
Number of Country 
Years 
 
67 
 
67 
 
67 
 
67 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Two-tailed tests 
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Table 3.4 Multilevel Models of Protest Participation in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (with interactions) 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
 
Model 7 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
 
Model 8 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
 
Model 9 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
 
Model 10  
Coeff. (s.e.) 
      
Individual Level 
Variables 
    
     
Female -0.270*** -0.255*** -0.275*** -0.277*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (-0.007) 
Age -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Wealth (quintile) 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Interest in Politics 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education 0.262*** 0.265*** 0.260*** 0.331*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) 
Community 
Participation 
0.025*** 
(0.0008) 
--  0.026*** 
(0.0007) 
0.026*** 
(0.0007) 
     
Presidential 
Approval  
-0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
-.003*** 
(0.0005) 
-.003*** 
(0.0005) 
     
Interpersonal Trust -0.001*** -0.0006 -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Personal Economic 
Situation 
-0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0006) 
     
System Support -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Community Dummy -- 0.737*** 
(0.037) 
-- -- 
     
Second level 
Variables 
 
    
Gini Index (2009) 3.905 4.021 3.299 3.174 
 (2.663) (2.690) (2.576) (2.580) 
HDI (2007) 1.822 1.079 2.000 2.063 
 (2.204) (2.227) (2.128) (2.132) 
GDP growth 
(annual) 
0.010 
(0.039) 
0.011 
(0.040) 
 
0.027 
(0.038) 
0.028 
(0.038) 
Institutions Index -0.107 0.020 -.484* -0.822*** 
 (0.264) (0.270) (0.274) (0.282) 
Institutions Index * 
Community 
Participation 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-- -- -- 
     
Institutions Index *  -0.313*** -- -- 
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Community Dummy (0.062) 
     
Institutions Index* 
Interest in Politics 
-- -- 0.002** 
(0.0007) 
-- 
     
Institutions Index * 
Education 
-- -- -- 0.194*** 
(0.033) 
 
Constant 
 
-6.343** 
 
-6.125** 
 
-6.348*** 
 
-6.457*** 
 (2.590) (2.617) (2.453) (2.457) 
     
Observations 92,567 92,567 92,567 92,567 
 
Number of Country 
Years 
 
67 
 
67 
 
67 
 
67 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Two-tailed tests 
 
 
First, it should be mentioned that second level economic variables seem to play a 
very minor role in explaining individual-level protest dynamics in Latin America during 
the time period under consideration. Neither inequality, human development, nor GDP 
growth during the year of the survey serve as significant predictors of protest 
participation, raising questions about the idea that macroeconomic forces are what drive 
cycles of protest. Although individuals’ perceptions of their personal economic situation 
do continue to carry some weight, as do negative performance evaluations of the current 
president, wealth is not a strong predictor of participation. It thus appears that we can 
discount economic factors as the primary determinants of mass mobilization in Latin 
America. This does not mean that economic grievances fail to play any role in motivating 
instances of contentious behavior—rather, it indicates that many citizens experiencing 
economic hardship decide not to protest, while others in comfortable economic situations 
do choose to participate. At the same time, these results do not reveal any positive 
relationship between economic development and protest participation, contrary to 
findings from accounts grounded in analyses of developed democracies. 
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 The relationship between institutional context and protest participation is a 
thornier one to interpret. In each of the first four models, it appears that the institutional 
variables—while having the predicted negative sign—fail to attain statistical significance 
as predictors of protest involvement. This would seem to indicate that institutional 
environment itself does not have a significant impact on the probability that individuals 
within that context will protest, controlling for other individual and aggregate level 
factors, which contradicts the findings of Machado et al. (2011).   
However, the theory I put forth in this paper is an interactive one, whereby 
institutions interact with community engagement to affect individuals’ likelihood of 
adopting contentious political behaviors. In Model 7, I interact the “Institutional Quality 
Index”, a country level variable, with community engagement, an individual level 
variable. The coefficient is negative, and obtains statistical significance at the p<.01 level. 
The fact that the effect for institutional quality is insignificant in this model indicates that 
it is not an important predictor of protest where community engagement equals zero. 
However, the significance of the interaction’s coefficient indicates that this changes as 
the two interacted variables’ values change.  
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Figure 3.6 Predicted Probabilities: Interaction between Institutional Context and 
Community Engagement 
 
 
Figure 3.6 displays predicted probabilities of participating in a protest depending 
on variation in institutional context and community engagement. By graphing changes in 
the predicted probabilities, we can clearly observe that the causal impact of institutional 
context changes drastically depending on levels of community engagement, and vice 
versa. Where community engagement equals zero—i.e., citizens have no ties to any of 
the five types of civic organizations referred to in the questions that make up the index—
institutional quality has no effect on the probability of protesting. However, as 
engagement increases, the causal importance of institutional context begins to emerge. 
Where the “Community Engagement” index equals fifty, it seems that citizens in low 
quality institutional settings become substantially more likely to protest, holding other 
individual and second level variables at their means and modes. Where community 
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involvement is high, the differences in probabilities are even starker—indeed, while a 
maximally engaged individual in a low quality institutional environment (Institutional 
Quality Index = -1) possesses a .48 probability of participating in a protest, that same 
individual possesses only a .26 probability of participating in a high quality institutional 
environment. Thus, active citizens are nearly twice as likely to have protested in low 
quality institutional contexts compared to high quality institutional contexts.  
As a robustness check, Model 8 offers a similar interaction term with an 
alternative coding of the community engagement variable. In this case, I coded as 
“Community Engagement Dummy” = 1 individuals who were at least minimally 
participative in one community organization, and as Community Engagement Dummy = 
0 those who possessed no ties to local community groups.27 Throughout Latin America, 
roughly twenty-two percent of respondents fall in the category of completely unengaged 
in their communities, while seventy-eight percent were coded as Community 
Engagement Dummy = 1.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This alternative coding of the engagement variable controls for the possibility that a small 
number of hyper engaged citizens—e.g. individuals who are active in three or more community 
organizations—are driving results.  
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Figure 3.7. Predicted Probabilities: Unengaged v. Engaged Citizens 
 
 
Predicted probabilities for this interaction are presented in Figure 3.7. Again, it 
appears that the causal import of community engagement and institutional quality are 
highly dependent on one another. Engaged citizens in low quality institutional 
environments are almost twice as likely to participate in a protest as their counterparts in 
high quality institutional settings. Moreover, while engaged citizens are more than twice 
as likely as unengaged people to protest where institutions are poor, that difference is not 
nearly as glaring in strong institutional settings. Unengaged citizens are almost equally 
likely to participate in protests regardless of institutional context. Put simply, it seems 
that poor political institutions seem to push the politically engaged towards adopting 
protest participation while having very little effect on the contentious behaviors of 
unengaged citizens.  
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Figure 3.8. Predicted Probabilities: Institutional Context and Education 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Predicted Probabilities: Institutional Context and Interest in Politics 
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Finally, Models 9 and 10 include interaction terms with institutional quality on 
one hand, and education and interest in politics, respectively, on the other. In each of 
these models the coefficient term for the interaction is significant. As Figures 3.8 and 3.9 
illustrate, each of these variables interacts similarly with institutional quality, in that each 
becomes a stronger predictor of protest participation in weak institutional contexts, 
particularly in the case of interest in politics. For entirely uninterested citizens, 
institutions fail to exert much influence on the probability that individuals protest – 
however, as interest in politics increases, the causal import of institutional quality begins 
to take off.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Many scholars have sought to understand how social, political, and economic 
factors influence protest participation and social movement formation. On the economic 
side, adherents to the resource mobilization approach have argued that high levels of 
economic development supply the organizational resources that yield protests. Others 
have suggested that economic struggles lie at the root of contentious movements, as they 
provide potential protestors with the motivating grievances to mobilize against the 
government and demand a higher standard of living. In terms of political development, 
the literature is also divided. While some claim that more open political systems allow for 
higher rates of protest participation, others argue that it is precisely the ineffectiveness of 
formal vehicles for representation in certain contexts that pushes citizens to adopt 
alternative, contentious means of claim-making. 
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This chapter promotes an alternative explanation of why protest emerges as a vital 
component of the participatory repertoire in certain national contexts and among certain 
individuals, but not others. What the findings here suggest is an interactive relationship 
between sociopolitical factors at the individual level and country level institutional 
characteristics. Low quality political institutions have an important positive effect on 
protest participation, but only among citizens who are at least minimally engaged in 
political life. In other words, low quality institutions alone cannot determine whether or 
not an individual decides to attend a protest rally or demonstration—rather, the 
combination of a low quality institutional environment where citizens feel 
underrepresented by formal democratic institutions, and high levels of individual-level 
political engagement and community involvement, can greatly increase the probability 
that citizens resort to contentious tactics to make their voices heard. 
Admittedly, this explanation of protest across countries is somewhat knotty. 
Rather than putting forth one variable or set of causal factors as the driving force behind 
contentious politics, I offer a more nuanced interactive theory that combines seemingly 
two contradictory phenomena—dysfunctional institutions and high civic engagement—to 
explain protest. Indeed, virtually any scholar would argue that community engagement 
serves as a positive force in democracies, and that individuals across Latin America and 
other regions are only capable of participating in protests because of massive gains in 
political liberalization made during the last four decades and recent socioeconomic 
advances that have seemingly laid the foundation for a rise in civic activism.  
Both points are probably correct. However, the massive wave of democratization 
that has taken place since the 1970s has also produced a multitude of regimes where 
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elections occur and basic civil liberties are observed, but where formal representative 
institutions fall short in terms of effectively channeling mass participation and public 
opinion. The results presented here suggest that when formal institutions fail to meet the 
needs of a highly engaged and determined populace, engaged citizens will adopt other 
means to make their voices heard. In short, mass level democratic engagement has 
outpaced the consolidation of high quality formal institutions in many Latin American 
regimes, creating a gap in terms of citizens’ demands for democratic representation and 
its supply.  
Moving beyond twenty-first century Latin America, these findings might also 
help understand how gains in social development and civic engagement, coupled with 
low quality formal political institutions, could lie at the root of mass protests in other 
regions and time periods. Indeed, an increase in political engagement and the use of 
social media to share political information clearly played an important role in Arab 
Spring countries, where citizens began to demand institutional reforms that made leaders 
more accountable to the citizenry. In Europe, citizens in countries like Greece and 
Spain—both of which possess myriad educated and engaged citizens—have not only 
been devastated by a severe economic recession, but frustrated by their inability to have 
their voices heard by policymakers amidst EU-prescribed austerity measures. Even going 
back to the Civil Rights Movement and anti-war demonstrations in the 1960s and 1970s 
in the United States, protests were seemingly led by active and informed citizens faced 
with exclusionary or nonresponsive political institutions. Thus, this chapter casts light on 
a broader set of phenomena, and informs scholars as they attempt to understand the 
causes and consequences of future episodes of protest participation across the world.  
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In the following chapter, I shift my attention to Argentina – a country that has in 
recent years been enveloped by contentious political participation, and is widely 
considered to be a democracy with weak political institutions (Levitsky and Murillo 
2005). Specifically, I trace how Argentine national political institutions have paved the 
way for the rise of normalized protest participation in the country, and how subnational 
variation in terms of provincial political environments has influenced the emergence and 
sustainability of politics in the streets.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
NORMALIZED PROTEST IN A FLAWED DEMOCRACY:  
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA 
 
 
Argentina currently ranks as one of Latin America’s most contentious regimes, 
according to data from the AmericasBarometer surveys from 2008-2012 (LAPOP). 
Anecdotal evidence would suggest that Argentina’s contentiousness goes back further—
indeed, the rise of the piquetero movement during the late-1990s and the role of public 
demonstrations in the country’s epic economic and political crises in 2001-2002 have 
been well chronicled by journalists and academics alike. But has Argentina always been a 
hotbed for contentious social movements? How have contentious repertoires expanded 
and potentially mutated since the country’s transition to democracy? Further, has this 
process occurred uniformly at the national level, or does subnational variation exist in 
terms of the prevalence and form of contentious politics? 
To answer these questions, I shift focus from analyzing variation in levels of 
protest participation across countries at a particular point in time, to assessing the 
evolution of contentious politics within one regime over several decades. Thus, rather 
than using cross-sectional survey data to assess the individual and country-level 
predictors of protest, the next two chapters endeavor to understand how protest evolves as 
a form of participation within a particular national context, and how this evolution may in 
part be a product of the same combination of rising levels of citizen engagement amidst 
flawed institutions of democratic representation. 
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Specifically, in these two chapters on Argentina, I seek to provide a richer 
treatment each of the three hypotheses presented in Chapter Two. Namely, how do 
institutional characteristics bear on patterns of protest participation in a particular 
political context? How might the behaviors of politically active citizens be altered where 
high quality democratic representation via formal vehicles is lacking? Most importantly, 
in these chapters I begin to analyze how over time, persistent institutional dysfunction 
can result in protest normalizing as a form of political participation to the extent that it 
becomes a quotidian characteristic of everyday political life. 
In Chapter Four, I first outline the previous twenty-five years of protest in 
Argentina, offering a summary of how contentious “repertoires,” to use Tilly’s (1978) 
terminology, have advanced over the years within the country. I begin the discussion with 
Menem’s first term (1989-1995) and conclude with the police riots that occurred 
throughout the country in January-February 2014. I argue that since the early 1990s, the 
importance of protest to Argentine politics has steadily grown, and that contentious 
repertoires of participation have consolidated to the extent that they can now be 
considered “normal.” However, this too varies subnationally. In the second part of this 
chapter, I consider how subnational variation in terms of democratic quality might bear 
on patterns of popular mobilization across Argentine provinces. Finally, I draw on three 
specific provincial cases—Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and San Luis—to help articulate my 
theoretical perspective. These case studies are based in part on fieldwork carried out in 
each province from March to June 2013 with support from the National Science 
Foundation (SES-1263807).  
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The Rise of Protest in Argentina, 1989-2014 
 
Perhaps as much as any Latin American country, Argentina has a rich history of 
popular mobilization. From the rise of the industrial working class in Buenos Aires in the 
1930s and 1940s to the emergence of the “madres” of the Plaza de Mayo during the tail 
end of the country’s Dirty War in the early 1980s, social movements have played an 
important role in Argentine politics for decades. But following the demise of the ruling 
military junta in 1983 amidst widespread demonstrations, many observers predicted that 
public debate would be channeled through newly created democratic institutions. Indeed, 
the initial decade of democracy in Argentina did little to dispel that notion. While the new 
regime certainly had its rocky moments, including President Raúl Alfonsín’s premature 
resignation amidst a spiking inflation rate in 1989, large-scale contentious protests would 
not reemerge in Argentina until the mid-1990s.  
 
The Menem Years – Sowing the Seeds of Contention 
In 1989 Carlos Menem, a relatively unknown Peronist (PJ) from the small 
northwestern province of La Rioja, succeeded Alfonsín and soon embarked on an 
ambitious plan to reduce inflation and trim public excess by pegging the Argentine peso 
to the U.S. dollar, deregulating markets, and privatizing public services (Svampa and 
Pereyra 2003). This new economic model represented an abrupt departure from the 
previous import substitution industrialization approach in Argentina, where a large 
percentage of workers were either public employees or members of powerful unions that 
served as intermediaries between the government and industry (Murillo 1997).  
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Throughout the first half of the 1990s, the reforms were successful by numerous 
metrics, sparking growth and reducing inflation in a country previously mired in decades 
of stunted economic progress. However, not every sector benefited from the neoliberal 
model. Industrial employment fell from twenty-four percent of total employment in 1991 
to sixteen percent in 2000 (Bayón and Saraví 2002), and the unemployment rate 
increased from six percent in 1990 to eighteen percent in 1996 (Svampa and Pereyra 
2003). Labor unions were largely stripped of their power, and the country’s largest and 
most important confederation of unions, the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo), 
split in 1992 over the decision to continue to support Menem’s reinvented Peronist party 
(Etchemendy 2005). While Menem was popular enough amidst a booming economy to 
reform the constitution and seek reelection in 1995, the seeds of discontent had been 
planted among the recently unemployed and disenfranchised union members who 
suffered under the new economic order.  
 A new era of contention was inaugurated in 1993 with the santiagazo in the 
northern province of Santiago del Estero. As a result of state decentralization efforts by 
Menem, where Argentine provinces were granted greater fiscal autonomy than ever 
before and tasked with taking over important public services like healthcare and 
education, Santiago del Estero soon found itself in a fiscal hole (Carrera and Cotarelo 
2001). Angered that they were not receiving their paychecks on time—or in some cases, 
at all—santiagueño public employees took to the streets, installing roadblocks, looting 
stores, and occupying and defacing government buildings throughout the provincial 
capital. To put an end to the most violent pueblada in Argentine history, the national 
government eventually intervened, but not before hundreds were injured and as many as 
	  91	  
ten were dead, and a slew of important government buildings and even the private homes 
of prominent public officials had been destroyed (Villalón 2007; Cotarelo 1999).  
 Unrest spread like wildfire throughout Argentina in the following months and 
years. Beginning with the southern province of Neuquén in 1996, the piquetero 
movement formed as a response to the 1992 privatization of Argentina’s state oil 
company, YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales), which was the largest source of 
public employment in the country and served as the economic backbone of oil-producing 
provinces in the Patagonia region. Following privatization, tens of thousands of state 
employees, accustomed to high-paying, secure employment, soon found themselves out 
of work as the new majority stakeholder in the company, Spanish oil giant Repsol, sought 
to strip down and make more efficient Argentina’s largest and most antiquated state 
industry. Following the initial roadblocks organized in Cutral-Có, Neuquén, the practice 
expanded to unemployed workers in other cities, where different groups adopted the 
piquetero moniker in their quest from public assistance amid dire economic 
circumstances (Garay 2007). 
Perhaps most notable about the protests in the 1990s was the extent to which non-
traditional civic organizations were credited with leading this rising tide of contention 
(Villalón 2007). In a democracy long dominated by a powerful workers party, which 
drew its strength in large part from labor unions, it was striking to see local neighborhood 
associations and newly founded confederations of the unemployed mobilizing citizens at 
such a prodigious rate. The protests of the 1990s were clearly more than just a response 
to unfortunate economic circumstances—they were the first indication that traditional 
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representational outlets were insufficient, and reflected a growing lack of trust in 
Argentina’s formal political institutions.  
Indeed, beyond merely being adversely affected by the economic reforms 
undertaken by Menem’s newly reimagined Peronist Party, there was a sense among many 
Argentine citizens that they had been duped by a politician who had said one thing during 
his presidential campaign, but done virtually the exact opposite once in office (Stokes 
2001). Menem ran a classic populist campaign, geared towards winning over union 
leadership and the working class – the traditional backbone of the PJ. Following his 
election, he not only embarked on a neoliberal economic campaign that crippled many of 
his supporters, but did so in a way that subverted political dialogue and compromise, 
forcing his agenda through using executive decrees and court-packing, among other 
democratically questionable tactics (O’Donnell 1993, Carey and Shugart 1998; Helmke 
2002). While the initially positive results of Menem’s economic strategy kept the 
backlash in check for a brief period of time, this growing sense of betrayal reared its head 
when menemismo began to produce diminishing returns.  
 
The December 2001 Crisis 
Years of building tension amidst widespread social unrest came to a head in late 
2001 following the October midterm elections, which resulted in the highest rates of 
absenteeism since Argentina returned to democracy and an unprecedented number of 
spoiled or null ballots (“voto bronca”; Figure 4.1). Menem’s second term had come and 
gone, and Argentina’s economic prospects were bleak. Two years into a severe economic 
recession, which had brought on unprecedented unemployment, food shortages, and 
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drastic cuts in social spending, Economic Minister Domingo Cavallo launched, with 
virtually no democratic debate and seemingly following the prescriptions of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), an effort to reduce capital flight by restricting the 
amount of money Argentines could withdraw from their bank accounts—a measure 
dubbed the “corralito” (Vilas 2006). Having alienated perhaps the only group of citizens 
not already in the streets, middle class Argentines with bank accounts in need of cash but 
without credit, the government’s fate was sealed. In December, citizens of all stripes 
launched an all-out assault on the incumbent de la Rúa government, setting the stage for 
perhaps the most contentious moment in Argentine history.  
 
Figure 4.1. Absenteeism and the “Voto Bronca” in the 2001 Legislative Election28 
 
 
 By mid-December, riots had broken out across the country, lootings of 
supermarkets and neighborhood kioscos had become widespread, and massive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Source: Argentine Ministry of the Interior website.  
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“cacerolazos,” characterized by the banging of empty pots and pans to symbolize the 
shortage of basic foodstuffs, were routine (Auyero 2005). De la Rúa declared a state of 
siege, allowing for the intervention of police and the military to quell the insurrections, 
which resulted in thirty-seven deaths in a week (Vilas 2006). Nowhere were the 
protestors bolder and more numerous than in the capital city, where on December 19 and 
20 tens of thousands of Argentines staged a cacerolazo in the Plaza de Mayo armed with 
one unifying cry – “Que se vayan todos!” (All of them must go!) – a phrase that perfectly 
captured Argentines’ lost faith in the democratic institutions of their country. On 
December 21, de la Rúa announced his resignation. His successor, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, 
would also resign after barely a week on the job.  
 More than just a reflection of the dire economic situation, the 2001-2002 protests 
exposed a growing lack of confidence in formal representative institutions that were 
deemed corrupt and ineffectual (Levitsky and Murillo 2003). Argentines believed that 
both of the country’s major parties—the Peronists, headed by Menem, and the UCR 
(Unión Radical Civil), represented by de la Rúa’s coalition government—had misled 
voters during their presidential campaigns, and ran corrupt administrations that rewarded 
loyalists and made politically advantageous but economically disastrous policy decisions. 
The sheer number of null and spoiled votes cast in the October midterms revealed this 
institutional distrust, as did the generalness of the protestors’ rallying cry.  
However, in the lead-up to de la Rúa’s resignation, political actors had already 
begun to explore how they might harness the power of these incipient social movements. 
Auyero’s (2007) seminal book on the 2001-2002 riots in the Buenos Aires metropolitan 
area explores this “gray zone” of politics, revealing that Peronist party leaders helped to 
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organize lootings of supermarkets and other protest events as the crisis loomed. 
Eventually, the Peronist governor of Buenos Aires province, Eduardo Duhalde, would 
take control of the presidency and help stabilize the Argentine economy. Another 
Peronist, Nestor Kirchner, succeeded him as president following Menem’s withdrawal 
from the race in the face of certain defeat in the second round election. Thus, while in 
many ways the Argentine citizenry accomplished their immediate goal of replacing de la 
Rúa, they also confirmed the potential usefulness of contentious tactics to a once-
powerful political party currently on the fringes of political influence.  
 
The Kirchner Years – An Era of Normalized Protest 
Like Menem, Kirchner was a little-known Peronist governor, this time from the 
sparsely populated southern province of Santa Cruz, who culminated his meteoric rise in 
Argentine politics with a ballotage victory in April 2003. Having only received about 
twenty percent of the vote in the first round, Kirchner was tasked with constructing an 
operational coalition with very little political clout within the traditional Peronist Party 
structure.  
One of the first places that Kirchner looked for support was among those who 
were most critical of the government during the crisis years—particularly the piquetero 
movement, which had emerged as one of the most powerful political groups in the 
country over the last decade. If Kirchner was going to be able to effectively govern, he 
needed to prevent the types of destabilizing protests that fomented popular discontent and 
brought an end to the de la Rúa and Duhalde presidencies. Thus, he reached out to 
piquetero leaders by offering several of them posts in his government, like Jorge Ceballos 
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(Barrios de Pie) and Luis D’Elía (Federación Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat). He also 
renewed the state’s commitment to unemployed Argentines in the form of increases in 
social welfare spending primarily through the Jefes y Jefas (Heads of Household) 
program. Finally, Kirchner made it a point of emphasis that police officers not repress 
protestors, in a conscious effort to avoid making the same mistakes as his predecessors 
(Levitsky and Murillo 2008). 
During the first Kirchner term, from 2003-2007, the government was able to quell 
contentious protests for the most part, and achieve the election of First Lady and Senator 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner to succeed her husband. Furthermore, the economy 
bounced back, as Argentines enjoyed one of the most successful four-year periods of 
growth in the country’s history (Figure 4.4). Fernández de Kirchner won with more than 
forty-five percent of the popular vote in the first round of the 2007 presidential election—
double what her husband received and more than twice as many votes as her closest 
competitor—thus precluding the need for a run-off. Despite their historic popularity and 
seeming vice grip on the Argentine presidency, the Kirchners would find themselves 
embroiled in one of Argentina’s most contentious moments ever only a few months later.  
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Figure 4.2. GDP Growth in Argentina from 1994-2012 29 
 
 
The first large scale protests under the two Kirchner governments began in March 
2008. Emboldened by strong economic growth and immense popularity since Kirchner’s 
2003 election (see Figure 4.4), Fernández de Kirchner sought to boost government 
revenues and decrease domestic food prices through a controversial export tax that also 
had the potential to enervate one of Peronism’s most powerful enemies: the agricultural 
sector. The tax would target soybean and sunflower exports—two of Argentina’s most 
lucrative commodities on the international market. Almost immediately, Argentine 
farmers responded with a countrywide strike, roadblocks of major highways, and a 
massive cacerolazo in the Plaza de Mayo, during which violent clashes between D’Elía’s 
pro-government followers and anti-government protestors resulted in multiple injuries.30 
In response, government supporters organized a protest march to counter that of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Source: The World Bank: data.worldbank.org/country/argentina.  
30 Most accounts point to D’Elía’s band of supporters as the aggressors, even suggesting that 
police nearby were aware of the violence but had been instructed not to intervene (Sued 2008: 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/998778-caceria-para-ganar-la-plaza).  
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farmers in April 2008 attended by thousands of kirchneristas. Finally, when the 
controversial legislation went up before the Argentine Senate after passing in the 
Chamber of Deputies, Vice President Julio Cobos cast a tie-breaking vote against the 
measure, effectively ending his relationship with the Fernández de Kirchner government.  
Since 2008, protest has continued to prosper as a form of political participation in 
Argentina. An increasingly vocal opposition organized several massive cacerolazos in 
2012, culminating in a protest event on November 8, 2012 that attracted over 700,000 
demonstrators in Buenos Aires alone31 and hundreds of thousands more in cities across 
the country. In 2014, a protest strike by police in Córdoba triggered similar work 
stoppages nationwide, which eventually resulted in rampant lootings and multiple deaths 
before provincial governments finally gave in to the protestors’ demands. Like 
clockwork, the start of the school year in March was delayed by a standoff between 
teacher’s unions and provincial governments, particularly in the chronically underfunded 
province of Buenos Aires. Fernández de Kirchner’s supporters, led by former piqueteros 
and La Cámpora, a youth organization founded by her son, continued to counteract anti-
government demonstrations with pro-government ones. In sum, virtually any political 
conflict seems to find its way into the streets in Argentina, regardless of the claimant or 
target of that claim.  
In Argentina, two organizations have taken the initiative to attempt to document 
protest activity since its emergence in the early 1990s: Nueva Mayoría and Programa de 
Investigación sobre el Movimiento de la Sociedad Argentina (PIMSA). As seen in 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4, the early to mid-1990s were relatively quiet in terms of protest 
activity. However, protest rates would swell in the latter part of the decade, with 2001-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	   Source: The Justice and Security Ministry of Buenos Aires. 	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2002 representing an unprecedented spike in protest activity across the country. 
However, perhaps more striking is the extent to which rates of protest participation have 
remained high in the aftermath of the crisis, even as the economy has stabilized. Indeed, 
Argentina has had a very healthy recovery from that debacle, growing at some of the 
most impressive rates in Latin America, which as a region has been booming since the 
turn of the century. In the case of roadblocks, 2008 (perhaps the peak of Argentina’s 
recent commodities boom) scores as far and away the most contentious year in recent 
history. It appears as if a new era of protest was inaugurated around the turn of the 
millennium, as political groups now seek to utilize protest repertoires to further their 
goals even in times of relative political and economic stability.  
 
Figure 4.3. Acts of Rebellion in Argentina, 1993-2009 
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Figure 4.4. Roadblocks in Argentina, 1997-2012 
 
          Source: Nueva Mayoría 2012      
 
These protest data confirm the extent to which Argentine citizens have 
increasingly responded in a contentious fashion to a political system that promises 
democratic representation, yet fails to deliver. As democracy has consolidated in 
Argentina over the past three decades and individuals have become increasingly 
politically active, I aver that expectations for democracy have risen. I argue that the 
persistence of “delegative” democracy (O’Donnell 1993), rampant political corruption, 
and parties that vacillate wildly from one policy stance to the next have led Argentines to 
sour on formal modes of making their voices heard, and turned increasingly to street-
based participation as a more aggressive, but oftentimes effective, mode of obtaining 
representation. This disenchantment is reflected in survey data from the country, in 
addition to the recent normalization of contentious participation (Figure 4.5). Figure 4.5 
illustrates that Argentine ranks among the bottom in Americas in system support, a 
variable constructed by LAPOP to gauge citizen support for key regime institutions like 
the national legislature, the Supreme Court, and political parties. 
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Figure 4.5. System Support in Argentina in Comparative Perspective (2008-2012)32 
 
 
In the following section, I evaluate the degree to which Argentine provinces differ 
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32 Support for national institutions is measured by scale summarizing results of seven B-series 
questions (b2 b3 b4 b6 b21 b13 b31): B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions 
of (country)? B3. To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the 
political system of (country)? B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political 
system of (country)? B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system 
of (country)? B13. To what extent do you trust the National Legislature? B21. To what extent do 
you trust the political parties? B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court? 	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their borders. My expectation is that in certain subnational contexts within Argentina, 
patrimonial governments dominate political life to the extent that the expectation for 
democratic representation among individuals has evaporated. However, in other 
provincial regimes at intermediate levels of democratic quality, a similar dynamic to what 
we observe at the national level surfaces, wherein democratic institutions are 
unresponsive enough that contentious participation in deemed necessary, but not so 
closed off as to preclude any challenging of the local political machine. Finally, I also 
expect that certain provincial systems outperform the national regime, achieving a level 
of competitive multiparty democracy similar to what we find in countries like Uruguay 
and Costa Rica.  
 
Narrowing the Focus: Analyzing Protest at the Provincial Level 
 
Argentina is undoubtedly a contentious case, as illustrated in the previous section. 
At certain moments, the country has seemingly erupted in mass protests nationwide that 
have had serious consequences for the country’s politics. Now, it seems that virtually any 
political conflict is mediated at least in part in the streets. Yet this national-level account 
of Argentine protests leaves two questions unanswered: Do repertoires of participation 
vary subnationally in Argentina? And if so, what explains the uneven nature of protest 
activity found within the country?  
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Figure 4.6. Average Annual Acts of Rebellion by Province, 1994-2010 
 
 
 Clearly, wide variation exists in terms of the extent to which protest has caught on 
in Argentine provinces. The most obvious initial conclusion one might draw from Figure 
4.6 is that the population of the province is what drives levels of contentious politics, as 
the top four cases in terms of average annual protest events are the capital city and the 
country’s three most populous provinces. But it seems as if other factors are at play as 
well—indeed, several more sparsely populated provinces like Jujuy, Entre Rios, and 
Neuquén are ranked relatively high in terms of annual acts of rebellion, while provinces 
of a similar size like Formosa and La Rioja register virtually no protests during the period 
under consideration. 
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Figure 4.7. Annual Roadblocks by PBG per Capita 
 
 
At first glance, no obvious relationship surfaces between economic circumstances 
and variation in protest activity across provinces (Figure 4.7). Indeed, both poor and rich 
provinces can be counted among the “most contentious” cases, while the same can be 
said for the group of provinces with lower rates of protest activity. Clearly the 2001-2002 
economic crisis produced a spike in protest activity, but the extremely high number of 
protests in 2008 occurred during times of relative prosperity. Along the same lines, the 
economically depressed times of the late 1980s failed to produce many protests. For all of 
these reasons, I look to political factors to explain this striking subnational variation in 
protest activity. 
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Uneven Democracy and Protest 
Since the Third Wave of democracy occurred in Latin America, scholars have 
noted that democratization failed to take hold uniformly within countries—that is, 
“authoritarian enclaves” remained in regimes that were at the national level, ostensibly 
democratic (Fox 1994). In these so-called “brown areas,” subnational politics might 
scarcely resemble modern conceptualizations of democracy, characterized instead by 
personalistic machines, uncompetitive elections, and political clientelism (O’Donnell 
1993). This variation could conceivably have important consequences for the political 
rights of citizens, economic development outcomes, and individuals’ attitudes towards 
the national political regime (e.g. Hiskey 2002, Gibson 2004, Hiskey and Bowler 2005).  
Like many of its Latin American neighbors, Argentina is a veritable hodgepodge 
of subnational regime types. It is home to one of Latin America’s most (in)famous 
federal systems, characterized by vast differences in the quality of democratic institutions 
found within the country’s twenty-three provincial governments (Spiller and Tommasi 
2009, Gibson and Suarez-Cao 2010, Behrend 2011). In some provinces, liberal 
democracy is the name of the game, characterized by competitive elections, free media, 
enforced property rights, and the apolitical dispersion of social programs and public jobs. 
In other Argentine provinces, powerful bosses eliminate their competition through 
aggressive political clientelism, the absence of independent media, and even occasional 
repression (e.g. Gibson and Calvo 2001, Chavez 2004, Gibson 2004, Gervasoni 2010). In 
sum, while Argentina has certainly transitioned to liberal democracy at the national level 
(even if it experiences the occasional hiccup), there is a great deal of evidence supporting 
the notion that many Argentine provinces have yet to make that transition.  
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One additional factor that makes Argentina a particularly intriguing case for 
subnational research is the profound decentralization of economic resources and 
policymaking authority that occurred in the 1990s in the country. Seemingly, these 
reforms would make provincial regimes more accountable to the popular will, but also 
more capable in responding to public opinion and election results. However, contrary to 
received wisdom, much evidence suggests that the decentralization process that occurred 
in the country failed to significantly increase provincial power vis-à-vis the central 
government, and has led to numerous high profile fiscal crises and corruption scandals in 
provincial governments (Falleti 2005; 2010). In sum, the growing provincial obligations 
with respect to the provision of public services have made the successes and failings of 
provincial governments more apparent to Argentine citizens than ever before. 
 How might the uneven nature of subnational democracy in Argentina impact the 
spatial variation we observe in terms of contentious politics and relate to my argument 
about flawed institutions and civic engagement? To this point, most work on the 
institutional determinants of protest has zeroed in on the national level (e.g. Machado et 
al. 2012, Dalton et al. 2009). Two recent articles have attempted to unravel how political 
competition affects rates of protest participation at the subnational level (Arce and 
Mangonnet (2012) focus on Argentine provinces, while Boulding (2010) looks at 
Bolivian municipalities), but neither study offers a more complete view of the ways in 
which subnational political environments might exacerbate or discourage contentious 
participation.  
 The work most relevant to explaining how subnational regime characteristics 
influence variation in contentious politics within Argentina actually comes from the 
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1970s, beginning with a study on urban riots in U.S. cities. In his seminal 1973 article in 
the American Political Science Review, Peter Eisinger sought to explain why violent 
uprisings occurred in certain U.S. cities during the American Civil Rights Movement, but 
not others. While the dominant theoretical school at the time attributed urban uprisings by 
African Americans to relative deprivation—i.e., the "perceived discrepancy between 
value expectations and value capabilities" (Gurr 1970, p. 37)—Eisinger was interested in 
how characteristics of local political systems might make citizens more or less likely to 
adopt contentious tactics. Specifically, he analyzed the extent to which municipal 
institutions were “open” or “closed” to effective political participation by African 
Americans (i.e., promising and delivering – or not – on democratic representation). 
Eventually, he determined that the relationship between political openness and protest 
participation was a curvilinear one: i.e., open systems facilitate effective participation via 
formal vehicles, while closed systems prevent widespread protest participation due to the 
costliness of participating. However, at intermediate levels of openness, institutions are 
not responsive to the extent that they render protest unnecessary, yet are open enough that 
individuals can draw on existing civil society organizations to mobilize without fear of 
repression (see also Muller and Seligson 1987).  These regimes promise but do not 
deliver democratic representation, and where an active citizenry is present, this failure to 
deliver can transform civic engagement into protest. 
 While the initial unveiling of this theoretical approach focused on the subnational 
level, subsequent studies attempted to apply the political contextual framework to 
national political institutions. Eventually, a new avenue of empirical research began to 
crystalize that examined “political opportunities,” or “consistent—but not necessarily 
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formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for 
people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or 
failure” (Tarrow 1994; p. 85). These dimensions can include the nature of political 
competition, characteristics of party systems and legislative bodies, and rule of law 
institutions—any factors that influence social movements’ prospects for “(a) mobilizing, 
(b) advancing particular claims rather than others, (c) cultivating some alliances rather 
than others, (d) employing particular political strategies and tactics rather than others, and 
(e) affecting mainstream institutional politics and policy” (Meyer 2004, p. 126; see also 
Kitschelt 1986).  
 Of course, other causal mechanisms are necessary for protest to emerge in a 
particular system beyond contextual political factors alone. Grievances and 
organizational resources specifically have an important impact on a given population’s 
potential for mobilizing in contentious ways. Yet as we have seen, no direct relationship 
between levels of development and the number of protest events seems to emerge at the 
provincial level, and contentious political activities have continued to thrive in Argentina 
even as the economy has rebounded. Moreover, in the Argentine context, organizational 
resources (i.e., opportunities for “engagement”) and provincial political contexts are 
tightly related. In many provincial regimes—e.g. San Luis, Formosa, and La Rioja—civil 
society is so dominated by the ruling political elite, that independent grassroots 
movements might have trouble forming and garnering mass support. Thus, in some ways, 
“openness” encompasses the extent to which civic organizations can serve to aggregate 
and vocalize opposition voices in the form of organized protests. Finally, by shifting the 
level of analysis to “within-country,” I am able to control for many (but not all) national 
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economic shocks that affect subnational units in a given country, and cultural factors that 
might bear on protest repertoires.  
 
Three Subnational Regime Types  
From this discussion of political opportunities and relative openness, we can 
derive three different subnational regimes “types” that might help explain variation in 
contention across Argentine provinces: 1) the closed provincial regime, 2) the open 
provincial regime, and 3) the mixed provincial political environment. Below, I discuss 
specific characteristics of each, and how they relate to conceptualizations of institutional 
quality presented in previous chapters.  
 On one end of the openness spectrum is the closed system, where there exists no 
credible political threat to the political machine in power. Opposition parties in these 
contexts are weakly organized and lack necessary funding, and the dominant political 
force in the province exerts a great deal of control over local media and civil society. The 
same party almost always controls the governorship and legislature, and that party also 
plays a pivotal role in selecting the national legislators that will represent the province in 
Buenos Aires. Moreover, the political elite in closed systems frequently wield a great 
deal of control over the judiciary and local law enforcement, and often come from a 
select group of powerful political families who use their discretionary control over public 
employment to reward loyalists and punish dissidents (Chavez 2004, Behrend 2011). In 
many cases, these types of subnational regimes develop in small, peripheral provinces 
with limited productive activity, thus granting the ruling machine immense influence over 
the local economy given the considerable funding that such provinces receive under the 
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Co-Participation System enacted in 1988 (Gervasoni 2010).33 Closed regimes impede 
effective political participation, as the winner in virtually any local election is 
predetermined. Given the absence of strong opposition parties and meekness of local 
media and civil society, citizens within these regimes encounter difficulties when 
attempting to mobilize opposition. Further, the ruling machine’s access to economic and 
juridical power makes any potential protestors vulnerable to harsh punishment.    
 On the other hand, in open systems more than one party competes for political 
power with realistic hopes of attaining office—i.e., there is “institutionalized uncertainty” 
(Przeworski 1991). In these more liberal contexts media is free, with different news 
outlets representing distinct economic and political sectors, some of which are openly 
critical of the incumbent government. Such provincial regimes also boast independent 
judiciaries and law enforcement, which treat citizens equitably regardless of their partisan 
affiliation. In open provincial regimes, power has changed hands several times without 
incident, and the indefinite reelection of governors (and even members of the same 
family, in the case of Mendoza) is prohibited. Open regimes should provide citizens with 
numerous formal outlets for political participation through which they can feel at least 
somewhat efficacious, given the diversity of electoral options and the general 
inclusiveness of the provincial regime. Certainly some protest can be expected, as is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The Co-Participation Law has existed in some form since the 1930s, though its most recent 
incarnation was passed in 1988. Originally only a temporary provision, the law intended to 
redistribute funds from Argentina’s wealthiest provinces to its poorest. So in the case of a 
province like Buenos Aires, the largest in the country in terms of population and economic 
output, it contributes far more to federal funds than it receives. On the other hand, a province like 
La Rioja contributes virtually nothing to the co-participation system while receiving funding from 
the national government that amounts to a very high percentage of the total economic activity in 
that province. Given that the Argentine population is largely concentrated in three provinces—
Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, and Córdoba—and the autonomous capital, the vast majority of 
provinces stand to benefit from the current set-up, and most experts regard any potential reform 
of the current system highly unlikely.  
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case in any democratic regime, but most conflict will be mediated through non-
confrontational, in many cases formal, channels.  
 Finally, mixed systems typify the protest-producing contexts outlined by Eisinger 
and others, where political structures are not fully accommodating of opposition voices 
and participation, yet are not so closed off that potential movements have no 
organizational capacity or hope that their actions might make a difference. In other 
words, non-traditional forms of participation might be deemed necessary to effectively 
influence policymakers, but not so costly as to render them unlikely. An example might 
be a province where one party has always controlled the governorship and legislature, 
rendering electoral participation ineffectual in large part, but elections are increasingly 
competitive, independent media exists, and repression is rarely utilized to quell anti-
government demonstrations. In such a case where a hegemonic provincial party exists but 
there are still reasons for citizens in the opposition to believe that 1) they are capable of 
effectively organizing movements and 2) those movements might precipitate a positive 
response from the government, protest can flourish.  
 Figure 4.8 illustrates how the number of contentious events varies based on 
provincial regime characteristics. Using Gervasoni’s (2010) subnational democracy 
scores, we find the lowest levels of contentiousness among Argentina’s most and least 
democratic provinces. The highest levels of protest activity are found in mixed contexts, 
in keeping with the expectations outlined above. Below, I consider three provinces that 
fall in each category, providing more nuanced information as to how political contexts 
affect individuals’ abilities to coordinate and participate in contentious activities.  
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Figure 4.8. Protests across Provincial Political Environments: 
Average annual protests per 100,000 citizens in Argentine Provinces, 1994-2011 
 
Sources: Nueva Mayoría 2012, PIMSA 2011           
 
A Sequential Outline of the Normalization of Protest 
The argument and suggestive evidence outlined above hold that in mixed systems, 
falling somewhere in the middle of the openness spectrum, individuals are more likely to 
turn to contentious means of participation in attempting to influence government. In these 
contexts, formal institutional vehicles for representation remain suboptimal, but 
individuals are able to organize movements and expect that their contentious activities 
will be met with some type of government response other than repression. In other words, 
institutional performance is low while civic engagement remains relatively high, unlike in 
closed systems. 
 I argue that over the course of time, contentious participation is absorbed into the 
“repertoire” of normal, everyday tactics used by politically interested and active citizens 
in poorly performing democracies. While many social movement scholars have argued 
over the years that democratization eventually allows for movements’ absorption into 
politics through formal mechanisms of representation, I argue that this process has not 
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occurred as expected, particularly at the subnational level in Latin America. In provincial 
and state regimes across the region democratization has been uneven, as many systems 
have remained dominated by one party or political family, the rule of law is often 
patchily enforced, and wide gaps in economic development persist. 
 Where protest is deemed necessary to effectively pursue political objectives and 
citizens are allowed to freely organize and demonstrate, contentious participation can 
consolidate as a go-to form of political voice. As observed in Figure 4.3, since the dawn 
of the current era of protest in Argentina leading up to the 2001-2002 crisis, rates of 
protest have fallen only slightly to levels far exceeding those observed before the crisis. 
While the spike in contentious activity in 2001-2002 might be partially explained by a 
deep recession and debt default, which drew the collective ire of Argentines across the 
sociopolitical spectra, the time period since has been characterized by unprecedented 
economic prosperity for the country. I argue that individuals’ lack of faith in formal 
political institutions, and the success they had in mobilizing during the crisis and 
precipitating profound changes in the government, paved the way for an era where 
politics in the streets would be the norm rather than the exception.  
 
Subnational Institutions and Protest: Lessons from Three Provinces 
 
In this section, I draw on three provincial cases to help illustrate how subnational 
political environments shape contentious repertoires in Argentina. Each case corresponds 
to one of the three ideal types described above, and a section of the openness spectrum. 
These case studies are based on 1) my reading of historical research by local academics 
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and 2) interviews with protestors, public officials, and other resident experts on the 
politics of the provinces of San Luis, Mendoza, and Buenos Aires.34 Because of the 
delicate nature of some of these interviews, I have omitted any identifying information 
that could be traced to interviewees in the discussion below.35 
 
Figure 4.9. A Map of Argentine Provinces 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Thirty-seven total sit-down interviews were carried out in Buenos Aires capital, Buenos Aires 
province, Mendoza, and San Luis in Spring 2013. Subjects were initially drawn from a list of 
experts utilized in Gervasoni’s (2010) elite surveys project, and then additional interviews were 
obtained through these contacts. I also carried out dozens of informal interviews in Buenos Aires 
with protestors throughout late 2012 and early 2013—notably, at the three massive cacerolazos 
that occurred on September 13, 2012, November 8, 2012, and April 18, 2013.  
35 Conditional for approval by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board: IRB# 
101398.   
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 These three provinces were chosen for the diversity they offer on the key 
independent and dependent variables—namely, political context and protest activity—but 
also for their similarities on other key variables. While Buenos Aires is by far the most 
populous province in Argentina and for that reason, a different animal in some respects, 
all three provinces could be characterized as middle income in terms of per capita PGB 
and relatively high in terms of human development (INDEC 2010). While Argentina’s 
northern provinces are very poor and underdeveloped, and its southern energy-producing 
provinces are located far above the national averages on classic development metrics (e.g. 
education levels, infant mortality, food scarcity), Argentina’s middle corridor of 
provinces—Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, Córdoba, San Luis, and Mendoza—are all largely 
agricultural and upper-middle income when compared to other provinces. In sum, while 
this selection of cases is probably not perfect by Mill’s (1843) standards, it does provide 
examples of three provincial environments characterized by similar levels of economic 
and human development, but vastly different institutional environments and contentious 
repertoires.  
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Figure 4.10. Openness and Protest Activity in Argentine Provinces36 
 
 
San Luis 
The province of San Luis is located in the Cuyo region of Argentina, in the center-
west. San Luis is a sparsely populated province that was underdeveloped historically, 
lacking the fertile soil of the Pampas region or any major urban center. Politically, San 
Luis has been one of the most uncompetitive, borderline authoritarian provinces in 
Argentina since democratization. Two brothers from one of the province’s most 
important families, Adolfo and Alberto Rodríguez-Saá, alternated serving as governor of 
San Luis from 1983 to 2011, during which time each brother also served multiple terms 
as a national senator. Adolfo actually held the governorship for five consecutive terms, 
after managing to reform the San Luis constitution in 1987.  
 Beyond simply occupying important elected offices in San Luis politics, the 
Rodriguez-Saá brothers have also possessed several other distinct advantages that they 
have used to maintain their political hegemony in the province. Beginning in the 1980s, 
the two major newspapers (El Diario de San Luis and La Opinión) and several important 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The shaded area indicates democracy.  
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television outlets in the province were all eventually purchased by either the Rodríguez-
Saá family itself or close friends who occupied important positions in their 
administrations (Behrend 2011).  
From an economic standpoint, the Rodríguez-Saá brothers have possessed several 
other sources of influence that have permitted them to dominate the provincial economy 
and continually obtain reelection. Given San Luis’ small size and overrepresentation in 
the national congress, it receives a great deal of federal funding under Argentina’s co-
participation scheme—much more per capita than more populated provinces. This fact 
has allowed the Rodríguez-Saá brothers to invest heavily in public housing, welfare 
programs, and infrastructure (Bianchi 2013). Indeed, a sizeable percentage of the 
puntano37 population has either been employed by the provincial government or lives in 
one of the many homes built with public funds, which cost next to nothing and range 
from humble public housing projects to larger homes for middle class families. 
38According to local academic Matias Bianchi, from 1983 to 2000, the San Luis 
government constructed 43,202 public houses39 that were made available to anyone, and 
ranged from humble, one-bedroom casitas to four-bedroom homes found in suburban 
areas outside of the capital city (Bianchi 2013). One professor at Universidad Nacional 
de San Luis (UNSL) explained that the mortgage on his three-bedroom house was about 
$100 a month—much cheaper than a privately constructed home of similar quality. While 
he was no fan of the Rodriguez-Saá brothers and openly recognized the illiberal nature of 
San Luis politics, the offer was too good to refuse. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The nickname “puntano” comes from the capital city’s location at the foot of the Punta de los 
Venados mountain.  
38 In 2004, forty-seven out of every 1,000 puntanos were public employees, outpacing the 
national average by ten (MECON 2004).  
39 Keep in mind that in 2000, the population of San Luis province was 365,168.	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One prominent UCR leader in San Luis lamented that building the party’s base in 
the province was nearly impossible amidst such high levels of dependence on the 
government for housing, employment, and sustenance. He listed several cases where his 
supporters had been fired from their public jobs or denied their monthly cash transfers 
after Rodríguez-Saá operatives discovered they had attended a UCR rally. In his words, 
competing against the PJ in San Luis was playing football on a “cancha inclinada” 
(uneven playing field). Another puntana activist said that the provincial government 
actually required that individuals participate in a ceremonial handing over of the keys to 
obtain public housing, which was always attended by one of the brothers and a small 
group of journalists that would document the event in the next day’s edition of the 
provincial paper. One of her friends had refused to partake in the ceremony, and was 
shortly notified that her contract was void and she would not receive a house.  
Another key facet of the Rodríguez-Saá dominance of San Luis politics has been 
the Industrial Promotion Law, which went into effect in the 1980s under President 
Alfonsín. This legislation was originally drafted under Perón in 1973 as an effort to 
compensate the western Argentine provinces that sustained the heaviest casualties during 
the War for Independence (Catamarca, La Rioja, San Juan, and San Luis). The law 
essentially created tax-free zones in each of the four provinces, providing strong 
incentives for companies to relocate at least some phase of production to these four 
previously lagging provincial economies. This advantage resulted in San Luis’ transition 
to a middle-class province, and built a great deal of political capital for the Rodríguez-
Saá brothers for overseeing this rapid period of growth (Bianchi 2013).  
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 According to both Nueva Mayoría and PIMSA data, San Luis has maintained one 
of the lowest rates of protest participation in Argentina since 1993. Interviews with local 
activists, politicians, and academics reinforced the idea that organizing movements 
against the Rodríguez Saá was exceedingly difficult and in some cases, dangerous. 
Generally, opportunities for citizen engagement of any kind are few and far between, 
given the Rodríguez-Saá brothers’ deep insertion in virtually every sphere of social and 
political life. 
One local activist recounted the events of the multisectorial—a social movement 
named for the multiple sectors of puntano society that banded together to protest against a 
highly controversial redistricting effort led by the Rodríguez-Saá brothers in 2004. While 
the PJ dominated politics at the provincial level, they were weaker in the capital city, 
where the UCR continued to win local elections on occasion. The brothers viewed this as 
an affront to their provincial dominance, and concocted a plan that would divide the city 
government into five different sub-cities, aiming to counteract the mayor elected from the 
UCR stronghold with four Rodríguez-Saá loyalists—in other words, a San Luis version 
of American gerrymandering.  
 For the first time under the reign of the Rodríguez-Saá, the citizens of San Luis 
had had enough. Led by opposition parties, union leaders (mostly associated with the 
Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA)), prominent academics at the UNSL, and 
religious leaders, 40,000 protestors congregated in front of the casa de gobierno to voice 
their resistance to what they viewed as bald-faced political maneuvering that would have 
serious consequences for how they would be taxed, what schools their children would 
attend, and most importantly, their cultural identities as citizens of San Luis. Puntanos 
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were also well aware that towns where the opposition won often found their funding 
mysteriously disappear, as was the case in the nearby touristic city of Merlo (Rosenberg 
2004),40 and sought to prevent suffering a similar fate in the UCR controlled section of 
the capital.  
The protests began in March of 2004, and would continue for months. Quickly, 
the events turned violent, as then-governor Alberto Rodríguez-Saá ordered the provincial 
police to crack down on the protestors with tear gas and batons. In retaliation, the 
demonstrators began peppering the casa de gobierno with rocks, vandalizing it and 
several other public buildings, and lighting tires in the streets. The most violent 
confrontation between the police and protestors occurred in May, when fifteen protestors 
were hospitalized for injuries inflicted by the police and fifty-five demonstrators were 
imprisoned (San Martín 2004).41 As the protestors shifted their focus from the proposed 
redistricting to myriad other claims regarding the Rodríguez-Saá family’s domination of 
San Luis politics, they began to look to the national government for help, demanding a 
federal intervention. Eventually, Hebe de Bonafini, founder and leader of the Madres de 
la Plaza de Mayo movement, joined the protestors in San Luis, proclaiming,  
 
“I know the Rodríguez-Saá, and they are corrupt fascists. In Argentina, we can’t 
allow for the existence of hidden dictatorships. San Luis is a hidden dictatorship, and the 
police repress anyone who works for and demands justice and democracy. The only thing 
they’re missing is López-Rega” 42 (Página12 2004; author’s translation).43 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 La Nación: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/587910-rodriguez-saa-borro-de-los-mapas-a-merlo-
bastion-de-la-oposicion  
41 La Nación: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/597473-la-represion-policial-dejo-15-hospitalizados  
42 José López-Rega was the Minister of Social Welfare under Perón from 1973-1976 who is 
credited with hastening Argentina’s descent into authoritarianism and initiating the “Dirty War.” 
43 Página 12: http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-35317-2004-05-14.html  
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Just when it seemed that the multisectorial would result in fundamental political 
change for the province, the national government refused to intervene, the provincial 
government backed down on their redistricting efforts, and eventually the protests died 
down. As evident in Figure 4.11, which compares San Luis to Mendoza and Buenos 
Aires, protest rates were low before the events of 2004 and have remained low since. On 
the only occasion when a large-scale protest mobilization occurred, it was met swiftly 
with repression by the provincial government, and while successful in the short term, 
produced little in the way of long term political change. Thus, while the 2004 
multisectorial attracted the participation of an unprecedented percentage of the San Luis 
population, it was only a remarkable blip in a province otherwise dominated by the 
Rodríguez-Saá for the past thirty years. Hardly anyone in San Luis protested during the 
2001-2002 crisis, and even during recent years when protests have raged across most of 
the rest of the country, citizens of San Luis have remained conspicuously silent.  
 
Figure 4.11. Acts of Rebellion per 100,000 Citizens: 
San Luis, Mendoza, and Buenos Aires 
 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Buenos Aires Mendoza San Luis 
	  122	  
Mendoza 
Mendoza neighbors San Luis to the west and is also part of the Cuyo region of 
Argentina, but from a political standpoint the two provinces could not be more 
different.44 Since the country’s democratization, Mendoza has played host to strong 
multiparty competition, an independent and free press, and a diversified economy 
characterized by minimal public employment and low levels of clientelism. Despite 
having only one significant urban center—the provincial capital that shares the same 
name—Mendoza has never been dominated by one family or cadre of political and 
economic elites, and boasts a political system where the principle of separation of powers 
is highly observed and valued. It is also home to a diverse collection of citizen 
organizations, boasting one of the highest concentrations of civil associations per 1,000 
citizens in Argentina (MECON 2010).  
 Unlike at the national level, where Peronism has been the dominant party since its 
inception with the Radicals running a distant second, Mendoza possesses three significant 
political parties: the PJ, UCR, and the Democratic Party (PD), a center right party found 
only in Mendoza. The UCR and PJ have alternated in the governorship since 1983, while 
the PD has maintained a steady presence in the provincial legislature, even winning a 
plurality of the votes in 1999. All three parties possess strong organizations that carry out 
community outreach programs throughout the province, build alliances within the 
provincial and national legislatures (where the PD votes with Buenos Aires-based PRO), 
and maintain fairly consistent ideological platforms.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 In numerous conversations, mendocinos proudly pointed to the democratic history of their 
province, and in some cases mocked neighboring San Luis by quoting an old slogan the province 
used to promote tourism: “San Luis, es otro pais!” One activist even shared with me that the only 
province in the country where her organization had yet to gain a foothold was San Luis, due to a 
combination of factors. 
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Among the consequences of multiparty competition in Mendoza has been an 
independent judiciary and strong rule of law institutions (Chavez 2002). Unlike San Luis, 
Mendoza is also home to several independent provincial newspapers that are owned by 
different groups, and are free to criticize the incumbent government without fear of 
retribution. For these reasons, Mendoza has routinely been scored as the most democratic 
province in Argentina (Giraudy 2009, Gervasoni 2010). A former editor of the province’s 
most important newspaper, Andes, suggested that Mendoza’s democratic history could be 
traced to its closer proximity to Chile than to Buenos Aires, its strong middle class, and 
the extent to which those factors produced a resilient Radical party that could compete 
with Peronism, unlike in many other Argentine provinces.  
 Mendoza ranks low among Argentine provinces in terms of the number of 
protests that occur there annually per the size of its population. According to multiple 
sources, on the rare occasion that Mendoza does erupt in mass protest, those protests are 
normally directed at the national government and often revolve around issues related to 
democratic rules of the game. The 1972 mendozazo is still regarded as one of the most 
important and violent protests to occur under the Argentine military regimes, and was one 
of the many mobilizations throughout Argentina that precipitated the brief return of 
elections in 1973. Since the establishment of the provincial constitution in 1916, 
Mendoza has been one of only two provinces in Argentina to continue to ban governors 
from being reelected, and the only province to prohibit consecutive terms by family 
members. When current governor Francisco Pérez sought a constitutional reform in 2013 
to permit one reelection for governors, he was met by widespread protests in the 
provincial capital. Indeed, some of the most significant mobilizations in Mendoza have 
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arisen in response to attempted constitutional reforms—e.g., when Menem pursued 
reelection in the mid-1990s and when rumors began to swirl that Cristina Kirchner would 
seek indefinite reelection in late-2012. Thus, while protests surface on occasion, they 
normally look towards Buenos Aires, and hardly ever result in long-standing strikes or 
the widespread use of confrontational tactics like roadblocks. 
 
Buenos Aires 
Representing the middle of the spectrum is Buenos Aires, Argentina’s largest 
province in terms of population and economic importance. By some metrics, Buenos 
Aires is a relatively open subnational democracy – no small elite cadre has dominated its 
politics and it has the country’s most varied provincial economy, which has produced a 
diverse and influential civil society capable of mobilizing large numbers of citizens at a 
moment’s notice. Independent sources of political information abound, as Buenos Aires 
has a rich collection of newspapers, television channels, and radio stations that fall 
outside of the provincial government’s sphere of influence.  
 However, Buenos Aires comes up short in terms of democratic quality when 
compared to a province like Mendoza for several reasons; chiefly, the Peronists’ electoral 
dominance in the province. The only time another party has held the governorship of 
Buenos Aires was during the first four years of democracy following the 1983 transition, 
and another party has held control of the provincial legislature for only four years (the 
UCR from 1997-2001). In many cases, the winning Peronist candidate for governor has 
garnered a margin of victory exceeding thirty percent, offering a strong indication of the 
power asymmetry that exists in the province between the PJ and its closest rival, the 
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UCR. Moreover, the most populated area of the province—the conurbano metropolitan 
region surrounding the nation’s capital—has been famously dominated by clientelistic 
Peronist mayors who played a critical role in fomenting unrest during the lead-up to the 
December 2001 crisis (Auyero 2005).   
Another reason why Buenos Aires’ provincial political institutions fall short of 
ideal representativeness has little to do with what happens within the province itself. 
Buenos Aires is the primary victim of Argentina’s Co-Participation Law, meaning that 
bonaerense citizens receive far less federal funding per capita for education, healthcare, 
and social programs than Argentines in any other province. For this reason, provincial 
politicians are often unable to deliver high quality public services to their constituents—
part of the reason why Buenos Aires has higher levels of poverty and unemployment than 
the national average—and experts on provincial politics have called the governor of 
Buenos Aires one of the weakest public figures in the country (Di Marco 2013).45 Recent 
strikes by police officers and teachers in pursuit of pay raises offer evidence of the extent 
to which the provincial government is hamstrung by its relatively low levels of federal 
funding when attempting to mediate social conflict. In certain situations, the federal 
government has stepped in to provide a short-term boost in public spending, and given 
the electoral import of the country’s most populous province, claim credit for the 
generous federal intervention (Moscovich 2013). In the eyes of bonaerenses, these 
interventions further highlight the inability of provincial institutions to respond to the 
demands the province’s citizenry.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 La Nación 2013: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1634629-cuentas-fuertes-lealtades-debiles-el-
secreto-del-poder-de-los-intendentes  
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In conversations with former politicians and other experts on the politics of 
Buenos Aires, several interviewees stressed that the province was best understood as 
having two distinct parts: the conurbano and the interior. Traditionally, protests are more 
common in the conurbano, where individuals are more likely to identify as porteños 
(inhabitants of the capital city of Buenos Aires) than citizens of the province. Indeed, 
these electoral districts are underrepresented in the provincial legislature in La Plata in 
terms of the number of seats they possess, while the conurbano is the most important 
battleground during presidential elections, meaning citizens of the area often look more 
to national than provincial elected officials for solutions to their problems. Given this 
fact, one provincial pollster said that denizens of the conurbano region were often 
dissatisfied with representation in the provincial legislature, and were sometimes even 
unaware of basic facts regarding provincial institutions. For them, the politicians in La 
Plata care far less about what happens in their neighborhood than national political 
leaders, who are more visible in the media and spend more timing campaigning in the 
conurbano in election years.  
Recent social movements in Buenos Aires province offer illustrative examples 
regarding the role that representational deficits play in creating an environment ripe for 
protest. During the standoff between the agricultural sector and the Kirchner government 
in 2008, Buenos Aires was one of the primary battlegrounds, given the importance of soy 
and sunflower production in the interior of the province. Bonaerense farmers were caught 
in a difficult situation in terms of their options for overturning the legislation. Citizens of 
a country with one hegemonic political party at the national level (the PJ), and a province 
dominated by a powerful branch of that party operating in close concert with the federal 
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government, they were left with few formal options for political representation. Strikes 
and roadblocks thus became the key tactics utilized, as they attempted to shut down the 
country’s most important productive sector and put the squeeze on their rivals in Buenos 
Aires. Eventually, their efforts resulted in a surprise success in the Senate based on the 
movement’s ability to shift national public opinion in their favor.  
Another example would be the seemingly annual conflict between teachers and 
the governor in Buenos Aires over salaries. As of the final week of March 2014, Buenos 
Aires public schools had been closed for the initial two weeks of the school year due to 
ongoing wage negotiations between the bonaerense government and teachers’ unions led 
by the Buenos Aires division of the Confederación de Trabajadores de la Educación de 
la República de Argentina (CTERA), Sindicato Unificado de Trabajadores de la 
Educación de Buenos Aires (SUTEBA). These strikes have become so frequent and 
occasionally dramatic that the leader of SUTEBA, Roberto Baradel, has emerged as a 
well-known public figure throughout Argentina, grabbing front-page headlines routinely 
in La Nación and Clarín. While teachers’ strikes are commonplace in Argentina, the 
contentiousness of the relationship between unions and the bonaerense government is 
heightened by the Buenos Aires governor’s fiscal weakness (the province’s teachers have 
some of the lowest salaries in the country) and the lack of an effective participatory 
alternative to striking for Buenos Aires teachers.  
As evident in Figure 4.12, Buenos Aires province has played host to a staggering 
number of protest events since the early 1990s, and particularly since 2000.46 Even when 
one takes into account the size of the province, Buenos Aires ranks as one of the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 These figures do not include the autonomous national capital, which is not technically part of 
Buenos Aires province. 
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contentious cases in the country in terms of protests per 100,000 citizens. I argue that the 
primary reason for this marked contentiousness is the combination of a relatively open 
context characterized by an active civil society and diversified economy, with a political 
environment characterized by single party dominance and weak provincial governing 
capacity.  
 
Figure 4.12. Total Acts of Rebellion in San Luis, Mendoza, and Buenos Aires, 1994-
2010 
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In this chapter, I have introduced the Argentine case as a particularly apt one for 
testing my theory of contentious politics in Latin America. Argentina embarked on a 
striking trend towards widespread protest participation beginning in the late-1990s, and 
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much of the country. Indeed, Argentina typifies the type of high protest case discussed in 
the previous chapter, where many individuals have lost faith in traditional 
representational outlets and turned to protest as their preferred tool for acquiring political 
influence.  
While the frequency and intensity of protests, coupled with the extent to which 
contentious tactics have seemingly normalized over the last decade, make Argentina a 
critical case in the study of protest behavior, an additional feature of Argentine 
democracy makes it an ideal laboratory for examining the relationship between 
institutions and protest. Argentina is home to one of Latin America’s most (in)famous 
federal systems, with vast differences in the quality of democratic institutions found 
among the country’s twenty-three provincial governments (e.g. Chavez 2004, Spiller and 
Tommasi 2009). Moreover, rates of protest activity differ a great deal across provincial 
contexts as well. As observed in the cases of San Luis, Mendoza, and Buenos Aires, the 
quality of provincial democratic institutions can bear on a citizenry’s ability to organize 
collective action.  While these case studies can best be characterized as suggestive of that 
theoretical understanding, based on interviews and historical research in only small 
sample of provinces, in the following chapter I more rigorously test my argument on data 
from every Argentine province during the period from 1994 to 2012. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
SUBNATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS: 
EVIDENCE FROM ARGENTINE PROVINCES 
 
 
What explains the striking variation we observe in terms of protest activity across 
Argentine provinces? How do provincial political characteristics influence the emergence 
and sustainability of contentious politics? Building on the previous chapter’s qualitative 
treatment of these questions, this chapter seeks to provide a more empirically rigorous, 
quantitative evaluation of how regime characteristics of Argentine provinces impact 
protest participation within their borders. In so doing, this analysis becomes one of the 
first empirical examinations of the relationship between subnational regime 
characteristics and contentious politics to date, and offers an additional test of the 
theoretical framework that I outlined and tested at the country level in Chapter Three of 
this dissertation.  
Specifically, in this chapter I seek to test the argument that contentious 
participation tends to thrive at intermediate levels of subnational democracy, as originally 
posited but not systematically tested by Eisinger (1973) in the American context. In short, 
I argue that protest thrives where democratic political institutions are not fully 
accommodating of opposition voices and participation, yet are not so closed off that 
potential movements have no organizational capacity or hope that their actions might 
make a difference. To test this argument, I draw on protest events data from Argentine 
provinces that I obtained while conducting fieldwork in Argentina during the 2012-2013 
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academic year with the support of a dissertation grant from the National Science 
Foundation (SES-1263807). I also utilize data from the 2008, 2010, and 2012 
AmericasBarometer surveys of Argentina to corroborate the findings from the protest 
events analysis.   
In the pages below, I first address the classic challenges of conceptualizing and 
measuring subnational democracy in the developing world, and then introduce my own 
approach based largely on Gervasoni’s (2010) work on fiscal federalism and subnational 
democracy in Argentina. This measurement strategy utilizes gubernatorial and provincial 
legislative elections results to produce “Subnational Democracy” scores for each 
province from 1993 to 2011. Second, I introduce the events count data used for this 
analysis, obtained from two Argentine think tanks – the Programa de Investigación sobre 
el Movimiento Social Argentina (PIMSA) and Nueva Mayoría – and discuss the 
advantages and drawbacks of using these two measures. These data were drawn from 
newspaper reports on protests in all twenty-three Argentine provinces from 1993-2011, 
meaning that the analysis requires corresponding independent variables that cover the 
same sample of provinces over the entire time period under consideration.  
Third, I outline my plan for modeling the relationship between provincial regime 
characteristics and protest events, which includes Poisson regression, fixed effects for 
individual provinces, and a number of important control variables. Then, I present the 
results of these analyses. To conclude, I consider another source of data – the 2008-2012 
AmericasBarometer national surveys of Argentina – as a robustness check, thus bringing 
to a close the most comprehensive analysis to date of the relationship between 
subnational regime characteristics and contentious politics in the developing world.  
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Measuring Subnational Democracy 
 
 Unlike at the country level, where democracy scores are published annually by an 
array of organizations like the World Bank, Polity, and Freedom House, easily accessible 
and reputable democracy indicators at the subnational level are few and far between. For 
this reason, students of subnational politics have had to be creative in crafting their own 
measures of regime characteristics—particularly in developing contexts where good 
political data are harder to find. Thus, as the literature on subnational politics in the 
developing world has expanded, so too has a small collection of measurement strategies 
aiming to quantify how democratic local regimes really are. In this section, I review 
extant approaches to conceptualizing and measuring subnational regime types, and 
eventually argue for what I believe is the best approach for the purposes of this particular 
analysis.  
 The first decision any student of subnational democracy must make is that of 
which conceptualization of democracy is most apt for the question they seek to answer. 
Generally speaking, subnational regimes found within democratic national contexts are 
not wholly authoritarian, given that to some extent those subnational units must answer to 
national political authorities and prevailing democratic rules of the game. However, a 
great deal of evidence suggests that processes of democratization have occurred unevenly 
in many developing regimes, and subnational units can fall into some category in 
between liberal democracy and full-scale dictatorship. While in certain cases, subnational 
regimes measure up to and even outperform the national regime in terms of democratic 
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norms and procedures, in other cases state and provincial regimes are patrimonial, 
clientelistic, and exclusionary of minority voices (e.g. Key 1949, Fox 1994, Snyder 1999, 
Gibson 2005, Gervasoni 2010). These regimes resemble the category of national level 
regimes described in the literature on “competitive authoritarian” or “illiberal” 
democracies, where one personalistic leader or powerful party generally dominates 
politics, but several key features of democratic rule (e.g. regular elections free of blatant 
fraud) remain in place (Levitsky and Way 2002 ; Zakaria 1997). In sum, any 
conceptualization of subnational democracy must account for these shades of democratic 
quality, spanning from illiberal but not completely authoritarian (e.g. “closed”) to liberal 
multiparty competition (e.g. “open”).  
In gauging subnational democracy, some scholars have sought to ascertain the 
extent to which “institutionalized uncertainty” (Przeworski 1991)—i.e., the realistic 
possibility of change in the ruling party—exists in a particular setting by coding 
subnational regimes according to whether or not they have undergone a rotation in power 
from one party to another (see also Alvarez et al. 1996). In a case like Mexico, for 
example, where true multiparty competition took hold in certain states before the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) finally ceded power at the national level in 2000, 
while other states have yet to see a non-PRI party win the governorship, a dichotomous 
rotation measure would seem highly indicative of the extent to which subnational regimes 
have transitioned to multiparty competition (e.g. Hiskey 2002; Hiskey and Bowler 2005).  
In other studies, scholars have argued for a more nuanced conceptualization of 
local regime types, arguing that a multidimensional measure that takes into account both 
access to state power (i.e., the presence of inclusive and competitive elections) and the 
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exercise of state power (e.g. checks and balances, bureaucratic norms, and judicial 
independence) is paramount (Gervasoni 2010b; Giraudy 2013). While the qualitative 
differences between these two dimensions of democratic rule seem important, acquiring 
useful data regarding the exercise of power component can present challenges. For 
example, while Gervasoni (2010b) carried out an innovative expert survey project in 
Argentina to evaluate subnational democracy on both dimensions from 2003 to 2007, 
such a laborious endeavor requires a great deal of time and ample research funding, and 
in the case of Gervasoni’s undertaking only yielded democracy scores for one 
gubernatorial term. Analyzing protest data over a nearly twenty year period will therefore 
require a less intensive, but more encompassing measure that accurately captures 
democratic quality across many provinces at various time points, but is realistically 
attainable with finite resources.  
Given that in previous chapters of this dissertation I have defined democratic 
institutional quality as “the extent to which formal political institutions fulfill the 
democratic promise of representation,” it would seem wise to continue with that 
conceptualization at the subnational level. Thus, any measurement strategy I adopt should 
adequately capture the degree to which Argentine provincial regimes offer ample 
opportunity for individuals to influence policymakers and obtain representation, without 
having their voices suppressed or ignored by a powerful political leader or party.  
This measure would need to take into consideration countless characteristics of 
provincial political life that could bear on an individual’s ability to obtain effective 
democratic representation—e.g., the nature of party competition, checks on executive 
power, the independence from political influence of the provincial media and judiciary, 
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and the potential consolidation of political and economic power in the hands of a 
powerful elite, to name a few. But acquiring reasonable measures for all of these 
variables in each of Argentina’s twenty-three provinces over a twenty-year period is 
difficult, if not impossible, given temporal constraints on available data. The challenge 
for this analysis is therefore finding high quality information on provincial political 
environments that can serve as a proxy for many if not all of the important components of 
subnational democracy enumerated above, but is also readily available across years and 
provinces.   
 
Construction of the Subnational Democracy Index 
 
 The best source for local political information that is accessible across subnational 
units and time is electoral data (Wibbels 2005; Gervasoni 2010a; Giraudy 2010). Indeed, 
while obtaining information regarding levels of press freedom, civil liberties, and judicial 
independence might require extensive fieldwork in each local context, which would 
likely prevent large-N quantitative studies comparing subnational units, utilizing election 
results to make inferences regarding these factors is much easier and more generalizable. 
In other words, one might assume that the information provided by provincial election 
results—e.g., margin of victory, reelection(s) of a particular party or leader, and inter-
branch dynamics—reveals a great deal about the nature of those regimes, and can serve 
as an effective proxy for provinces’ overall levels of democratic quality. Put simply, we 
can reasonably assume that in less democratic provincial contexts, where local leaders 
utilize clientelistic practices and public funding in their campaigns, own or dominate 
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local media, and control local judges and law enforcement to bias outcomes in their 
favor, that will be reflected in multiple reelections, uncompetitive contests, and electoral 
rules that favor the incumbent.  
In his 2010 World Politics piece on fiscal federalism and subnational democracy, 
Gervasoni uses provincial electoral data to measure two key dimensions of democracy: 
contestation and constraints on power (see also Dahl 1971). Gervasoni proposes an index 
based on five particular indicators derived from provincial gubernatorial and legislative 
elections: Executive Contestation, Legislative Contestation, Succession Control, 
Legislature Control, and Term Limits. Executive Contestation gauges how competitive 
elections for the governorship are by subtracting the percentage of the total vote garnered 
by the winning candidate from one. Legislative Contestation does the same, but with the 
governor’s party in provincial legislative elections.47 Succession Control assesses the 
degree to which incumbent governors are successful in controlling who follows them in 
office – this variable is coded as high if the governor himself or a close ally achieves 
reelection (3), medium if someone from the same party as the governor is elected (2), and 
low if an opposition party captures the provincial executive office (1). Legislature 
Control measures congruence between the legislature and the governor in terms of 
legislative seat shares, operationalized as the percentage of lower house seats won by the 
governor’s party in each election. Finally, Term Limits codes whether and to what degree 
limits exist on the length of a governor’s reign in power, coded from 0 (reelection is 
prohibited) to 3 (indefinite reelection). As of 2014, five Argentine provinces allow for 
indefinite reelection (Formosa, Santa Cruz, San Luis, La Rioja, and Catamarca) and two 
provinces prohibit reelection for governors altogether (Mendoza and Santa Fe). The rest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 In provinces with bicameral legislatures, the measure is calculated for the lower house.  
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allow either one or two reelections for governors. Of the five provinces that permit 
indefinite reelection of governors, four have never experienced a rotation in power since 
Argentina democratized in 1983, with Catamarca being the only exception.48 
While Gervasoni’s piece provides Subnational Democracy scores for every 
Argentine province aside from Tierra del Fuego from 1983 to 2003, this particular 
analysis requires that I have democracy scores through 2011, necessitating an extension 
of Gervasoni’s data.49 To calculate the Subnational Democracy index, I use factor 
analysis to aggregate the five indicators described above into a single continuous 
measure, normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (see 
Appendix for descriptive statistics). Thus, the most undemocratic provinces will have 
negative scores, middling provinces will cluster around zero, and more democratic 
subnational regimes will score positive values.  
Below, I present mean subnational democracy scores from each province for the 
entire time period under consideration, 1993-2011 (Figure 5.1). Unsurprisingly, Formosa, 
Santa Cruz, La Rioja, and San Luis register the lowest values in terms of Subnational 
Democracy. None of these provinces has yet experienced a transition from PJ rule, and 
powerful individuals or families have dominated the politics of each province for 
decades. Another curious note regarding this group of provinces is that four of the past 
seven Argentine presidents—Menem, Rodríguez-Saá, and the two Kirchners—hail from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 All electoral data used for the creation of the Subnational Democracy Index were gathered from 
Andy Tow’s comprehensive website on subnational politics in Argentina, where he has compiled 
data on elections at the provincial and municipal level since the country’s 1983 transition to 
democracy: www.andytow.com. I would like to thank Dr. Tow for his continued efforts in 
providing this invaluable resource to students of subnational politics in Argentina.  
49 I would like to thank Dr. Gervasoni for graciously providing detailed code for creating the 
Subnational Democracy Index, in addition to his data for the period from 1983 to 2003 to check 
against values on my own measures.	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three of the four least democratic provinces in the country, La Rioja, San Luis, and Santa 
Cruz, respectively. Notably, many of the least democratic provinces are also known for 
their lack of contentious participation (with the recent exception of Santa Cruz), as 
apparent in Figure 5.1.50 
 
Figure 5.1. Subnational Democracy Index, Mean Scores (1993-2011) 
 
 
In the middle of the scale are several provinces that could be described as some of 
the most contentious in Argentina: notably, Jujuy, Salta, and Neuquén. Each of these 
provinces has registered rates of protest participation over the years that far outpace the 
national average, and each falls into a group of provinces that are neither overtly illiberal, 
nor host to high quality democratic regimes. For example, in Neuquén a local political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Yearly observations for provinces were divided into terciles based on their Subnational 
Democracy scores, with each group consisting of the same number of “provincial years.” So, the 
“Closed” category refers to the least democratic third of annual observations, while the “Open” 
category comprises the highest third of yearly democracy scores.  
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party called the Movimiento Popular Neuquino (MPN) has won every gubernatorial 
election since democratization, but typically the elections have been close (with the PJ 
running second) and the MPN typically holds only a plurality of votes in the provincial 
legislature. Likewise, in Salta and Jujuy the Peronist Party almost always wins the 
executive office, but normally commands only about thirty percent of the seats in the 
legislature. In these contexts, it seems that while the PJ could certainly be characterized 
as the dominant party, individuals can realistically organize protests and hope for some 
type of response from a provincial government that is not as hegemonic and exclusionary 
as in cases like Formosa and San Luis.    
 
Figure 5.2. Mean Number of Roadblocks and Acts of Rebellion by  
Subnational Democracy Group 
 
 
 Finally, it seems that while protests are more common in open contexts than in 
closed uncompetitive systems, the most democratic Argentine provinces tend to lag 
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behind mixed provinces in terms of the number of contentious protest events to which 
they play host. Included in this group are provinces like Mendoza, Tierra del Fuego, and 
Rio Negro, all of which have experienced multiple rotations of power and divided 
government. Notably, Buenos Aires province also scores as part of this group during 
certain periods in its history, though the province has yet to transition from Peronist rule 
following its initial post-transition victory against the UCR in 1987. 
 
Dependent Variables: Protest Event Counts 
 
To test the relationship between subnational democracy and contentious politics, I 
draw on two unique measures of protest at the provincial level, both of which track the 
number of protest events that occurred in each province on an annual basis. Since 1997, 
the researchers at Nueva Mayoría have carried out an ongoing research project on social 
conflict in Argentina, with a specific emphasis on the common tactic of blocking roads 
(“cortes de ruta”). To track the evolution of this tactic over time, Nueva Mayoría 
investigators have content-analyzed national newspapers51 and provincial newspapers52 to 
record unique instances of roadblocks occurring in each province every year. Since 1997, 
the number of roadblocks in Argentina has risen steadily, reaching its peak in 2008 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 La Nación, El Clarín, Página/12, La Prensa, Crónica, La Razón, Diario Popular, El Cronista, 
Ambito Financiero, The Buenos Aires Herald. 
52 El Ancasti (Catamarca), El Chubut (Chubut), La Voz del Interior (Córdoba), Corrientes Noticias 
(Corrientes), El Diario (Entre Ríos), La Mañana (Formosa), Pregón (Jujuy), La Arena y El Diario 
de la Pampa (La Pampa), El Independiente (La Rioja), Los Andes (Mendoza), El Territorio 
(Misiones), La Mañana del Sur (Neuquén), El Tribuno (Salta), El Zonda (San Juan), El Diario de 
la República (San Luis), La Opinión Austral (Santa Cruz), La Capital (Santa Fe), El Liberal 
(Santiago del Estero), El Sureño y el Tiempo Fueguino (Tierra del Fuego), La Gaceta (Tucumán).  	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thanks in large part to the heated standoff between the government and agriculture that 
resulted in thousands of roadblocks across the country (Figure 5.3).  
As for the second measure, PIMSA’s “acts of rebellion” (“hechos de rebelión”) 
measure captures a wider range of protest activities than just roadblocks. PIMSA’s 
researchers define acts of rebellion as “actions carried out by representatives of 
economic, political, or social groups, in order to contest some characteristic or policy of 
the existing state” (Cotarelo 2009; author’s translation). Among other pieces of 
information regarding each act, PIMSA investigators record the date and location of the 
event, the identity of the organizers, and the nature of their claim. Unlike Nueva 
Mayoría’s more expansive source material, PIMSA uses only national newspaper 
accounts to code protest events, in this case Clarín, La Nación, Página 12, and Crónica. 
It appears that similarly to roadblocks, the number of acts of rebellion increased steadily 
from 1994 to 2001, and while levels of protest fell slightly after the 2001-2002 crisis, 
they have remained much higher than before that pivotal moment in Argentine history 
(Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3. Roadblocks and Acts of Rebellion over Time:  
Argentine Provinces, 1994-2011 
 
 
There are positives and negatives associated with using each measure. The first 
drawback of using the PIMSA data is an obvious one—they are based on reports 
appearing only in national newspapers, all of which are located in Buenos Aires yet are 
being used to cull information on protest participation across the entire country. Buenos 
Aires-based papers tend to pay close attention to the goings-on of the capital and 
conurbano, while giving less press coverage to interior provinces. Thus, one might 
wonder if distance from the capital biases the extent to which protest events are covered 
in Buenos Aires-based newspapers, and thus if the PIMSA measure accurately portrays 
what is happening outside of the country’s largest metropolitan area.  
Another problem with both measures is that event counts fail to reveal much 
information regarding protest magnitude, meaning that each coded event is weighted the 
same regardless of whether five or 500,000 people attended. Indeed, one might envision a 
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scenario where multiple small, relatively inconsequential protests drive up the count in 
one particular province, while a small number of massive protests in another province are 
relatively underrepresented in the data. For this reason, many scholars prefer other 
approaches to measuring protest like surveys, which measure participation at the 
individual level and thus ensure that each observation is weighted the same (e.g. Dalton 
et al. 2009).  
These data, however, also carry with them several important advantages. First, 
they cover a time period of nearly twenty years, providing rare temporal breadth in the 
study of contentious politics at the subnational level. This feature allows us to account for 
any variation in the prevalence of contentious politics that might occur over time while 
also increasing the size of the sample, enabling a more robust evaluation of relationships 
between key variables. Second, these data were collected for each of Argentina’s twenty-
three provinces and capital city, which makes for a sample that includes highly urban 
areas (the Buenos Aires conurbano) and many rural, peripheral provinces (e.g. Santa 
Cruz or Formosa) that are often forgotten in quantitative analyses based on national level 
data. Finally, by utilizing two sources of protest events data, each of which captures a 
different set(s) of contentious repertoires, I argue that any common findings gleaned from 
these analyses should be particularly robust. Particularly when combined with the 
analysis of survey data from Argentina, which I will describe in more depth below, the 
analysis presented in this chapter is thus among the most thorough examinations of 
subnational politics and protest to date. 
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Modeling Strategy 
 
Because I am dealing with count data that span nearly twenty years for all of 
Argentina’s twenty-three provinces, there are several knotty methodological issues that 
must be sorted out before moving on to the analysis section. Count data are not normally 
distributed nor can they take on negative values, and the distribution is also discrete 
rather than continuous. Therefore, these data violate several key assumptions 
underpinning ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, rendering any findings from a 
standard OLS approach biased and/or inefficient (King 1988). For these reasons, I utilize 
Poisson regression, which assumes that the errors follow a Poisson distribution rather 
than a normal one, and models the natural log of the dependent variable (rather than the 
variable itself) as a linear function of the independent variables in the model (Long 1997; 
King 1988).  
Another complicating factor for this analysis is the fact that I am using panel data 
for twenty-three provinces, rather than a dataset consisting of wholly independent, cross-
sectional observations.53 The fact that this dataset includes multiple observations for 
individual provinces over time means that I cannot assume that the observations for a 
particular province are independent from one year to the next. In other words, the number 
of protests observed in Santiago del Estero at time t are inevitably contingent to some 
degree on the number of protests that occurred in Santiago del Estero at t - 1. So, any 
modeling approach should take into account the unique effects of a particular province on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 I have chosen to omit the autonomous capital of Buenos Aires from this analysis, due to its 
unique status as the home of Argentina’s national government and thus, the gathering place for 
many protestors who seek not to make claims on the local city government, but the national 
government itself. For this reason, protests in the capital would seem qualitatively different from 
those found in other provinces, where local protests are primarily directed at local authorities.  
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the number of protest events that occur in that province from year to year. For this reason, 
I use fixed effects for each province in all predictive models of protest events in an 
attempt to account for the concern that something within particular provinces is biasing 
results, and that a snowball effect might occur in provinces from one year to the next. I 
also include lagged measures of the two protest count variables, which offers an even 
more empirically rigorous evaluation of the impact of subnational regime characteristics 
on protest participation in a given context.  
Finally, there are a number of key control variables that must be included in any 
predictive model of protests across provinces to assure that the inferences made regarding 
the impact of subnational democracy on contentious participation are valid. First, an 
indicator for population must be controlled for in any predictive model of protest events 
by province, as larger provinces are obviously more likely to have higher counts that 
sparsely populated provinces. Second, if one is to isolate the impact of institutional 
factors, she must also control for relevant economic circumstances that might outweigh 
political factors in terms of theoretical import. Upticks in unemployment, downturns in 
economic growth (measured as the percent change in Producto Bruto Geográfico (PBG)), 
and the overall level of development in a province (PBG per capita) are all economic 
factors that might bear on the prevalence of protest participation in a particular setting.54 
In the models presented below, I also include control variables for several 
important political factors. In their 2012 piece on how political competition and 
partisanship shape protest repertoires, Arce and Mangonnet find that contexts in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Producto Bruto Interno is calculated by Argentina’s national statistical agency, Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC), and represents a measure of gross domestic product 
by province. INDEC data were also used for measures of population, unemployment, and public 
employment.  	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the Peronist party is in the opposition often produce higher protest activity, due to the 
grassroots connections of the PJ and its tremendous mobilization capacity. Thus, a 
dummy variable for whether or not the PJ hold the governorship will be included in every 
model. Finally, I have also included an indicator for the number of public employees per 
100,000 citizens in each province. This is based on numerous studies that have claimed 
that high levels of public employment tend to be associated with low quality, patrimonial 
democracy at the subnational level, and would seemingly diminish contentious activity 
(see Gervasoni 2010a, Giraudy 2012, McMann 2006).  
 
Results 
  
Results from four separate Poisson regression models are displayed in Table 5.1. 
Models 1 and 2 include the Subnational Democracy Index score for each provincial year 
as a continuous variable, while in Models 3 and 4 I include an indicator that divides 
provinces into terciles according to their democracy score, allowing me to examine the 
possibility that a nonlinear relationship between subnational democracy and protest 
exists. In Models 3 and 4, the middle tercile is the reference category, as I compare how 
less democratic (“Closed”) and more democratic (“Open”) systems influence the number 
of protest events observed during a giving year in comparison to provincial regimes at 
intermediate levels of democracy, net of other factors. 
The first finding that stands out from Models 1 and 2 is that the Subnational 
Democracy Index has a positive and significant effect on the number of acts of rebellion 
observed in a province during a particular year, while having a significant negative 
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impact on the number of roadblocks in a given provincial year (Table 5.1). In other 
words, when one treats Subnational Democracy as a continuous variable that has a 
constant linear effect on the number of protests in a given province, it produces 
contradictory results for the two measures of protest used in this analysis. This result runs 
counter to the primarily national level empirical work that argues for either a positive 
(e.g. Dalton et al. 2009) or negative (Machado et al. 2012) linear effect for democratic 
quality on rates of protest participation, and also seems to undermine subnational 
accounts that argue that competitive elections have a negative impact on the number of 
protest events in a particular context (Boulding 2010; Arce and Mangonnet 2012). 
 
Table 5.1. Predictive Models of Protest Events across Argentine Province 
(Poisson Regression Models) 
 Acts of Rebellion 
Subnational 
Democracy Index  
Roadblocks 
Subnational 
Democracy Index 
Acts of Rebellion 
Subnational 
Democracy Terciles 
Roadblocks 
Subnational 
Democracy Terciles 
VARIABLES Model 1 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
Model 2 
Coeff.  
(s.e.) 
Model 3 
Coeff.  
(s.e.) 
Model 4 
Coeff.  
(s.e.) 
     
Population (log) -4.809** 5.971** -5.132** 5.255** 
 (0.477) (0.634) (0.481) (0.635) 
Acts of Rebellion (t-1) 0.0005**  0.0005**  
 (5.20e-05)  (5.25e-05)  
Public Employment -0.017** -0.001 -0.015** 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment 0.093** 0.095** 0.094** 0.094** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
PBG per Capita (log) -1.224** -1.320** -1.175** -1.140** 
 (0.089) (0.082) (0.089) (0.082) 
PBG Change -0.0001** -0.0003** -0.0001** -0.0004** 
 (1.73e-05) (2.18e-05) (1.73e-05) (2.20e-05) 
PJ Governor 0.046 0.266** 0.0334 0.164** 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.029) (0.035) 
Year 0.229** 0.215** 0.234** 0.207** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
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Roadblocks (t-1)  -.0002** 
(3.04e-05) 
 
 
-5.34e-05 
(3.09e-05) 
 
Subnational Democracy 
Index 
 
0.028* 
(0.013) 
 
-0.145** 
(0.015) 
  
     
Closed System (Demcat=0)   -0.068** -0.138** 
   (0.033) (0.033) 
Open System (Demcat=2)   -0.105** -0.489** 
   (0.019) (0.022) 
 
Observations 
 
367 
 
264 
 
367 
 
264 
Number of groups (Province) 23 23 23 23 
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, **p<0.05 
 
 
However, when provinces are categorized as belonging to three terciles based on 
their Subnational Democracy score at that particular point in time, the logic behind these 
puzzling results for the continuous measure becomes more decipherable. Put simply, it 
appears that subnational democracy has a nonlinear impact on protest events, in that at 
intermediate levels of democracy, protest appears to be more common than at either end 
of the spectrum. In “Closed Systems” and “Open Systems,” the predicted number of 
protest events is significantly lower than in provinces at intermediate levels of 
democracy, even at conservative levels of statistical significance (p<.01). Indeed, it 
seems that as predicted in the theoretical framework elaborated above and in the prior 
chapter, protest wanes in the most democratic subnational contexts in Argentina, where 
citizens have access to high quality formal representation, and in the least democratic 
provinces in the country, where individuals have no realistic hope of changing the status 
quo nor the ability to organize with their fellow citizens. 
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In Figures 5.4 and 5.5, I graph predicted event counts based on variation in 
Subnational Democracy category. To calculate predictive margins, the other variables in 
the models were held at their means. In the case of the Acts of Rebellion measure, clear 
and statistically significant differences between democracy categories emerge in terms of 
predicted counts, with “Open” systems bringing up the rear and “Mixed” systems 
unmistakably outpacing the other contexts in terms of contentious participation. 
However, the Roadblocks measure is where the starkness of the difference between 
subnational regime categories really comes to the fore. Holding all other variables 
constant, the predicted number of counts for a given province in a particular year would 
nearly double if one were to move that province from the “Open” to the “Mixed” 
category. The difference is almost as extreme between “Closed” and “Mixed” regimes, as 
belonging to the intermediate category would increase the predicted number of protest 
events by twenty-seven.  
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Figure 5.4. Subnational Democracy and Acts of Rebellion:  
Predicted Counts 
 
Figure 5.5. Subnational Democracy and Roadblocks:  
Predicted Counts 
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As for the control variables, as expected, the lagged number of protest events has 
a positive impact on the number of events observed in the current year. Controlling for 
other factors, population has mixed effects on the number of protests in a given province 
for a particular year—however, taking into account that the Acts of Rebellion variable 
was created based on newspaper accounts in Buenos Aires-based publications, it makes 
sense the that events in smaller provinces might receive less press coverage. On the other 
hand, controlling for a litany of factors that might influence the results for the population 
variable, it seems that smaller provinces play host to a higher numbers of roadblocks. 
Blocking roads is by its very definition a rural act of contention, and is particularly 
common in sparsely populated provinces like Jujuy, Santa Cruz, and La Pampa, casting 
some light on this initially perplexing result.  
Unemployment and PBG Change have the expected effects on the number of 
protest events in a particular context, as increases in unemployment and downturns in 
economic growth are associated with higher protest counts. PBG per Capita seems to 
have a negative effect on protest participation, as wealthier provinces play host to lower 
protest event counts. Also as anticipated, the control variable for year has a strong 
positive effect on the predicted number of protest events in a particular province. It seems 
that since 1994, protest events have become progressively more common in Argentina, 
which fits with the argument that the tactic has “normalized” since the early 2000s. 
Finally, the indicator “PJ Governor” has a weak positive effect on the number of protests 
in a particular province, running counter to Arce and Mangonnet’s finding from a more 
limited sample of Argentine provinces over time. 
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Robustness Check: Testing the Argument on Survey Data from Argentina 
 
Having established that intermediate levels of subnational democracy seem to 
produce higher levels of contentious participation in Argentine provinces, one key 
robustness check of this finding remains: testing the argument on individual level data. 
The AmericasBarometer survey has been carried out in Argentina since 2008, and draws 
on a nationally representative sample of the Argentine population. In this section, I 
marshal evidence from these surveys to buttress the finding from the provincial level 
analysis that intermediate levels of subnational democracy tend to produce higher rates of 
contentious participation than low or high quality democratic contexts.  
In 2008, 2010, and 2012, the AmericasBarometer has utilized a national 
probability sample design of voting-age Argentines, with about 1,500 respondents taking 
part in face-to-face interviews in Spanish in each round for a total N of 4,408. The sample 
has a complex design, featuring stratification and cluster sampling from the Argentine 
population, and has been stratified by regions within Argentina (Buenos Aires, Central, 
Northeastern, Northwestern, Cuyo, and Patagonia) and by urban and rural areas. The 
sample consists of 286 primary sampling units (municipalities), representing 21 of 23 
provinces.55 The dependent variable is drawn from a question that asks respondents if 
they have participated in a protest march or demonstration during the previous year. 
Combining results from all three surveys, about eighteen percent of Argentines reported 
having participated in a protest during the specified timeframe, placing the country third 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  The sample is self-weighting, and estimates will represent the desired target population. The 
total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas was 3,927 and in rural areas, 481.	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in Latin America behind only Bolivia and Peru in terms of citizens’ professed 
contentiousness.  
As with the provincial event count models, a handful of control variables must be 
included in any individual level model of protest participation to assure that the 
relationship between subnational regime characteristics and protest participation is not 
spurious.56 First, demographic controls for age, gender, and wealth have been included in 
each model. While effects for gender and wealth are often inconsequential, age has been 
found to have a powerful negative impact on the likelihood that one has participated in a 
protest in the prior year, as older citizens are far less likely to take to the streets to make 
claims on governments than their younger counterparts (Moseley and Layton 2013).  
Second, a collection of sociopolitical factors that are associated with higher 
probabilities of protesting is included in the models presented below, including interest in 
politics, level of education, and community engagement. All of these reflect hypotheses 
from the “resource mobilization” approach to explaining protest, which as the dominant 
theoretical paradigm in the contentious politics literature argues that more civically 
active, socially connected individuals are the more likely protestors, as they possess the 
necessary skills and access to organizational structures to effectively mobilize contention 
(e.g. Meyer 2004; McCarthy and Zald 1977). Finally, I include a control for individuals’ 
personal economic situations, which should capture any overriding grievance driving 
participation. 
As for the key independent variable, subnational democracy, I code provinces 
according to their scores for the year preceding each survey, given that the 
AmericasBarometer interviews took place early in the year and the question regarding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Question wording for all variables can be found in the appendix.  
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protest asks specifically about participation over the previous twelve months. Because the 
coded province in which individuals live is actually a contextual variable – i.e., survey 
respondents are nested within provinces – the results presented below are from multilevel 
models, which assess the impact of being located within a particular subnational context 
on one’s likelihood of having protested (Gelman and Hill 2006). To capture the 
possibility of a nonlinear relationship between subnational democracy and protest 
participation, I code the democracy variable in three different ways: 1) the undoctored, 
continuous index score, 2) terciles corresponding to the provincial analysis above, and 3) 
the democracy score squared, which allows for the possibility that values further from 
zero (i.e., corresponding to high and low levels of subnational democracy) produce lower 
rates of protest participation. 
 
Figure 5.6. Protest Participation by Subnational Democracy Category 
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At first glance, it appears that rates of protest participation by subnational regime 
category match up fairly well with the findings from the provincial level analysis (Figure 
5.6). Among individuals who live in mixed systems, rates of protest participation 
approach .20 and exceed rates of participation in closed and open democratic contexts. 
However, it also appears that more democratic provinces are characterized by 
significantly higher rates of contentious participation than the least democratic ones, and 
that mixed and open systems do not differ significantly in terms participation rates. 
However, the only sure way to test my hypothesis is to run a predictive logistic regression 
model of protest participation, to see how subnational political context bears on one’s 
proclivity to protest, ceteris paribus. 
As expected, the Subnational Democracy indicator has no significant effect on the 
likelihood that an individual has participated in a protest in the prior year (Table 5.2). 
Thus, any attempt to attribute protests across Argentine provinces to increasing or 
decreasing levels of subnational democracy appears misplaced, as no direct linear 
relationship exists between the two variables. However, results for the categorical 
indicators for subnational democracy included in Model 2 indicate that, similar to results 
from the provincial analysis, it is at intermediate levels of subnational democracy where 
contentious tactics truly thrive. Specifically, it appears that in closed systems, citizens 
have a significantly lower probability of engaging in protest than in mixed systems. 
However, while the negative sign indicates lower rates of protest participation in open 
provincial contexts as well (and this difference closely approaches statistical 
significance), it appears that we cannot declare beyond the shadow of a doubt that open 
systems are associated with a lower likelihood of protesting than mixed systems.  
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But, in Model 3 I include an indicator for subnational democracy squared, which 
captures the extent to which a province’s distance from zero – which can be attributed to 
either high or low levels of subnational democracy – influences the probability that 
individuals within that province will participate in a contentious demonstration or protest 
march. The variable “Subnational Democracy Squared” has a strongly significant, 
negative impact on an individual’s probability of participating in contentious activities. 
This result indicates that, as predicted, the further subnational democracies move away 
from the protest-producing middle region of democratic quality – whether towards high 
quality democratic rule or towards outright authoritarianism – the fewer the number of 
protests we should observe. Figure 5.6 plots the predicted probabilities associated with 
varying levels of subnational democracy squared, indicating that at the highest values 
individuals’ probabilities of protesting wane.57 For example, a person living in a province 
at the absolute midpoint in terms of democratic quality (Subnational Democracy Squared 
= 0) is more than three times as likely to participate in a protest compared to a person 
living in one of the most or least democratic provincial contexts in Argentina 
(Subnational Democracy Squared = 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 This finding holds when I create a variable that represents the absolute value of provinces’ 
democracy scores – in other words, increasing a province’s distance from zero in terms of 
subnational democracy decreases the probability of protesting among individuals.  
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Table 5.2. Predictive Models of Protest Participation in Argentina 
(Logistic Regression Models) 
 Protest 
Participation 
(1=Protested) 
Subnational 
Democracy Index 
 
Protest 
Participation 
(1=Protested) 
Subnational 
Democracy 
Terciles 
 
Protest 
Participation 
(1=Protested) 
Subnational 
Democracy 
Squared 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Female -0.010 -0.004 -0.009 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
Age -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Wealth Quintile -0.023 -0.02 -0.023 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Interest in Politics 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education Level 0.145** 0.141** 0.146** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
Community Participation 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Personal Econ. Situation -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
Subnational Democracy 
 
Closed System 
 
-0.004 
(0.098) 
 
 
 
-0.522*** 
 
0.132 
(0.113) 
(Dem Category=0)  (0.140)  
Open System  -0.128  
(Dem Category=2)  (0.115)  
Subnational Democracy 
Squared 
  -0.245** 
(0.103) 
    
Constant -1.862*** -1.695*** -1.701*** 
 (0.267) (0.273) (0.272) 
    
Observations 3,836 3,836 3,836 
Number of groups (Province) 21 21 21 
    
    
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
The results for control variables in these individual level models of protest 
participation match up fairly well with results from the regional analysis of survey data 
presented in Chapter Three. While gender and wealth appear unrelated to one’s 
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likelihood of protesting, age has a strong negative impact on participation. Education, 
community participation, and interest in politics are, as expected, strong predictors of 
having participated in a protest during the previous twelve months. Lastly, having 
encountered an economic rough patch personally seems to fuel protest participation, 
which is in keeping with the finding from Chapter Three that personal economic 
circumstances often seem to outweigh sociotropic evaluations when it comes to 
motivating protest participation.  
 
Figure 5.7. Subnational Democracy Squared and Protest Participation:  
Predicted Probabilities  
 
 
Subnational Democracy and Civic Engagement 
 To this point, I have treated the three provincial regime categories as proxies for 
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due to problems related to data availability in terms of subnational measures of 
engagement, but also because I argue that the subnational democracy measures based on 
electoral data offer a rough proxy for both concepts, as engagement is inevitably low in 
illiberal contexts devoid of competition and steeped in patrimonial state-society relations. 
However, to bring this analysis more in line with the cross-national results presented in 
Chapter Three, I take a brief look here at how subnational institutional environments 
interact with civic engagement to influence rates of protest participation.  
 
Figure 5.8 The Interaction between Subnational Democracy and Civic 
Engagement58 
 
 
Unlike at the country level, I fail to uncover a significant result for the interaction 
between subnational democracy and community participation when I include the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 These are absolute probabilities, as opposed to predicted probabilities derived from model 
results.  
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interaction term in a predicted model of protest participation. As apparent in Figure 5.8, 
engaged citizens are clearly more likely to partake of contentious participation that their 
less engaged counterparts, regardless of democratic context. However, it appears that in 
Argentina, engaged citizens in open and mixed provincial contexts are equally likely to 
participate in protests, which contradicts the country level finding to some extent, as we 
would assume that engagement has a stronger impact on participation in mixed (i.e., less 
democratic) settings. While living in a closed system clearly stifles contentious activity, it 
appears that differences between high and mixed democratic contexts are minimal in 
terms of protest participation rates, with the main distinguishing factor being that 
unengaged citizens in mixed contexts are more likely protestors than their counterparts in 
open provincial democracies.  
While there appear to be slight disparities in how this cross-level relationship 
plays out within Argentina compared to across Latin American regimes, one must keep in 
mind that in looking at the impact of subnational democracy, we are dealing with regimes 
that are nested within a unique national context. As mentioned in Chapter Four, many 
individuals in democratic provinces—who are highly engaged in politics—take to the 
streets to protest against the national regime, as has been the case recently in Mendoza. 
Moreover, I would also argue that Argentine provinces provide a more diverse set of 
cases in terms of democratic quality, as the least democratic subnational regimes in the 
country are in many ways more closed off than even the most illiberal national 
democracies in the region (e.g. Venezuela or Ecuador), which are at least characterized 
my competitive elections and increasingly vibrant opposition parties. Thus, while the 
results obtained in this subnational chapter largely corroborate what we observe at the 
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national level, in that flawed democracies play host to more protests than high quality 
democracies or illiberal regimes, they are by no means a perfect match. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter offers a thorough investigation of the relationship between 
subnational democratic institutions and protest participation in Argentine provinces, 
utilizing multiple sources of data and methodological approaches. The findings are 
consistent: rather than unearthing a linear relationship between subnational democracy 
and protest, it appears that contentious politics thrives at intermediate levels of 
democratic quality, and fades at either end of the openness spectrum. These findings not 
only shed light on a heretofore under-examined dynamic in the Latin American context, 
but call for a recalibration of how we understand why and where protests occur in the 
developing world more generally. Indeed, rates of mobilization can vary drastically even 
within the context of a single democratic regime, and uneven processes of subnational 
democratic development can have important consequences for the participatory 
repertoires that individuals within those contexts utilize.  
 Furthermore, I believe that these provincial level findings complement the results 
from the cross-national analysis presented in Chapter Three. In many ways, Argentine 
provinces offer a more extensive universe of cases in terms of democratic quality than 
what we find at the national level in Latin America. That is, in certain provinces in 
Argentina, democratic competition is virtually nonexistent, the current government 
dominates local media, and the ruling elite’s control over access to public jobs and social 
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assistance programs keeps potential political challengers perpetually at bay. Even in Latin 
America’s least democratic country aside from Cuba, Venezuela, recent elections have 
been characterized by intense competition between incumbent candidates and an 
increasingly unified opposition, and the government’s domination of the economic sphere 
is nowhere near as complete as it is in a province like Formosa, La Rioja, or San Luis, 
Argentina.  
 In sum, these findings from Argentina reveal the limitations of the argument that 
flawed institutions spawn high levels of contentious political behaviors. At a certain 
point, the closing down of opportunities for political expression becomes so complete 
that individuals can neither organize themselves nor hope that potential contentious 
actions on their part would have any influence on policymakers. In other words, where 
the democratic promise of representation ceases to exist, so too does the motivation to 
take to the streets in demand of change. However, where democratic institutions are only 
partially flawed, as is the case in numerous developing regimes across the region and in 
many provinces within Argentina, protest becomes a powerful tool for individuals in 
pursuit of effective democratic representation.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I have sought to explain why protests arise in certain Latin 
American contexts but not others, and how individual level and institutional factors 
interact to explain contentious political participation. I find that characteristics of 
democratic political institutions help explain the emergence of protest participation in 
different national and subnational contexts, but that the effects of these political factors 
are not as straightforward as many have argued. Rather, they are best characterized as 
non-linear, or conditional on a certain base level of civic engagement among a particular 
citizenry. That is, while underperforming democratic institutions can play a part in 
triggering contentious modes of political participation, institutions can also be so un-
democratic that protest movements are prevented from ever getting off the ground. In 
sum, institutions matter in explaining why individuals protest, but in complicated ways 
that defy our collective desire for a parsimonious explanation. 
In this concluding chapter, I summarize and offer additional interpretation of the 
key findings presented to this point. Then, I discuss the implications of these findings at 
greater length, and offer some ideas for extending and improving upon this research. I 
conclude with some additional remarks on the state of the literature on contentious 
politics in the developing world.  
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Contentious Engagement in Flawed Democracies 
  
Prior to this dissertation, scant empirical work has examined protest participation 
across countries, nor have many studies sought to unravel how characteristics of national 
political institutions might bear on repertoires of contentious participation within that 
country’s borders.59 Perhaps more importantly, few have examined how the interaction of 
country level political factors with individual level variables influences protest activities 
within a society. Contrary to accounts that attribute swelling rates of protest participation 
to rising political and economic development (Dalton et al. 2009) or institutional 
weakness (Machado et al. 2011), I find that institutional quality has no significant linear 
impact on the likelihood that individuals participate in protests. Instead, results from the 
predictive models of protest participation I run in Chapter Three uncover a substantial 
interactive effect for institutional quality and an intervening individual level variable: 
civic engagement. Where civic engagement is low, institutional quality fails to register a 
significant impact on the likelihood that an individual will partake of protest. However, 
as individuals become more involved in their communities and gain access to the 
organizational resources necessary for mobilization, institutions begin to exert an 
important stimulative effect on an individual’s probability of protesting. Conversely, the 
strongest positive effects for community engagement on protest participation are found in 
low quality democratic contexts, where engaged citizens are almost twice as likely to 
participate in a protest rally or demonstration as their counterparts in high quality 
democracies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The only exceptions would be work by Dalton et al. 2009 and Machado et al. 2011.  
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This finding is robust to alternative conceptualizations of community engagement, 
and is especially strong when one examines the stark differences in predicted 
probabilities of protesting between individuals who have zero connections to community 
organizations and citizens who are least minimally involved in some local group. 
Moreover, I find that this interactive relationship manifests itself in different ways 
beyond merely the cross-level political institutions—civic engagement nexus. Indeed, I 
also uncover a significant interactive relationship between system support and 
community involvement: that is, when individuals lack faith in core political institutions 
and are active in local community associations, they are far likelier to protest than when 
either factor is absent. Education and interest in politics interact in similar ways with 
institutional characteristics to what we observe for civic engagement, though the findings 
are not as strong. 
In contrast to these confirmatory results for the importance of political institutions 
in provoking protest among civically engaged citizens, I find few significant effects for 
the economic factors that have often been hailed in the literature on contentious politics 
in Latin America as crucial in explaining instances of mass mobilization (e.g. Almeida 
2007; Silva 2009; Walton 1989; Yashar 2005, 1998). Measured at the individual level, 
wealth itself has little impact on an individual’s probability of taking part in a rally or 
demonstration, nor do individuals’ perceptions of the national economic situation. At the 
country level, national measures of inequality, recent economic growth or decline, and 
human development also fail to lend much explanatory power to answering the question 
of why individuals participate in protests.  
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In sum, these findings call for a recalibration of our understanding of the 
connection between national political institutions and individual level protest 
participation in the developing world, and the determinants of contentious political 
participation more generally. Given the many challenges associated with democratic 
transition and consolidation (e.g. Linz and Stepan 1994; Schmitter 1994), the number of 
flawed democracies has exploded in recent years as the third—and now potentially, 
fourth—“waves” have spread throughout the world. At the national level, dysfunctional 
democratic institutions seem to combine with mass level trends in civic engagement to 
explain why certain individuals are more likely to protest than others. Where institutions 
fail to fulfill the democratic promise of representation, politically active citizens may 
seek alternative means of influencing government policy that are not spelled out on a 
piece of paper. While the presence of contentious politics itself signals progress in 
countries where only a few decades ago, any challenging of the incumbent regime was 
strictly prohibited, it is also symptomatic of a system that fails to provide high quality 
representation and policy responsiveness to its citizens.  
 
The Limitations of the ‘Bad Institutions’ Argument 
  
 While Chapter Three offers compelling evidence that institutional deficiencies at 
the country level can spur contentious participation by engaged individuals, in Chapters 
Four and Five I narrow my focus to Argentina, a country characterized by weak national 
political institutions but also vast subnational variation in terms of protest. Since 
Argentina’s return to democracy, and specifically beginning in the mid-1990s under the 
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Menem government, protests have become increasingly prevalent in the country. 
Crippled by market reforms that left a record number of Argentines unemployed, and 
driven by extreme disillusionment with representative institutions, the newly formed 
piquetero movement began to install roadblocks across the country in the late 1990s. In 
2001, as the Argentine economic crisis reached its dramatic apex, thousands of citizens 
descended on the capital city to voice their indignation over the corrupt and unresponsive 
political actors and institutions they deemed culpable for their current state of despair.  
 More than just reflective of a deep economic crisis that had serious consequences 
for the daily well being of Argentine citizens, the 2001-2002 protests signaled a crisis of 
representation. Argentine citizens were fed up with a system that seemingly rewarded 
corrupt and inept leadership, power hungry presidents, and parties that pivoted from one 
ideological stance to another at the drop of a hat. The rallying cry that resonated with so 
many Argentinean citizens – “All of them must go!” – perfectly captured the 
overwhelming lack of faith in formal vehicles for representation that pervaded at the 
time, and the tactics used by Argentine protestors at this pivotal moment—e.g., 
roadblocks and cacerolazos—have since become consolidated as relatively normal 
repertoires of political participation. 
 However, in spite of what this national-level narrative would lead us to believe, 
protest has taken hold unevenly within Argentina. According to data from two leading 
Argentine think tanks, Nueva Mayoría and PIMSA, the country as a whole has indeed 
become more contentious over the years and protest repertoires have expanded in 
usefulness and scope, but there are certain provinces where protests are not particularly 
common. This subnational landscape offers a unique opportunity to explore the question 
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of how subnational variation in democratic quality impinges on varying levels of protest 
activity within Argentina.  
 In Chapter Five, I find that characteristics of subnational regime institutions have 
important consequences for the number of protests that occur within a given provincial 
context. Utilizing an innovative measurement strategy devised by Carlos Gervasoni 
(2010), I calculate (on an annual basis) subnational democracy scores for each of 
Argentina’s twenty-three provinces over the course of nearly twenty years. I find that, net 
of other factors, the degree of democracy within a province plays an important, but non-
linear, role in the frequency of protests that occur within its borders. Consistent with my 
more general argument about the quality of representative institutions, but also expanding 
that argument to incorporate explicitly undemocratic political systems, I find that protests 
are less common in both the most democratic and least democratic contexts. At 
intermediate levels of subnational democracy, where representative institutions are most 
likely to fall short of their democratic promise but not so illiberal as to preclude any 
challenging of the incumbent government, protest flourishes as a form of political voice. 
The substantive effects for these three distinct subnational regime types are impressive—
while “open” and “closed” provinces play host to similar predicted counts of protest 
events holding other variables constant (~ fifty protests annually), being a “mixed” 
system increases the predicted number of protests by about thirty for a given year.  
 To offer an alternative test of the argument that systems with flawed democratic 
institutions encourage higher rates of protest participation, I draw from the 2008, 2010, 
and 2012 AmericasBarometer national surveys of Argentina. Using multi-level models, I 
examine the possibility that provincial political context has an important impact on the 
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probability that individuals nested within those contexts have participated in a street 
march or demonstration during the prior year, controlling for a number of individual level 
predictors that I found to be consequential in Chapter Three.  
 The results from the analysis of Argentine survey data corroborate much of what I 
find using event counts data from each province: rather than having a linear impact on the 
likelihood that an individual will protest, the effect of subnational democracy is 
curvilinear. Both high quality democratic environments and authoritarian provincial 
institutions seem to discourage protest participation, while middling levels of democratic 
quality with presumably flawed representative institutions spur higher rates of 
contentious participation. These findings are thus robust to multiple sources of data and 
measurement strategies. 
 The results from the subnational analysis of protest across Argentine provinces 
reveal the limitations of the “bad institutions” argument. While findings from many 
studies to date on this topic might lead one to assume that the worse institutions get, the 
more likely protest becomes (e.g. Machado et al. 2009; Boulding 2010, 2014; Arce and 
Mangonnet 2012), it appears that flawed institutions stimulate protest only to a point, 
after which they become so closed off that protest movements are incapable of 
mobilizing at all to articulate their claims. This curvilinear relationship between 
institutional context and protest harkens back to Eisinger’s (1973) work on protest 
behavior in American cities in the 1960s, but has been conspicuously absent in recent 
accounts of protest in the developing world.  
In provincial political environments like San Luis, opposition movements are 
ignored, coopted, or even repressed by an incredibly powerful local machine, making 
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movement organization and mobilization too costly except under extreme circumstances. 
In provinces like Mendoza, citizens enjoy competitive multiparty democracy and high 
quality representation, rendering contentious participation unnecessary for the most part, 
but not obsolete. However, in provinces like Jujuy, Neuquén, and Buenos Aires, where 
one party often dominates the political realm but not to the extent that they exert total 
hegemony over political institutions, civil society, and economic opportunities, protest 
can thrive as a normal form of political voice. 
 
Normalized Protest in Argentina and Beyond   
 
According to figures from PIMSA and Nueva Mayoría, the number of protests in 
Argentina surged in the lead up to the 2001-2002 crisis, and has remained high ever 
since. In 2008, nearly one in three Argentines claimed to have participated in a protest 
rally or demonstration in the previous year, and over 5,000 roadblocks were staged 
nationwide. Without a doubt, protests have become very common, rivaling virtually any 
other form of political participation in terms of popularity aside from voting (Figure 6.1). 
But can we classify protest participation in Argentina as “normal?” In other words, is 
protest utilized equally across socioeconomic and demographic groups, and do the same 
variables that predict standard formal modes of political participation also predict which 
individuals will take part in protests?  
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Figure 6.1. Protest Compared to other Participation in Argentina, 2008-2010 
 
 
In a word, “yes.” In addition to its prevalence as a political activity, it seems that 
several of the classic (see Verba et al. 1995) individual level predictors of formal political 
participation—most notably, education and interest in politics—are strongly associated 
with contentious participation in Argentina. Moreover, the degree to which non-
contentious forms of community participation and protests are linked, a relationship 
covered extensively in Chapter Three, speaks to the “conventional” nature of contentious 
political participation in Argentina. Perhaps the only standard predictor of conventional 
participation that is not associated with higher rates of protest is wealth, as no significant 
relationship exists between class and protest participation in Argentina. However, while 
in Argentina class does not appear to be a strong predictor of participation, evidence from 
the rest of Latin America indicates that middle-class individuals are indeed the most 
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likely protestors, corroborating Verba et al.’s findings from the American context 
(Moseley and Layton 2013).  
 
Figure 6.2. Rates of Protest Participation in Argentina According to Wealth 
Quintile, 2008-2012 
 
 
In general, it appears that protest participation is almost equally prevalent across 
key demographic groups. While 17.1% of male respondents surveyed in 2008, 2010, and 
2012 in Argentina responded that they had participated in a protest during the previous 
year, 16.5% of females responded in the affirmative to the same question—a difference 
of means undistinguishable from zero. As mentioned above, across income quintiles rates 
of participation differ very little, and while protest participation begins to taper off after 
individuals turn fifty-five years old (probably for the obvious reasons related to the sheer 
physicality of demonstrating in the streets), differences between age brackets below that 
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level are slight (LAPOP 2008-2012). In sum, while protestors appear to make up a 
younger than average slice of the citizenry, they otherwise constitute a fairly 
representative cross-section of Argentina’s politically active population, deviating little 
from voters and other habitual participants in politics.  
Evidence from the rest of Latin America is mixed in terms of the degree to which 
protest has normalized. Only Peru and Bolivia outpace Argentina with respect to 
participation rates since 2008, and regional analyses generally reveal striking similarities 
between protestors and citizens who participate in politics through formal vehicles. 
However, one might also imagine that in certain countries where institutions are of higher 
quality, like Costa Rica, Chile, or Uruguay, protestors make up a smaller, less 
representative subsample of the total population. Indeed, in Chile, community 
participation is not associated with protest participation, which offers a striking contrast 
to what we observe Argentina and the region at large (LAPOP 2010, 2012).  
To make a definitive claim about whether or not certain repertoires of 
participation have consolidated as the years have passed, one would need longitudinal 
data from within each of those countries, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, in Argentina the data tell a very clear story: thirty years of weak institutions 
and low quality democratic representation has birthed a country where contentious 
participation is the norm, as individuals seek more effective tactics for influencing 
government. The provinces within Argentina where this is not the case are either 1) so 
authoritarian that protest mobilization is too costly or 2) high-functioning enough that 
citizens within that province are content to operate through formal vehicles for 
democratic representation.  
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Implications  
  
Moving forward, several important implications emerge from this dissertation for 
future research on political participation and democracy in Latin America and beyond. 
The first is that uneven institutional development in the region has serious consequences 
for how democratic citizens engage the political regimes they inhabit. While a significant 
body of research has documented the persistence of weak or flawed political institutions 
throughout Latin America (e.g. Levitsky and Murillo 2005; Scartascini and Tommasi 
2010), less research has evaluated how institutional strength or weakness might bear on 
patterns of political participation across and within national political contexts. This 
dissertation, along with a handful of other recent studies (e.g. Machado et al. 2009; 
Boulding 2010, 2014), offers an empirical evaluation of the relationship between 
institutional characteristics and the utilization of contentious modes of political behavior; 
however, one might imagine a number of different behavioral consequences of 
institutional variation, on variables including but not limited to voting, political 
clientelism, and party or union activism. Plus, variation in institutional quality probably 
influences the attitudinal consolidation of democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996), as well as 
key political attitudes like support for the political system, perceptions of crime and 
corruption, and support for extralegal or anti-democratic measures like public lynchings 
or military coups. Research examining how institutional variation influences mass level 
behaviors and attitudes is still somewhat limited in the developing world (see Anderson 
and Singer 2008), especially taking into account the vast differences in institutional 
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quality observed in a region like Latin America, and thus represents a fruitful avenue for 
deepening our understanding of democratic politics in Latin America. 
 Another important contribution of this research is that it further underlines the 
importance of subnational approaches to understanding political phenomena, particularly 
in the developing world. By conducting a provincial level analysis of contentious politics 
in Argentina, a country characterized by stark subnational variation in terms of economic 
and political development, I marshal additional evidence for my general argument 
regarding the connection between institutional characteristics and protest participation. 
Indeed, Argentine provinces provided a more expansive universe in terms of the temporal 
coverage of the data and the magnitude of the variation on key institutional 
characteristics, which resulted in distinct findings from the cross-national analysis. 
Within countries, democracy can take hold at a different pace, and what we think we 
might know about a given country’s politics and development prospects might not apply 
at all to certain territories within its national boundaries. The differences that I 
encountered between cities and provinces when living and conducting fieldwork in 
Argentina made this fact more clear than ever.  
 On that note, I also want to reiterate how important it was for this particular 
dissertation project that in testing my theory, I was able to obtain different types of data 
from distinct sources, at multiple levels of analysis. Organizations like LAPOP provide 
an invaluable resource to students of political behavior, and we are fortunate to have 
unprecedented access to rich mass level data that until recently, only existed for the 
United States and Europe. However, while to some extent multi-national survey data 
served as the empirical backbone of this dissertation project, I believe my dissertation 
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benefited greatly from the subnational component. By testing my theoretical approach on 
two distinct sources of event counts data from Argentina and uncovering results that 
corroborated what I had found at the national level, this project provides a much more 
convincing test of my argument than would have been possible with only survey data. 
Moreover, by living in Argentina for a year and conducting interviews in three diverse 
provinces and the capital city, I gained an on-the-ground understanding of the country’s 
politics that contextualized what I was observing in the data.  
 
Potential Extensions of this Project 
  
As much as I would like to say that this dissertation offers the definitive statement 
on democratic political institutions and protest in Latin America, it does suffer from 
numerous shortcomings that could be improved upon in future studies. Leaving aside 
obvious limitations that could only be solved with additional research funding or data that 
do not currently exist—e.g., conducting another national case study to compare with 
Argentina or obtaining additional survey level data for a time-series analysis of protest 
across countries—here I consider several potential extensions of this project that might 
help ameliorate some its most notable flaws in future studies.  
One important next step for this project would be to evaluate the consequences of 
normalized protest for political representation and democratic politics in Latin America—
a topic that this dissertation does little to address. How do governments respond to 
protests in contexts like Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina, versus countries where contentious 
participation is less common? How effective are protestors in pursuing their political 
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goals through street-based, extra-institutional activities compared to formal modes of 
participation? On one hand, there are numerous examples of protests really working in 
many Latin American contexts, which inevitably explains to some extent why individuals 
and groups continue to view contentious activities as viable problem-solving strategies. 
On the other hand, policymakers might suffer from protest fatigue in a “Boy who Cried 
Wolf” scenario, where contentious actions lose their power through overuse. Normalized 
protest might result in governments responding only enough to quell the masses, without 
having to provide long-term solutions to real problems. Unlike representation through 
elections and political parties, protests require no guaranteed feedback between 
individuals and representatives—if a particular issue fades once it has been resolved in 
the short-term, policymakers are not obligated to follow through on whatever promises 
they made to make that issue go away. 
An interesting way of studying the effectiveness of protest participation might be 
threefold. First, one could track specific claims over time and evaluate how those protest-
motivating issues were eventually resolved. In doing so, one could estimate how 
frequently protestors are successful in a particular context in accomplishing their goals, 
and uncover information regarding the conditions under which protests succeed or fail.60 
Second, one might utilize survey data to explore how efficacious and well-represented 
protestors feel compared to participants in other more formal political activities, while 
accounting for obvious problems related to endogeneity. Finally, one might explore how 
the policy preferences of protestors correspond to actual policy output, compared to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 To my knowledge, the only studies to this point that have addressed the policy consequences of 
protest have been Tenorio’s (2014) piece on social policy responses to mass protests and 
Franklin’s (2009) article on how Latin American governments respond differently to distinct 
repertoires of contention.  
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preferences of non-protestors—a strategy that has been used in the American context to 
examine if voters are better represented than non-voters (Griffin and Newman 2005).  
Debating whether heightened levels of protest are “good” or “bad” for democracy 
is perhaps an even thornier enterprise. The fact that protestors across Latin America are 
now able to take to the streets and make claims on governments is undoubtedly an 
important sign of progress for a region where only thirty years ago, those same 
individuals would have been imprisoned or worse. Moreover, widespread protests are 
indicative of a swelling number of citizens who are engaged in politics and want to have 
their voices heard, which is a positive sign in an era when scholars bemoan declining 
turnout rates and widespread apathy with regard to politics. At the same time, protests are 
by definition aggressive, can frequently descend into outright political violence, and often 
carry with them consequences for the local and national economy. Regardless of whether 
it is the protestors or law enforcement officers who are the chief perpetrators, the fact 
remains that protests are frequently (but not always) dangerous in Latin America, raising 
serious concerns regarding public safety. As mentioned above, protest also remains a 
relatively blunt instrument for obtaining desirable outcomes in terms of representation—
even when demonstrations are successful in the short term, they often provoke only 
piecemeal concessions from a government seeking to avoid a public relations nightmare, 
rather than meaningful long-term changes in how public officials respond to the popular 
will.  
Another potential avenue of research would be to evaluate the representativeness 
of protestors vis-à-vis partakers of other forms of political participation. Scholars have 
long expressed concern that voters are not representative of the entire population, 
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particularly in countries without obligatory voting (Lijphart 1997), as voters often consist 
of a biased cross-section of citizens in terms of class, racial, and ethnic characteristics. 
Moreover, research from the U.S. context has found that costlier forms of participation 
like local community and political party activism exacerbate participation biases, as 
wealthier, whiter, and more educated citizens exert far more influence via civic 
voluntarism (Verba et al. 1995). While in the Argentine case, it does seem that protest has 
“normalized” across several important demographic variables, there are other ways in 
which augmented influence for the people who take to the streets might distort policy 
outcomes in undesirable ways.  
As argued throughout this dissertation, protestors need organization to effectively 
mobilize. Thus, individuals with access to these crucial organizational resources are 
likely to exert more influence on policymakers than less connected citizens. In a case like 
the 2008 agricultural uprising in Argentina, where farmers throughout the country 
quickly organized to block major highways and cease production until the government 
abandoned its proposed export tax increase, a small sliver of the Argentine population 
was able to achieve a very influential political victory through sheer organizational 
strength and dexterity. As opposed to elections, where a large percentage of the 
population has the opportunity to weigh in and provide a more representative depiction of 
public opinion, protests tend to serve to promote the particularistic interests of an 
organized few, except in rare instances where massive numbers mobilize to communicate 
more general claims. In Dahl’s terms, this offers a classic case of the intensity of 
preferences winning the day over the majority of preferences (Dahl 1956). While perhaps 
in some ways deserving of their heightened influence due to their efforts, educated, 
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politically interested, and socially connected citizens might not speak on behalf of their 
less contentious (and less politically-savvy) counterparts, who by abstaining from 
protests miss out on an important opportunity to influence public policy. 
Finally, perhaps the gravest omission from this dissertation is that I largely 
neglect variation in protest “type” as an important dependent variable. Not all repertoires 
are created equal—peaceful street demonstrations are different from roadblocks, which 
are in turn distinct from organized lootings of grocery stores. It is possible that 
institutional characteristics encourage certain types of contention, but not others. 
However, in this dissertation my argument is that the same institutional characteristics 
that increase the number of roadblocks in a particular province also increase rates of 
participation in street marches and demonstrations. Future work might divide repertoires 
by type, analyzing whether or not institutional deficiencies exert the same type of 
influence peaceful demonstrations as they do on more confrontational, violent tactics. My 
expectation is that while protests might be less common in more illiberal contexts, the 
protests that arise in those settings have a higher probability of becoming violent—e.g., 
the case of the “multisectorial” in San Luis in 2004-2005.  
Moreover, the characteristics of protestors themselves and the typical response 
from law enforcement to contentious behaviors would seem highly consequential in 
explaining patterns of contention in a particular context. For example, in a country with 
weak institutions like Argentina, protest appears to be relatively normal across 
demographic and socioeconomic groups. Because public manifestations are so common, 
and protestors are composed of such a large, diverse cross-section of the total population, 
demonstrations are most often peaceful and non-confrontational (with obvious exceptions 
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like the 2001-2002 riots). However, in a country like Chile, where protest is far less 
common and utilized by a less representative subsection of the population (usually, 
younger and more leftist), we find that tactics are more aggressive and are often met by 
police with tear gas and nightsticks. I leave these dynamics relatively unexplored in my 
dissertation, but future studies would do well to take the next step and explore these 
intriguing puzzles.  
 This dissertation project has contributed to our understanding of why people 
protest at different rates across Latin America, and how characteristics of national and 
provincial political institutions interact with individual level factors to explain why 
individual citizens adopt contentious tactics in their quest to make democracy work for 
them. It has also shed light on a particularly contentious case in Argentina, a country 
where protest continues to shape democratic politics on an everyday basis, and how 
uneven democratization at the subnational level can influence patterns of political 
participation within a single country. In so doing, this dissertation connects the two 
dominant strains of comparative research—institutions and behavior—to offer a 
comprehensive examination of one of the most important sociopolitical phenomena in 
Latin America today.  
However, despite this dissertation’s contributions, it only serves to highlight how 
much work is left to be done on the topic of contentious politics in the twenty-first 
century. Democracy is changing, as increasingly engaged citizens grow impatient with 
the unresponsive nature of many formal institutions and utilize an expanding array of 
organization tools to mobilize contentious repertoires of participation in making their 
voices heard. Only by expanding upon this dissertation to include other cases and 
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repertoires of contention, and further delve into the consequences of normalized protest, 
will we begin to fully grasp how contentious behaviors are revolutionizing democratic 
politics in Latin America and beyond.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. World Bank Governance Indicator Scores, 2007-2011 
 Voice and 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Rule of Law Institutions 
Index 
Chile 1.03 1.19 1.28 1.17 
Uruguay 1.07 0.56 0.65 0.76 
Costa Rica 0.97 0.29 0.44 0.57 
Panama 0.56 0.13 -0.14 0.18 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.52 0.31 -0.52 0.10 
Jamaica 0.51 0.23 -0.45 0.10 
Brazil 0.5 -0.03 -0.21 0.09 
Belize 0.65 -0.44 -0.33 -0.04 
Suriname 0.37 -0.08 -0.48 -0.06 
Guyana 0.08 -0.09 -0.22 -0.08 
Mexico 0.1 0.22 -0.61 -0.10 
Argentina 0.35 -0.18 -0.61 -0.15 
Colombia -0.18 0.06 -0.38 -0.17 
El Salvador 0.07 -0.11 -0.74 -0.26 
Peru 0.04 -0.35 -0.69 -0.33 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.08 -0.58 -0.69 -0.40 
Bolivia -0.03 -0.51 -1 -0.51 
Honduras -0.44 -0.6 -0.92 -0.65 
Paraguay -0.15 -0.86 -0.95 -0.65 
Guatemala -0.29 -0.64 -1.1 -0.68 
Ecuador -0.26 -0.74 -1.14 -0.71 
Nicaragua -0.43 -0.92 -0.79 -0.71 
Venezuela -0.84 -1 -1.58 -1.14 
Haiti -0.68 -1.49 -1.37 -1.18 
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Table A2. Question Wording and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Question Wording or 
explanation 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Dependent variable      
Protest “In the last 12 months, have 
you participated in a 
demonstration or protest 
march?” Yes (1); No (0). 
105,600 .103 .304 0 1 
Independent Variables 
Community 
Engagement 
“Now, changing the 
subject.  
In the last 12 months have 
you tried to help to solve a 
problem in your 
community or in your 
neighborhood? Please, tell 
me if you did it at least 
once a week, once or twice 
a month, once or twice a 
year or never in the last 12 
months.” This was 
repeated for religious 
organization, parents’ 
association, community 
improvement organization, 
an association of 
professionals, or a political 
party. 4-point scale; higher 
values = more 
participation. 
 
Answers to these questions 
were then converted into 
an index. 
116,526 19.628 16.661 0 100 
External 
Efficacy 
 “Those who govern this 
country are interested in 
what people like you think. 
How much do you agree or 
disagree with this 
statement?”  100-point 
scale; higher values = more 
efficacy. 
111,596 39.365 32.099 0 100 
System 
Support 
Index 
“I am going to ask you a 
series of questions. I am 
going to ask that you use 
the numbers provided in 
the ladder to answer.  
1. To what extent do you 
think the courts in 
113,147 52.234 22.548 0 100 
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(country) guarantee a fair 
trial? 
2. To what extent do you 
respect the political 
institutions of (country)? 
3. To what extent do you 
think that citizens’ basic 
rights are well protected by 
the political system of 
(country)? 
4. To what extent do you 
feel proud of living under 
the political system of 
(country)? 
5. To what extent do you 
think that one should 
support the political system 
of (country)?”  
7-point scale; higher values 
= more positive evaluation 
of institutions.  
 
Answers to these questions 
were then converted into 
an index.  
Personal 
Economic 
Situation 
“How would you describe 
your overall economic 
situation? Would you say 
that it is very good, good, 
neither good nor bad, bad 
or very bad?” 
100-point scale; higher 
values = good.  
115949 49.441 20.987 0 100 
National 
Economic 
Situation 
“How would you describe 
the country’s economic 
situation? Would you say 
that it is very good, good, 
neither good nor bad, bad 
or very bad?” 
100-point scale; higher 
values = good. 
115,512 42.121 23.367 0 100 
Satisfaction 
with Public 
Services 
“And thinking about this 
city/area where you live, 
are you very satisfied, 
satisfied, dissatisfied, or 
very dissatisfied with the 
condition of the streets, 
roads, and highways?” 
Repeated for public health 
services and schools. 
100-point scale; higher 
34,685 50.194 19.471 0 100 
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values = more satisfied.   
Interest in 
Politics 
How much interest do you 
have in politics: a lot, 
some, little or none? 
100-point scale; higher 
values = more interest.  
115,418 35.277 .772 0 100 
Shared 
Information 
Via Social 
Network 
And in the last twelve 
months, have you read or 
shared political 
information through any 
social network website 
such as Twitter or 
Facebook or Orkut? 
Coded as 1 if “yes”, 0 if 
“no.” 
 
38,126 .111 .327 0 1 
Perception of 
Corruption 
Taking into account your 
own experience or what 
you have heard, corruption 
among public officials is 
very common, common, 
uncommon or very 
uncommon? 100-point 
scale; higher values = 
higher perception of 
corruption.  
109,775 72.385 28.472 0 100 
Age Respondents’ age in years.  116,042 39.193 15.803 16 99 
Wealth 
Quintile 
A weighted index that 
measures wealth based on 
the possession of certain 
household goods such as 
televisions, refrigerators, 
conventional and cellular 
telephones, vehicles, 
washing machines, 
microwave ovens, indoor 
plumbing, indoor 
bathrooms and computers.  
116,275 2.933 1.422 1 5 
Interpersonal 
trust 
And speaking of the people 
from around here, would 
you say that people in this 
community are very 
trustworthy, somewhat 
trustworthy, not very 
trustworthy or 
untrustworthy...?   
100 point scale; higher 
values = more trustworthy. 
114, 039 58.244 30.029 0 100 
Presidential 
approval 
Speaking in general of the 
current administration, how 
would you rate the job 
113,353 54.952 24.653 0 100 
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performance of President 
[NAME]? 
100 point scale; higher 
values = more favorable.  
Education Level of formal education. 
4-point scale; 0=None, 
1=Primary, 2=Secondary, 
3=Superior 
116,656 1.817 0.772 0 3 
Female 1 if female, 0 if male. 116,655 0.501 0.500 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  188	  
Table A3. Community Engagement and Protest: Instrumental Variables Regression 
VARIABLES Model 1 
IVReg 
(2SLS) 
 Second stage  
(DV: Protest) 
Community Participation .0007*** 
(.0001) 
Female  -.024*** 
(.002) 
Age -.0004*** 
(.00006) 
Interest in Politics .001*** 
(.00003) 
Education .027*** 
(.001) 
Wealth -.0002 
(.0007) 
Internal efficacy -.00007** 
(.00003) 
Constant .030*** 
(.005) 
 First stage  
(DV: Community Participation) 
 
Church Attendance  .200*** 
(.001) 
Female  .423*** 
(.003) 
Age .013*** 
(.003) 
Interest in Politics .072*** 
(.002) 
Education -.027 
(.072) 
Wealth .015 
(.037) 
Internal efficacy 018*** 
(.002) 
Constant 5.374*** 
(.001) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-
statistic                    
19557.97 
Number of Observations 96,546 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Two-tailed tests
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Church attendance was chosen as the instrument—a variable that strongly correlates with 
community participation, but is unassociated with protest participation. Indeed, the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic indicates that this is a very strong instrument. The 
assumption I then make in the analysis above is that church attendance does not influence 
protest participation through any pathway other than community engagement. The results 
for community engagement remain strong, and comparable to those presented in the body 
of the paper.   
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